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Abstract
This thesis examines how the US Air Force responded to the first combat firing of
the SA-2 surface-to-air missile over North Vietnam in 1965. That response included the
deployment of aircraft specifically designed to jam radars, the production ofjamming pods
for tactical fighters, borrowing the US Na-ry's anti-radiation missile, and the introduction of,
the unique Wild Weasel aircraft. Together, these technologies represented a nascent form
of tactical electronic combat that helped the Air Force to regain control of the air over
North Vietnam. Four questions are asked in this study: (l)How might a system initially
react to a new opposing technology on the battlefield? (2)What might make a system
choose one set of responses to that technology and not others? (3) How might a system
change as these technological responses are incorporated within it? (4) In what ways might
the story of technological change within a system be instructive if it includes the
perspectives and actions of the operators - a "bottom up" approach -- and not just those of
the high-level decision-makers?
This study reaches two general conclusions. First, integrating a new technology into
a military system is a very complex task. Many factors, including national culture and
military doctrine, influence a system's flexibility, that is, the ability of a military system to
react to change. Thus, two similarly structured systems may well have different degrees of
flexibility. The process of integration and possible considerations pertaining to how well a
system might react to a changing environment are shown by a detailed look at tactical
combat between the US Air Force and the North Vietnamese air defenses in 1%5.
Second, probably the most important'step ot: integration ,is ensuring that the technology can
be,used to its full potential. This is accomplished through adaptation. The operators adapt
the technology to the needs of the system through proper training efforts while the system
is made to adapt to the technology through development of doctrine. This study reveals the
complexity of adaptation through a "bottom-up" look at the Wild Weasel I test program.
1
\ ....--
Preface
War is not what it used to be, or so it seems. A new kind ofwarfare with advanced
technology like "black boxes" and "smart" bombs has taken on an increasingly impersonal
atu'a in popu1ar American culture. In the opening months of 1991, televisions across
America were painted with cross-hairs and black-and-white images. A nation watched as
video bombs silently neared their targets. No explosions were heard when the weapons
detonated. Instead, the screen went blank or a cloud of smoke billowed from a single
gaping hole.
The television and print media, beguiled by these sterile images, attached labels like
"Nintendo War" to the kind of warfare carried out by modern combat aircraft. These
images and labels obscured the fact that the advent of black boxes and other "high-tech"
equipment had not yet changed the human realities of warfare. The confusion and horror
inherent in war have remained despite these leaps in technology and the growth of
integrated combat systems. The shiny new gadgets, however, seemed to attract the most
attention.
Despite all the intelVening technology including radars, computers, electronics and
CRT displays, combat remains a struggle between people. The aviators, radar operators or
weapons controllers who fight the ubiquitous electronic video wars face a very personal
war unique to the technology that surrounds them. To the outside obsetver it appears as a
clean, sterile war capable of making awesome strikes with surgical precision and little mess
to clean up afterWards, but this image is deceiving. Calling attention to this electronic war
is in no way meant to detract from the living hell typically faced by combatants on the
ground, an environment vividly portrayed by many authors over the years, including John
Keegan and E.B. Sledge. >I< Whether in the air, at sea, or on the ground, humans continue to
remain on both the sending and receiving end ofmodem technology.
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The following essay shows the wielders of this relatively recent electronic combat
technology to be in two locations. One was a crowded radar control van and the other a
cramped cockpit of an aircraft. It is in both these places where, in July of 1965, our story
begins.
* John Keegan, The Face ofBattle New York: Penguin Books, 1978.
E.B. Sledge, With The Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa. New Yark: Oxford University
Press, 1990.
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Introduction
This paper examines the process by which the United States Air Force (USAF)
responded to the first combat firing of a North Vietnamese surface-to-air-missile in July of
1965.(1) Two related and recent scholarly studies have painted a far more comprehensive
picture of political and doctrinal aspects of the use of airpower in Vietnam than this study
could ever hope to accomplish.(2) Therefore, what follows remains strictly within the
realm of Air Force tactical operations over North Vietnam during a bombing campaign
more commonly known as "Rolling Thooder" that began in early 1965 and continued into
1968. This study focuses primarily on the time period between July and December, 1965
when a relatively new air defense technology, a swface-to-air missile known as the SA-2,
caused a collective shudder within the ranks ofthe US Air Force.
The Air Force reaction to this weapon was not solely the introduction of a new
technology or set of technologies designed to neutralize the missile threat. Rather, it
entailed an advanced fonn of tactical air warfare characterized by a dependence upon
electronic combat. In other words, the battle of the skies over North Vietnam. included
duels with radar pulses and other electromagnetic transmissions as well as the more familiar
engagements between opposing aircraft or between aircraft and aerial defenses. Although
initially comprised of rather desperate actions, the United States Air Force's response to
this SA-2 came to include the deployment of aircraft specially configured to jam, or
disrup~ North Vietnamese radars, the production ofjamming pods for tactical fighters, and
the borrowing of the US Navy's anti-radiation missile. In addition, the Air Force retrofitted
a small number of fighter aircraft to hoot down the elusive North Vietnamese surface-to-air
missile units. These aircraft came to be known as "Wild Weasels," and the name most
certainly matched the dangerous nature of the mission. Each of these new technologies
required the simultaneous development of new tactics with which to employ them.
Together, these technologies and tactics formed a nascent version of the tactical electronic
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combat espoused by current United States Air Force doctrine.(3) Understanding the
d}narnics of~this situation requires a closer examination of military systems and a look at
the nature of technological change within them.
Although much of the popular and historical focus on military technology has been
on individual weapons, the relationships between new technologies and the larger combat
systems within which they must perform has not been widely studied. A number of
historians have written about the relationship between technology and war.(4) Martin Van
Creveld, in his sweeping four-thousand year survey of technology and warfare wrote that
modem military forces integrate many different weapons technologies into a large system
mainly because of cost High costs precluded retiring older systems when their successors
came on line. Integration, then, involved findiIlg the right "mixture" of old and new,
superior and inferior, to create the "greatest combat power," or the biggest bang for the
available buck.(5)
Integration also brought with it a paradox with respect to a weapon's success. Van
Creveld asserts that, "there were some indications that the inexorable drive towards
integration was not only symptomatic of the declining effectiveness of each individual
element but was, at the same time, acting as its cause." (6) In other words, a weapon's
effectiveness was directly related to its degree of independence from such a system. Ever-
increasing degrees of integration beyond a certain threshold seemed made that system more
and more rigid, ultimately suffocating the individual weapons within it. However, an
individual weapon, if it was not mired in the greater military system, could dominate the
enemy in a particular place and time. Therefore, the most effective weapon would have
the correspondingly greatest degree of autonomy, for it would be the least affected by
integration's pernicious influence. Van Creveld's thesis is important because of its powerful
suggestions concerning the ramifications of technological change. However, an important
term in his thesis, integration, lacks the clarity necessary for a general application to military
systems.
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Integration is the foundation upon which a ritilitary system rests. Military weapons,
whether they have mechanical linkages, vacuum tubes, or solid state electronics, require
integration into larger systems partly because of cost, but also because modern war
necessitates this high degree of integration. Although advances in technology might induce
an "inexorable" drive toward a system's integration, neither a new technology nor
integration itself necessarily determines the degree of the system's flexibility. Rather,
flexibility is defined more by the nature of the system and less by the degree of integration.
A system's nature, shaped primarily by social and cultural forces, is the force that
determines the ability of a system to adapt to its changing environment. Regardless of the
Il;ature of a particular combat system,- the relationship between an element - a weapon, for
example --and its system tends to be mutually beneficial, not mutually degrading.(7)
At the heart of the relationship between the weapon and its system lies the people --
the operators or users - who employ the weapon in battle. (8) Opposing operators in aerial
combat rarely, if ever, see each other face to face but each is often exposed to imminent
danger and their respective skills with their modern weapons usually determine the battle's
outcome. An operator's survival in this kind of combat depends upon how well he knows
his own equipment and tactics, as well those of his adversatY. There are plenty ofhistorical
examples that show how technological ignorance has resulted in poor training, inadequate
combat tactics, or a disastrous combination of the two.(9)
The following essay attempts to accomplish two broad objectives: one, expand
upon Van Creveld's ideas and two, aid historians' efforts in assessing technological change
in militaIy systems by detailing specific examples of integration. The systems I will use to
illustrate these concepts are the North Vietnamese air defense system and the US Air Force
tactical combat system that evolved in response to the guided surface-to-air missile.
Specifically, four basic questions are asked. How might a system initially react to a new
opposing technology on the battlefield? What might make a system choose one set of
responses to that technology and not others? How might a system change as these
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technological responses are incorporated \Vithin it? Last and most important, in what ways
might the story of technological change within a system be instructive if includes the
perspectives and actions of the operators rather than solely the high-level decision-makers?
Possible answers to these questions are revealed by studying the impact of the SA-2 on the
American tactical air forces and in particular by a detailed study of an Air Force program
called Wild Weasel I. Hopefully, some light will be shed not only on how a new weapon
becomes a part of a large system but also how weapons are used by their operators in war.
It seems that the tools of war are continually changing, but the successful prosecution of
battle remains, as always, with its human participants.
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Chapter One
24 Jutv. 1965: A Fateful Mission
On 24 July, 1965, a Soviet-built surface-to-air missile exploded at approximately
23,000 feet altitude, northwest ofHano~ amid a flight of four USAF F-4C Phantom
fighter aircraft. (1) One F-4C was destroyed and the other three were damaged as a result
of the blast. Code-named the SA-2 Guideline by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and known to the Soviets as the S-75, this missile had only recently anived in
North Vietnam. The first of these Soviet-built missiles anived earlier that spring
accompanied by advisors from the Soviet Anny. The decision-makers responsible for
conducting tactical air combat operations over North Vietnam were not prepared to
counter this weapon.(2) Until these decision-makers, the Pacific Air Forces (pACAF),
could integrate into their air combat system a teclmology or teclmologies (and applicable
tactics) capable of neutralizing this new threat posed to their aircraft, PACAF could not
hope to reclaim the sky over North Vietnam.(3)
The Cold War had accelerated the development of the first operational guided anti-
aircraft missile systems in both the United States and Soviet Union. In the 1950's the
American government, for example, contracted with Bell Laboratories to produce the Nike
surface-ta-air missile system to defend the North American continent from Soviet
bombers.(4) The existence of Soviet air defense missiles was known to US Air Force
leaders since the early 1950's, after the first radar-guided missile site was built near
Moscow in response to the threat posed by long-range strategic bombers.(5) NATO
intelligence organizations named this first missile system the SA-1.(6) A few years later, a
second unique missile system, the SA-2, appeared in a 1957 May Day parade in Moscow.
With each passing year more SA-2 sites were established near trutior Soviet cities and other
potential strategic targets even in Soviet satellite countries such as Cuba. The SA-2 was
exported by the Soviet Union to North Vietnam early in 1965 soon after the Johnson
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Administration initiated the "Rol1ing Thunder" aerial bombardment campaign. The
imported SA-2 missile systems and their attendant crews quickly became integrated into the
blossoming North Vietnamese air defense system.
The 1965 shooting was the first time a surface-to-air missile had brought down an
aircraft during a major combat operation, but it was not the first time this weapon was fired
in anger. In May 1960, Francis Gary Powers' U-2 reconnaissance aircraft -- and an
unlucky Soviet fighter-- fell victim to SA-2s over the Soviet Union.(7) Approximately
fourteen missiles were fired that day. Twelve of the missiles never hit anything, the
thirteenth hit the Soviet pilot and the fourteenth got Powers.(8) Less than a year earlier, a
Communist Chinese SA-2 had downed a Taiwanese RB-57D.(9) These were the first of
similar incidents that followed in both Cuba and China where reconnaissance, or "spy"
planes were bro~t down by this weapon. Even though surface-to-air missiles systems on
both sides had been operational for about a decade, it wasn't until after July 1965 that Air
Foree tactical operations would be significantly transformed.
Leopard Zero-Four was the radio call-sign of the particular Phantom hit by the first
SA-2. Leopard flight consisted offour F-4C's. Each aircraft carried two airmen, a pilot and
a systems officer.(lO) After takeoff from Ubon Air Base in Thailand and subsequent aerial
refueling with KC-135 tankers, Leopard flighfs leader herded his aircraft into a fingertip
formation. Poor visibility necessitated this foonation in which the aircraft were positioned
like the four fingertips of one's hand. As little as thirty-six inches separated the wingtips of
any two of Leopard's aircraft. (11)
Leopard flight, and a sister formation called Panther flight, totaled eight F-4C's
whose task it was to patrol for North Vietnamese jet fighters. Known as MIG Combat Air
Patro~ -or MIGCAP, this mission provided protection from MIG's (North Vietnamese
fighter aircraft) for a much larger force ofF-lOS Thunderchiefs that was striking an
explosives plant approximately fifty-five miles northwest of Hanoi. There had been little
North Vietnamese MIG activity since Rolling Thunder began in February 1965, and today
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appeared to be no different than most of the others. The atmosphere was one of "tense
calm" when suddenly the radios carne to life.(12)
The radio call "bluebells ringing, bluebells ringing, " echoed through the ears of all
the attacking ainnen, including Leopard O4's pilot, forty-year-old Captain Richard P. Keirn.
Keirn, a veteran of World War II, had spent ten months as a prisoner of war after his B-17
was downed by Getman anti-aircraft fire in the late fall of 1944.(13) The "bluebells" radio
message warned of a weapon which Keirn had not seen over wartime Germany. It meant
that there were radar transmissions detected from an SA-2 surface-to-air missile site.(14) It
did not mean that a missile had been launched, rather this warning indicated that the
primary radar, known as a Fan Song, with which SA-2 missile crews used to continuously
track potential targets was in operation. The Phantoms' crews had been warned of SA-2
sites under construction near Hanoi, and had planned their flight path to circumvent the
suspected positions.(IS)
The North Vietnamese SA-2s, staffed with Soviet technicians, were forbidden
targets for US Air Force and US Navy air strikes. President Johnson and his closest
advisors, worried about killing the Soviet technicians, felt that by not bombing the missile
sites he would send the proper "signal" to the North Vie1namese, inducing the latter into
not using the missiles against American aircraft. Bombing the sites would, in this view,
escalate this war as well as court the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention in
Vietnam. (16)
Unfortunately, Leopard flight did not know that on the outskirts of Hanoi a fire
control battery of an SA-2 battalion commanded by Soviet Anny Major F.llyinykh tracked
Leopard's Phantoms across the North Vietnamese sky.(17) The battery commander and all
the rest of the site personnel were also in the Soviet Anny, who perfonned their duties
under the watchful eyes of North Vietname~e trainees. The battery commander had already
detennined where to search for the American aircraft after his battalion headquarters
provided the approximate location, course, and speed of the Phantoms. After ordering his ."
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crew to transmit with. the SA-2's Fan Song radar, he probably very quickly found the flight
of American aircraft and tracked their progress on his radar scopes.(18)
As soon as the Fan Song was in operation, or shortly thereafter, its signals were
picked up by the sensitive radar receivers of EB-66Cs, aircraft specially configured to
monitor radars and other electromagnetic transmissions. EB-66C's and other specially
modified aircraft often patrolled the periphery of the Soviet Union and China, listening for
and locating radar sites, always on the watch for new and WlUSua! signals which indicated
new radar developments. These electronic intelligence, or ELINT, missions were often
classified at the highest level and usually approved directly by the President,(19) The EB-
66C's, orbiting at about 25,000 feet altitude somewhere near the strike force but safely
beyond the range of North Vietnamese ground-based weapons had the task warning the
strike aircraft of any imminent danger posed by North Vietnamese radars, particularly
those radars which directed anti-aircraft artillery. The Fan Song was added to their "to do"
list after 24 July, 1965. The Fan Song's radar pulses were translated into audible,
rattlesnake-like tones by the EB-66's electronics. These transformed pulses reverberated
inside the headsets of the aircraft's four electronic warfare officers.(20)
These officers, skilled in analyzing and identifYing radar signals, were products of
many long months of highly classified training.(21) The new signals associated with the
SA-2 had been obsetVed by an EB-66C crew only the day before Leopard flight took off
on this mission The distinct sounds of the Fan Song radar had been correlated with unique
cathode-ray tube (CRT) displays on the electronic warfare officers' equipment, indicating
to them that these SA-2 sites near Hanoi were indeed occupied, operational, and probably
tracking the US aircraft. The question as to whether or not Hanoi had received the proper
political "signal" associated with the avoidance of SA-2 sites was about to be answered.
A second call of "bluebells ringing" came about five minutes after the first By
now, a second SA-2 fire control battery was tracking Leopard flight. This time, however,
the Phantom') had closed to within the range of the Guideline missiles, and the order came
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down from the Hanoi control center to fire upon the American jets. At about the same time
the EB-66C crew probably heard the radar's pitch in their headsets jwnp an octave higher.
The Fan Songs had changed their operating modes, sending out pulses even faster to
obtain more accurate tracking information. Each SA-2 fire control battery was now ready
to guide its missiles skyward.
With a huge cloud of smoke and dust, the first Guideline missile roared offits
launch rails. Two more Guidelines followed the first toward the Phantoms, at least one of
these from the other SA-2 site. The Guideline, according to Colonel Jack Broughton,
Deputy Commander of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-I05's) in 1966, created "a
good-sized dust storm on the ground, so ifyou just happen to be looking in the right
direction when it blasts oft: you know that Sam (sic) is airborne and on the prowl."(22)
These are appropriate words when applied to the surface-to-air missile, for it was what
amounted to an electronic hunter in search of airborne prey. Its laWlch obscured by the
intervening cloud layers, the missile swiftly closed the distance to the unsuspecting
Phantom aircraft.
Within six seconds after launch the lead missile's UHF antenna received the radio
steering commands transmitted from its fire control battery. The Guideline is a cornmand-
guided missile, which meant that the operators on the ground tracked the both the missile
and the intended target on radar. A computer predicted the point in the air where the
missile would intercept the aircraft based on the aircraft's current heading, speed and
altitude. Designed for a high success rate against bombers and other slow-maneuvering
aircraft, the SA-2 system usually required a high degree of operator skill to engage fighters,
for there was an appreciable delay between the time a need for a directional change was
recognized and when the missile responded to the new flight path.(23) The non-
maneuvering F-4C's of Leopard flight, however, presented easy targets.
The SA-2 was "soldier proof," durable in nature with large knobs and switches. It
required little training in the basics of operation when compared to similar Western
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only the battery commander could make the decisions for the crew based on the battalion's
orders. Despite the simple mechanisms of their system, the North Vietnamese SA-2 crews
became notorious for their combat savvy as the war progressed. In 1965, however, the SA-
2 was a relatively new weapon in Southeast Asia and both sides had much to learn about
how it was to be used effectively in combat
Tracking the F-4C's on the cathode ray screen in the cramped control van, the
missile's ground operator transmitted corrections to the Guideline's course based on the
continuously-updated predictions of the F-4C's flight path. Soon after launch the first-
stage solid-fuel booster expended its energy, detached itself from the Guideline, and fell
back to earth. The huge, thirty-five foot missile was probably flying at about mach two,
that is, twice the speed of sound or about 1400 miles per hour, by the time it reached ten-
thousand feet altitude. By twenty-thousand feet the SA-2's internal rocke~ using liquid
fuel, propelled the missile to almost two-and-one-half times the speed of sound when it
shot out of a cloud less than a thousand feet or so below the Leopard flight. The missile
continued to accelerate as it zoomed upward toward the :fingertip fonnation of fighters, a
distance covered in about a second or two.
Leopard 02 recalled what appeared to be a "flying telephone pole" suddenly
streaking upwards from the clouds towards the right side ofhis formation. The F-4's
began violent maneuvers away from the missile's path, but this was all too late to do
Leopard -04 any good. "Before I could press the mike button (for the radio)," recalled
Leopard 02's pilo~ "it had detonated under the formation. "(24) The missile's proximity
fuse, sensing that it was as close to Keirn's aircraft as it could ever logically be, triggered
iii
the detonation of about three-hundred pounds of high explosive. Hundreds of metal
shards were shotgunned from the missile's nose in a conical pattern. The fiery blast
engulfed the doomed Phantom, while the metal fragments ripped apart the aircraft's
fuselage and control surfaces. Leopard 04s back-seater Captain Roscoe Fobair, was
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probably killed outright. Keirn, relatively unscathed but fighting high G-forces induced by
the now-tumbling aircraft, recalled witnessing "fire coming arOlUld my head." Pulling his
ejection handle, both he and his dead partner were catapulted through the air in their
rocket-fired seats. Keirn again became a prisoner ofwar, this time for almost eight years.
The two other SA-2s exploded hannlessly below and behind the rest of Leopard flight, but
the remaining three aircraft had already been hit by shrapnel from the first missile. The US
Air Force had been rudely introduced to the latest technology in the North Vietnamese air
defense system.
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Chapter Two
Integration: A Discussion
"
Every so-called black box, space-age satellite or cruise missile is part of agreater
military system. A military system like that of the North Vietnamese in 1965 includes not
just technological hardware but the individuals and organizations that use it in battle.
Scholars have shown various interpretations of the word "system" over the years.(l) Most
of them, however, would probably agree with what one might find in one of Webster's
dictionaries, where a system is "a complex unity fonned of many diverse parts subject to a
common plan or serving a conunon purpose." (2) Two specific examples of such systems
that operate in the realm of air warfare are those of aerial attack and of aerial defense. Both
of these systems will be explained in more detail in subsequent chapters, but it would be
useful to first establish a framework for discussion ofmilitary systems.
This chapter provides a close look at the relationship between individual weapons
and their parent systems, as well as a clarifying the terms: element, flexibility, autonomy,
coordination and, most importantly, integration. These terms need to be defined in relation
to combat systems before this essay proceeds. The diverse parts, or basic building blocks of
systems are here referred to as elements. Flexibility and autonomy will be associated with a
system and element, respectively. Flexibility refers to the ability of a given system to
respond to changes in its environment Autonomy is the degree of freedom of action
allowed to the individual elements of a system. Coordination is the process by which all the
system's elements work toward a conunon goal. Integration, however, requires a more
detailed explanation because it is the foundation upon which a system rests.
All aspects of a system's activities are directly affected by integration. In a typical
combat system integration could include, among other things, the buying of new weapons
and their placement into particular positions within the system. In a macro-perspective this
15
could be seen in the organizational structure. Batteries of heavy artillery would sooner be
attached directly to regimental commanders than they would be to platoon commanders or
squad leaders. In a micro-perspective integration could mean not only ensuring that a radar
warning receiver's electronics were compatible with those of the fighter aircraft in which it
was to be installed but also that the receiver's cathode-ray tube (CRT) display was
positioned on the instrument panel so that the pilot could see it easily.
Integration of most elements into combat systems can be generalized in tenns of
these elements meeting three basic conditions. These conditions fall under the general
headings of mutual support, inter-system communications and successful adaptation to the
system. Although this characterization is by no means the final word on integration, it
provides a convenient framework for analyzing air combat systems. This chapter will
define these conditions and subsequently apply each to both the North Vietnamese air
defense system of 1965 and the US Air Force tactical combat system that faced it
First, the distance between each element must not be so great as to preclude their
mutual support. Guided missile batteries, for example, have finite effective ranges and
altitudes at which they can engage targets and the deployment of any two of these beyond
these ranges precludes any mutual support between them. In other words, the missile
batteries could not protect each other. An example showing the role played by physical
distance between individual elements is the Israeli success in defeating SA-6 surface-to-air
missile batteries during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.(3) By bombing politically sensitive
targets in Syria, Israel forced the Syrians to divert SA-6 batteries away from the battlefield
to protect those targets from future attacks. In order to maintain their battlefield air
defenses, the Syrians were forced to spread out their remaining SA-6's, leaving some gaps
in the air defense coverage. The Israeli Air Force then proceeded to pick apart the Syrian
missile umbrella by exploiting these gaps. Each battery was subsequently destroyed one at
a time. Mutual support is only one factor in integrating the elements of a large system.
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Second, the individual elements must also be able to commwricate with each other.
This enables concerted action by all the elements. Unes of comnnmication, whether they
be physical cables or electromagnetic waves in free space, are a key factor in maintaining
an effective, cohesive system of integrated weapons. Severed or blocked communication
lines break up the systems into smaller and usually less effective groups of elements
operating in isolation from each other. J~ as in the Syrian SA-6 example, isolation in
communications also means that a system is vulnerable to defeat in detail. That is to say an
opposing force can often easily overwhelm and defeat a system if it attacks a few isolated
elements at a time rather than taking on the entire system at once. It should come as no
surprise, then, that communications facilities are usuaJly critical targets for planners of
aerial campaigns. One of the first Iraqi targets bombed by US Air Force F-117 "stealth"
fighters in the opening minutes of Desert Storm in 1991 was a communications center
dubbed the "AT&T Building."(4) Physical distance and communications are perhaps the
most ob~ous and easily-measured aspects of an integrated system. The last condition of
integration is more difficult to assess.
The third and probably most important condition to be met is that the elements
must have been adapted by the system. The new weapon must be adapted to the larger
system while, simultaneously, the system is adapted to the particular weapon. The former is
accomplished in part through training and the latter through development of combat tactics.
Certainly, the process by which any military system procures and integrates a new weapon
is far more complex than the above definition of adaptation. However, assuming that the
new weapon was designed to meet the system's specifications and appeared to work as
advertised, training and tactics development will have the most direct bearing on integration
and ultimately, combat performance. Historical examples abound.
This need for this adaptation can been seen in the case of the French-built
mitrailleuse. An automatic weapon related to the Gatling gun, it was a~le to the
French army when they faced the Prussians in the Franco-Prossian War in 1870.
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Unfortunately, the secrecy 8WTounding the weapon was so great that few in the French
anny knew what the weapon could do, much less how it operated. For all practical
purposes, nobody had been trained in the use of the weapon. Therefore there was no hope
of integrating this weapon into the French units, let alone figuring out how to use the thing
effectively in actual combat The result was that the rnillatreuse became an ineffective,
highly vulnerable weapon. The weapons hardly fired any shots and were instead left
vulnerable to attack. They were quickly blown apart by Prussian artiI1ery.(5)
When a new technology, such as the millatreuse or any other weapon, is brought
into a system, the operators are usually responsible for making the technology "fit" into the
system. These individuals must first become familiar with this new technology before they
can properly deduce how to best use it in battle. It is important to stress that operators
learning the basics of a technology -- how to turn it on, recognize and fix problems - is an
entirely different process than their learning how to apply the technology to tactical combat
operations. Even if these operators succeed in developing new tactics for the new
~eapons, they might not have the power to make the necessary decisions that adjust the
system in response to that technology's capabilities. Historians accustomed to the
hierarchical nature of military systems usually assume that lowly operators are not so
empowered. A deeper investigation into the workings of a military system, however, might
not always support that assumption. Understanding the often complex relationships
between the technologies, the operators, and the larger system is an important step in
comprehending the process of military technological change. These internal relationships
are often affected directly by how well the system is able to respond to external forces, an
ability controlled by a system's nature.
All systems -- whether they be economic, political, biological or ones designed for
military combat -- demonstrate unique responses to their respective environments. A
system senses an environmental change through inputs from its various elements, and
subsequently initiates a process of adjustment This process is possible through proper
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·coordination. It is intuitively obvious that an uncoordinated response would be rather
detrimental to the system. Military historian S.L.A. Marshall documented many accounts
of American infantry combat in World War II where key defensive positions were lost
because of a lack ofcoordination. An infantry company, for example, ifunaware of
friendly companies positioned on its flanks, would often withdraw when an enemy force
was seen to threaten its "unprotected" tlanks.(6) The process of coordination in response
to external forces is accomplished by the people within the system. Both the individual
elements and the system itself react - or are made to react -- to their changed
surroundings. Who ultimately initiates this process of change? At what level of the
system's decision-making hierarchy rests the authority to initiate such coordinated actions?
Possible answers might be found in examining the nature of a system, for this governs the
rather complicated process through which a system responds to change.
The nature of a system falls somewhere between two opposed boundaries: order
and chaos.(7) These varying degrees of order or chaos govern the actions of elements
within a particular system. A highly ordered system exercises an extreme degree of control
from its center which greatly restricts the autonomy of the individual elements. Ifeach
element is constrained in this fashion then the system itself becomes rigid and unable to
respond quickly -- ifat all -- to a rapidly changing environment. By contrast, a system in
total chaos amounts to anarchy. Each element in this case works independently from,
often in opposition to, others in the same system. This causes a rather inefficient and wildly
unbalanced response to change. Some elements will react to a greater degree than other
elements, with some elements not reacting at all.
Having thus established a framework for studying systems, it can now be applied to
the North Vietnamese integrated air defense system and the air attack system of the US Air
Force. This framework is not intended to be all-inclusive; it cannot adequately explain
every aspect of a military sy~. What it does do is highlight two important factors, a
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system's nature and the process of adaptation, to be considered in the study of system
integration. These will be studied more closely in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Three
Integration: The North Vietnamese Air Defense System
The North Vietnamese air defenses were comprised of many different weapons
technologies, warning devices, communications equipment and associated personne1.(I)
Elements like the Guidelines were themselves small, self-contlined systems encased in
aerodynamic bodies. They were filled with Fhdio guidance equipmen~ electronic circuits,
both solid and liquid propellants, and high-explosives. All this was further embedded in a
larger system of missile laWlchers, control vans, missile crews, maintenance personne~
guidance and acquisition radars known collectively as an SA-2 battalion. Three SA-2
battalions comprised a larger entity called an SA-2 regimen~ which was but one small part
of the huge defense network. Also included in this air defense system there were command
elements, those who were empowered to make tactical decisions. Major llyinykh, the
Soviet SA-2 battalion commander on 24 July 1965, would be a specific example of a
command elemen~ but so would larger entities like a battalion command post or regimental
headquarters. There were other major categories of elements in this air defense system,
two of which are detailed below. These are categories of detection and response.
Detection refers to elements capable of providing advanced warning by either active
or passive means of an imminent air attack. Early-warning radars are examples of active
detection elements because in order to locate hostile aircraft the radars must transmit
electromagnetic energy. These radars are typically positioned near the periphery of a nation
to maximize the range at which aircraft can be detected prior to crossing that country's
sovereign territory. Detection methods need not be very sophisticated, for a lone observer
with a pair of binoculars, stationed at a remote outpost, serves a similar purpose.
Observers are representative of passive measures. Radar detection,devices, designed to give
warning of and in some cases locate distant radars, are additional examples of passive
means.(2) The inputs from each detection device provides a specific piece of infOlmation
21
to the commander of the system. After assessing these inputs the commander decides
upon a response.
Air defenses in place prior to the introduction of the surface-to-air missile, Pre-July
1965 North Vietnam included, had two basic kinds of responses at their disposal. One
form of response was anti-aircraft artillery, or AAA (pronounced "Triple-A"). Other
response elements were interceptor aircraft. Anti-aircraft artillery fired unguided shells at a
point in the sky, based on either the gunner's judgment or radar-based predictions. Almost
all of the US aircraft lost over Vietnam were due to AAA.(3) The sizes, tactical ranges and
-
rates of fire of these weapons varied.(4) The medium and heavy guns, like 57 millimeter
(mm), 85 nun and 100 mm cannon, typically used radar guidance. When a particular
aircraft or fonnation was detected by the air defense system, a fire control radar -- a radar
working directly with a gun battery to provide for accurate aiming -- searched for and
acquired the intended target. Once the fire control radar "locked on" to the aircraft, an
analog fire-control computer predicted where the target would be by the time the guns
were fired and the rounds reached the aircraft's predetennined position. There were,
however, some limitations to these radar-directed heavy guns.
There was no correcting the shell's flight path once it left the barrel. Each round
followed a ballistic path at the complete mercy of gravity and winds aloft. Despite radar
guidance, anti-aircraft fire tended to be less accurate at high altitudes (20,000 feet and
above) than it was at medium or low altitudes approximately (10,000 to 20,000 feet and
below 10,000 feet, respectively) Also these heavier guns were only somewhat effective
against targets at lower altitudes since their large caliber precluded high rates of fire and it
,.
was also difficult for the large, heavy barrels to traverse quickly enough to follow fast, low-
flying jets. Radar-directed artillery was, however, a very lethal threat to attacking aircraft
despite these limitations. Other weapons were available to the air defenses that
compensated for the low-altitude weaknesses of the heavier guns.
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Low altitude fligh~ especially Wlder 4500 fee~ was pretty much a livmg hell in the
~'" face of the smaller caliber weapons like the 14.5 millimeter (mm), 23 mm, and 37 mm
guns. These weapons featw"ed extremely high rates offire could traverse rapidly and were
the most numerous of all the air defense weapons. Over half of the aircraft losses due to
anti-aircraft artillery carne from these lighter guns. In approximately two years of combat
from January 1965 through December 1966, anti-aircraft fire downed 384 US aircraft.(5)
For every one of these downed, three suffered battle damage from this fire. Of those
aircraft lost, over fifty-three percent were initially hit by these weapons once the aircraft
descended below 4500 feet, and an additional six percent were hit between 4500 and 5000
feet altitude.(6) Tho sheer volume of shells flying through the air at these low altitudes was
enough to make even the most stalwart of pilots to think twice before commencing their
bomb runs.
"Our only defense," recalled former F-I05 pilot Jack Broughton, "was to keep
moving, or jink. We would keep moving up and down...side to side...slipping and skidding
to avoid coordinated flight on a steady track." This complicated the gunners' predictions.
Anti-aircraft gunners preferred to shoot at aircraft on the bomb runs, because
uncoordinated, jinking flight would be held to a minimum to allow for accurate bomb-
aiming. 1bis also allowed for better aiming of the anti-aircraft guns. The scores of US
aircraft that had been victims of this grolUld fire by 1965 convinced the Air Force and
Navy to make low-altitude flight under 4500 feet taboo for their jets.(7)
By the time the SA-2 was launched in July of 1965, Air Force bombing missions
were flown at medium altitudes such.as 15,000 feet. An aircraft usually commenced its
attack by diving from this altitude, releasing its weapons at the proper point in the dive, and
then pulling out of its bomb run while at least 4500 feet above the ground. The higher
initial altitude provided a greater measure of safety from most AAA fire and the pull-out
altitude shortened the exposure time to all anti-aircraft weapons after the bomb run began.
The radar-jamming EB-66 aircraft generally had good success against the anti-aircraft guns'
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fire control radars so the threat from heavier, radar directed artillery was minimized.(8)
The lighter weapons, however, could throw up walls of lead regardless of radar
effectiveness. The higher altitude also allowed.the aviators to locate their targets from great
distances, provided that both the weather was cooperative and the target wasn't hidden in
the jungle. This allowed for plenty of time to align the aircraft into a proper bomb-run
heading. In 1965 pilots also had another threat to consider in Southeast Asia. This was
the threat posed by the second element of response, airborne interceptors.
An interceptor is a fighter aircraft that defends friendly airspace from attack. North
Vietnamese interceptor pilots, like the North Korean, German and British pilots from wars
past made extensive use of ground-based radars -- known as ground-controlled intercept,
or GCI, radars-- in order to locate and intercept hostile attacking aircraft.(9) North
\
Vietnam did not have an interceptor force at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in
1964. Two days later, some Chinese MIG-15 and IvIIG-17 aircraft were deployed to an
airfield near Hanoi. These were older jet fighters and considered obsolete, but their
relatively successful use during the Rolling Thunder campaign, especially the IvIIG-17,
taught the American pilots some valuable lessons about air combat that had been lost in the
age of supersonic jets and air-to-air missiles.(10) The newer, more capable Soviet-built
l\.1IG-21 would not appear in Vietnam until December 1965 and would not be used in
combat until the following April. Although heavily outnwnbered, the North Vietnamese
fighters operated safely from airfields that were restricted from American bombing attacks
by President Lyndon Jolmson. Throughout 1965, North Vietnamese IvIIG-15 and l\.1IG-17
attacks were sporadic in nature, and even then were usually directed at the last flights of a
bombing mission after they targets had been struck and when the American fighter escorts
were low on fuel.(11) The fighters and anti-aircraft guns were officially joined by a third
element in July of 1965 as soon as llynykh's first Guideline thundered off its launch
rails.(12)
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The SA-2 offered a new dimension to the air defense system (See Figure I).
Although the accuracy and effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery fire decreased as the
target's altitude increased, the SA-2's lethality increased with higher altitudes. The
Guideline, did not reach its full speed of about Mach 3.5 until well over 25,000 feet in
altitude; it was less responsive to the controller's maneuver commands at the slower speeds
and correspondingly lower altitudes.(13) Therefore, attacker's tactics based on negating or
minimizing the effect of anti-aircraft artillery -- flying at higher altitudes - invariably
favored the SA-2 battalions. Conversely, low altitude flying to avoid the missiles' coverage
brought attacking aircraft into the lethal range of the anti-aircraft artillery. Unlike the
predicted artillery fire, an SA-2 fire control battery could compensate for its target's evasive
maneuvers by using electronic guidance. The missile itselfwas guided by a ground operator
to its intended target In addition to its own merits as a weapon, the SA-2 greatly enhanced
the effectiveness of the entire air defense system because the missile battalions were quickly
integrated within it Aiding in this fast process was the continuous construction of missile
sites.
Soviet advisors, North Vietnamese Anny troops, and civilians combined efforts to
construct SA-2 sites in preparation for each batta1ion's anival. Each site was carved out of
the surrounding coUntryside, and designed to allow for quick set-up of an SA-2 battalion's
radar vans, service vehicles, and missile launchers. A typical site was made in what was
called a "Star of David" pattern, similar to those seen in Figure n. The lines of this six-
pointed star were roads and pathways for the various service vehicles included in an SA-2
battalion, and there was a missile launcher at each of the star's points. Electric and
communications cables Were also laid out ahead of time to allow for fast connections.
Most importantly, these sites were quickly and expertly hidden.
The North Vietnamese quickly proved themselves as masters of hit and run missile
attacks from camouflaged sites. The shuttling of the missile battalions between these sites
was what amounted to a deadly shell game. The SA-2 battalions often remained in a
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FIGURE I
SA-2 Guideline Missile
....
ll'J I--'~
rt" nl "<
~~ 'C
1"10 ... •
c: ()
"J r1" PI
OJ· .....
rt
rt en
'1l Z ::.
1"10 I
:::rtN
• 0
FIGURE II Typical SA-2 Sites
% - ":l..!:':""C':o-.::C "':"'I'll\''''!:,~=
: - CC~·" ....·~·.qC"'!"~"N9 T~"ll.,:n!'
, - 9':Cl'r:!TV :r=NC::~
:I - Mt~~1"'= Ll\UNC:~'rr"~
~ - Ar.C'UI~:':"'N ;'.1\':)",.,
, - Gr:~Ir:l'1I'.TO"
r. - Ml!J~I'_:; H0LO .\"::/\
26
This mutual radar support, combined ~ith efficient communications, made the
North Vietnamese air defenses quite formidable in 1965. Radar density greatly complicated
the task ofpenetrating these air defenses for an attack, especially in light of the limited
-,
available electronic warfare assets. Electronic warfare aircraft like the EB-66's now had
more radars to handle and, more importantly, more distinct frequencies for their jammers
to cover. With only a finite nwnber ofjammers available on each aircraft, the EB-66's
quickly became overwhelmed.(IS) Originally employed in 1964 to jam most of the then-
rudimentary North Vietnamese radar network, by late 1965 the EB-66's could only focus
on but a small part of it Communications in the North Vietnamese air defenses ran the
gamut from radio relays to telephone lines to air-raid sirens. These linked all the system's
elements together and provided for a coordinated response to an air attack. Unlike the
American fliers, the air defense elements were positioned relatively close to their higher
headquarters, which eased the air defense commander's task of controlling all the forces at
his disposal.
North Vietnam constructed a very efficient system of air defense in a relatively
short time. When US air strikes began in August 1964, the North Vietnamese air defenses
were quite unsophisticated, resembling those of Korea in 1950. AILestimated 1426-anti--
aircraft guns wore available, supported by twenty-two earlY-warning radars and four fire-
control radars. The latter were capable of providing firing solutions for the medium and
heavy guns. By November 1968, when the dragged-out, sporadic Rolling Thunder
campaign carne to an end, the North Vietnames defenses were as follows: 8050 AAA
guns; 152 fighters (106 of these safely based in China); 40 "active" SA-2 Battalions; and
over 400 radars of all types.(16) The numbers and interlocking ranges tell only part of the
story about how this system grew so quickly. Most important was the fact that this air
defense technology was successfully adapted almost as soon as it arrived in North Vietnam
The North Vietnamese system was aided greatly by China and the Soviet Union in
adapting this air defense technology. The North's air defense elements had been tied into
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the Chinese air defense network, which added greatly to the total number of radars
available to the air defense commander. According to a contemporary Air Force report,
"the North Vietnam-China border ceased to exist when it came to air defense. "(17) In fact,
one of the alternate control centers for the air defense system was inside China, lest the
Americans knock out the primary center in Hanoi. This North Vietnamese air defense
network was also loaded with Soviet radar and missile technology and practiced Soviet
tactical doctrine with the aid of the latter's advisors. Fonner Soviet advisor to the
Vietnamese Air Force, General-Major Mikhail Dyich Fesenko wrote: "In the beginning, the
Vietnamese only watched our specialists work and learned from their experience." (l8)The
North Vietnamese operators quickly learned their art.
The ground control radar controllers lvfIG-21 fighter-interceptor pilots were
prime examples of this adaptation process. Shortly after lvfiG-21's were oflloaded in crates
from Soviet ships in Haiphong harbor they were reassembled and test-flown by Soviet
pilots before being brought into the North Vietnamese active inventory. Two-seat lvfiG-
\
21 's were used for a new Vietnamese pilot's initial training flights over North Vietnam. A
Soviet instructor accompanied his North Vietnamese student pilot. Sometimes, the Soviet
instructor and his student were "unwillingly" forced into combat with US aircraft!(19)
The fighters were under strict positive control during each training flight. Even
when the North Vietnamese pilots flew on their own, the Soviet radar operators -- and
Vietnamese operators under close Soviet supervision -- directed every action of the fighter
pilots other than the necessary tasks for take-off and landing. Throughout 1965 and during
the early months of 1966 North Vietnamese interceptors would be skillfully vectored by
ground controllers into attack positions behind US strike forces, but would usually break
off the attack before the American fighter escorts could respond.(20) While the radar
operators and pilots adapted to the newly imported Soviet technology, the North
Vietnamese system also displayed ever-increasing levels of coordination.
28
It became obvious to the Americans that the various air defense elements acted in
concert to confront various air strikes. The SA-2 fire control batteries, for example,
usually did not turn on their Fan Song radars until a prospective target was already well-
within missile firing parameters. This was despite the fact that the Fan Song radar was
capable of searching sectors of the sky alone for its own target. Other elements of the air
defenses such as early warning radars or even fire control radars for nearby anti-aircraft
guns passed target infonnation via the Hanoi control center to the waiting SA-2 battalion.
Late in 1965, Wild Weasel crews would observe North Vietnamese radars "handing off'
tracking responsibilities on their radar detection equipment.(21) As the aircraft passed by
one tracking radar that radar went off the air and another would begin to transmit and track
from a position somewhere off the aircraft's nose. When that was passed by, yet another
radar would pick up the aircraft.
Coordination also served to enhance combat tactics. Electronic reconnaissance
aircraft like the EB-66C would have problems pinpointing transmitting Fan Song radars not
only because their detection equipment was limited in accuracy but also because the other
air defense elements would warn the Fan Song of the approaching EB-66C's, allowing the
former plenty of time to~slo-ll transmitting and remain undetected. American ainnen also
noted that in some areas or on certain days, the MIG interceptors and the SA-2 battalions
would trade-off responsibilities for the air defenses or work in concert. Some days were
"MIG days" and other days were "SAM days." Also it was not lUlcomrnon for MIG's to act
as bait and lure US aircraft into SA-2 defended areas. In late November, North
Vietnamese MIG's attacked Air Force strike aircraft and then turned tail to allow the
pursuing American aircraft to chase them. The Vietnamese interceptors led them right into
airspace defended by some waiting SA-2 battalions. Conversely, SA-2's fired to force strike
aircraft into airspace defended by MIG's. In a very short period of time, the various
elements in this system had been skillfully brought together to act as one entity.(22)
29
While showing an exceptionally high degree of integration and coordination, the
North Vietnamese integrated air defense system in 1965 also showed a high degree of
order. Possible social, doctrinal and ideological conflicts between Soviet advisors and their
North Vietnamese trainees as well as other issues involving the transfer of one country's
technology to another are unanswerable Wltil a significant number of Soviet and North
Vietnamese records are released. However, given that this system possessed a relatively
high degree of order, it can be fwther postulated that the North Vietnamese system was to
some degree inflexible in combat operations.
This air defense system featured centralized decision-making in battle; all decisions
for the tactical employment of the air defenses were usually made in Hanoi control
center.(23) For example, while an SA-2 battalion commander might wish to engage a flight
of aircraft as they entered the Guideline's lethal range, the decision to fire generally could
not be made Wltil he was ordered to do so by an authority many times removed from the
battalion in the command center at Hanoi. Success often depended upon a fast,
Wlobstructed flow of information both to and from the Hanoi connnand center. The
individual elements in such a system would not necessarily be prepared to conduct
autonomous operations should communications to their higher headquarters be obstructed
or hindered.(24)
A doctrine that calls for such a centralized decision-making process may be more
influenced by social and cultural forces than technology. The North Vietnamese integrated
air defense system was very much like that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet tendency for
centralized control may have been influenced by a number of social factors present in what
was then a totalitarian form of government. The virtual absence of personal freedom in
Soviet society, mutual feelings of distrust, a lack of either initiative or desire to accept
responsibility, or even a pessimistic view an officer might have for the skill of the troops
wtder his command are just a few of many possible social forces which, when combined
induced such a doctrine.
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That the North Vietllatilese used a sinillar fonn of command and control in 1965
was in part because it was the doctrine espoused by the Soviet advisors and technicians
who were sent to North Vietnam along with the exported Soviet air defense technologies.
The Soviets operated these technologies themselves and also trained and closely supervised
the North Vietnamese operators. It was only natural that the Soviets emphasized the
doctrine which they themselves had been taught and used daily. That these air defenses
denied free use of the sky to the American aircraft in 1965 is due in large part to an
American air combat system that never quite found a workable balance between relative
extremes of order and chaos
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Chapter Four
Integration: The United States Air Force Air Attack System
j
Facing the North Vietnamese air defenses in 1965 was the aerial attack system of
the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). This system was spread out across the entire Pacific
Ocean. The headquarters of this body (HQPACAF) was located in Hawaii and was
responsible for the employment of most of the Air Force assets in Southeast Asia,
particularly those participating in Rolling Thunder strikes.(1) Ultimately, the responsibility
for these assets was with the stateside-based Tactical Air Command (TAe). Tactical Air
Command met the combat needs of PACAF by providing the latter with aircraft, personnel
and other assets. For example, when additional F-105 squadrons were ordered to
Southeast Asia in 1%5, most of these carne from stateside-based Tactical Air Command
units. Upon reaching their fOlWard bases in Thailand, these F-105 units came under the
immediate operational control of the Pacific Air Forces, and remained in that status until
their return to the United States where TAC resumed control.
As will be discussed, measures taken to counter the SA-2 originated from Tactical
Air Command, but were actually used in combat by the Pacific Air Forces. This chapter
Will be corifiried to the <Iay-to-<Iay war over the skies of North Vietnam, and therefore will
focus on PACAF. To aid in prosecution of the air war, HQPACAF established the
Second Air Division, a fOlWard-based command near Saigon, South Vietnam. The
combat units, or wings, flying the Rolling Thunder missions were situated in various bases
throughout South Vietnam and Thailand.(2) This system grew quickly.
The year 1965 saw ever-increasing numbers and types of Air Force aircraft being
deployed to Southeast Asian air bases. This Air Force system appeared to become
relatively more inflexible as it grew in size. The reasons for this have less to do with the
technology and more to do with the people in this system. The Air Force command
structure had problems not only in coping with demands imposed by Washington's political
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COlliltraints, but also in keeping pace with the changing nature and scope of air combat in
Southeast Asia. This chapter takes a closer look at the Air Force tactical combat system
employed over North Vietnam. The American strike force arrayed near Hanoi in July
1965 was typical of what the North Vietnamese air defenses saw on a daily basis.
The F-4C Phantoms of Leopard and Panther flights provided protection for this
strike force against opposing aircraft. The threat from North Vietnamese fighters, however
was sporadic at best in 1965. In fact, it wasn't until early 1966 that the tactical air units
were subjected to periodic, aggressive air attacks, but the threat of opposing fighters in
1965 was real enough to warrant continuous friendly fighter escort.(3) The Air Force was
not about to drop its guard and devote the Phantoms to other duties. This protective
mission, the aforementioned !'v1IGCAP, was designed to ward off threatening fighters that
attempted to shoot down or at least disropt either the strike aircraft or the heavy support
aircraft, like the EC-121 "Big Eye" and KC-135 "Stratotanker."
An EC-121 Big-Eye aircraft was equipped with a large radar on top of its fuselage
to electronically scan the sky for North Vietnamese jets. The Big Eye worked closely with
the :MIGCAP. These EC-121 aircraft had arrived from McClellan AFB in the spring of
1965 and began combat operations by May.(4) The Big Eye orbits-were-JJracetrack/Lor
oval patterns flown at very low altitudes. The Big Eye would typically fly only fifty to
three-hundred feet above the surface. In this fashion the Big Eye "looked up" at the sky
rather than "looked down" from above, a sharp contrast to modern airborne early warning
aircraft that typically operate at high altitudes.(5) Since the Big Eye radar was at its
optimwn perfonnance when the radar beam was enhanced by being "bounced" directly off
water's highly reflective surface, these orbits were situated about fifty miles off the coast of
Vietnam, over the Gulf of Tonkin. At best, EC-121 's could spot aircraft and track them out
to 140 miles away.(6) Other large aircraft required protective escort for marauding North
Vietnamese fighters as well.
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Huge KC-135 Stratotanker refueling aircraft orbited at pre-designated locations to
provide fuel to the gas-hungry fighter engines both before and after the strike. Their orbits
were usually over Thailand or the Gulf of Tonkin. Without the tankers, the Rolling
Thunder operations would have been severely constricted in their range and scope. These
tankers also helped to diminish greatly the possibility of aircraft crashing because they
burned too much fuel during unplanned combat maneuvering. Effecting an aerial
rendezvous between tanker and receiver was not always easy, however, and ground radar
was of considerable assistance.
Aiding considerably in these tanker-fighter rendezvous were ground-controlled
intercept, or Gel, radars. Unfot'tumltely, these radars had only limited coverage. They
could scan the skies over South Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin but not the heavily-
defended areas of North Vietnam such as Hano~ where many Rolling Thunder strikes took
place. Tankers flew to a specific point in the sky and circled, waiting for the fighters to join
with them and refuel. The Gel radar operators, broadcasting instructions over a
designated radio frequency, directed the fighters to the tankers' locations.(7) This separate
radio frequency was used so as not to interfere with other nearby aircraft formations. Once
the fighters had sighted the tankers and closed to within three to five miles of the latter,
both the fighters and tankers switched their radios to a pre-designated refueling frequency
and started refueling. This freed the ground controllers for other tasks.(8) Refueling was
an ever-present concern, as was the possibility of being shot down over hostile territory.
The Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Forces stood ready to recover downed
American ainnen. Orbiting at approximately ten-thousand feet over central Laos was
"Crown," a heavy, multi-engined HC-54 or HC-130 aircraft serving as the airborne mission
controller for the rescue forces. These forces consisted of rescue helicopters and close air
support aircraft to provide air cover for the former's operations. On alert also over Laotian
airspace were two large CHIHH-3 Helicopters, called "Jolly Green" in reference to the
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famed giant. Four A-IE SkyTaider aircraft at Udom Air Base, Thailand sat on the flight
ramp, on alert, waiting for an emergency call from Crown to assist in a rescue attempt.(9)
Ifan aircraft went down, the entire strike would often be called off then and there.
This decision depended greatly upon the intensity of opposing defenses in the vicinity of
the downed allmen. The mission would proceed, for example, if the strike force was busy
dodging intense flak while striking a target near Hanoi.(10) The relatively less-defended
western mOlUltainous regions of North Vietnam would be a more typical location for a
rescue mission. The primary task for all aircraft in the vicinity became an effort to get to
-
the airman before the North Vietnamese captured him.
Once an aircraft like an F-105 went down, the downed pilot's wingman would call
Crown on the radio and explain what happened and where the airman was thought to be.
All nearby strike pilots would at this point be looking for a descending, or landed,
parachute. Crown carried radio direction-finding equipment on board, and would attempt
to pinpoint the pilot's location by homing in on the pilot's "beeper" or emergency radio
beacon. Meanwhile the Jolly Greens and A-IE "Sandy" aircraft would be directed to the
scene. The remaining strike pilots would orbit the pilot's location, each flight of foW" F-
------~l-{f-5!s--GGGu~tinct_al1itudesJn_Order_forJh.e lower aircraft to cover the pilot while the
higher aircraft conserved fuel. When the lowest-altitude flight ran low on gas, it would
depart the scene and hook up with a tanker, while the next "stack" of fighters would
descend and repeat the process. Meanwhile Crown arranged for at least two flights of
MlGCAP F-4C's to provide cover and also redirected tanker aircraft to fly orbits near the
rescue scene. Shortly after arriving in the area, the Sandys typically talked to the downed
pilot over the radio while surveying the surrounding countryside for enemy forces. The A-
lE's attacked those who were an immediate threat. The helicopters would go in to pick up
the pilot after the Sandys had cleared the area. The rescue teams often received help in
driving off threatening ground forces from the F-I05's.(II)
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The F-105 "Thwuterchiefs," known more commonly as "Thuds", were the
primary strike aircraft of the Rolling Thunder campaign. The aircraft was originally
designed for a high-speed low altitude penetration of enemy air defenses in all weather
conditions. Thuds first rolled off the production lines in the late 1950's and soon took the
role as Tactical Air Command's premier carrier of nuclear weapons because there was
room reserved inside the F-105's bomb-bay for a single nuclear bomb. During the conflict
in Southeast Asia, this bomb bay held an extra fuel tank instead of ordnance.(12) Nothing
airborne in Southeast Asia could out-run a Thud flying below ten-thousand feet. The
Thud relied on this high speed to escape enemy air defenses. However, it was hard to
outfly a barrage of bullets and shells. By 1968, over one-third of the losses ofUSAF
aircraft in Southeast Asia were F-I05's, the losses being almost double that of any other
aircraft in the theater.(13) Still, the F-105 performed admirably in daily combat flights
over a period of three years, a role for which it was not intended. The F-I05 had no
capability to counter the North Vietnamese air defense radars, and for this the strike pilots
relied on the aging EB-66 aircraft.
The EB-66 aircraft were formerly B-66 bombers that had been reconfigured to
perform electronic reconnaissance and radar jamming duties. Some EB-66's monitored the
North Vietnamese radars and provided warnings when imminent danger was suspected,
while other EB-66's jammed certain air defense radars based on the route of the strike
force. These aircraft were the key elements in the tactical air combat system, because they
had the ability to disrupt the North Vietnamese radars. Until the SA-2 appeared over the
skies in July, the EB-66's were successful in harassing the opposing radar operators,
particularly those who worked directly with the anti-aircraft artillery.(14) The growing
North Vietnamese radar system posed a more formidable obstacle as the year wore on.
One version of this aircraft, the EB-66C's had been deployed to Southeast Asia
prior to 1965. This version accommodated four electronic warfare officers and carried
radar receivers, direction finding gear, radar pulse analyzers recording equipmen~ and self-
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protection radar jammers. At this time the EB-66 was being phased out of TAC's
inventory due to its age, but the expanding North Vietnamese defenses halted the phase-
out. In May 1965, newly modified EB-66C's arrived in the combat theater ~ith improved
capability against the North Vietnamese radar defenses.(15) The addition of the guided
missiles to the air defenses, however, rapidly made even the improved EB-66C's much less
effective by the end of 1965. It was difficult, for example, for an EB-66C to pinpoint the
location of an active SA-2 missile site accurately enough for a strike to be directed against
it.(16) The aircraft's lack of speed and maneuverability made it vulnerable to the SA-2's
Guideline missile, so the EB-66 crews had to be careful not to fly near the sites and
provoke a launch.(17)
Another version, the EB-66B "Brown Cradle", was first deployed to Vie1nam in
October, 1965, several months after the first SA-2 launch. Tactical Air Command
managed to send five of these aircraft for use by the Pacific Air Forces. The EB-66B
carried twenty three pre-set jammers and a single operator for all the equipment These
Brown Cradles were products ofjoint US Navy --US Air Force electronic warfare
exercises in 1958 and 1959. For these exercises, the bomb bays of a handful ofB-66
bombers had been stripped at the Brookey AFB, Alabama air depot and therein a pallet full
of the jamming equipment was installed. Additional EB-66's were given the Brown Cradle
conversion after those exercises. The B-model's equipment operator merely turned his
radar jammers' power switches to the "on" position when the time carne for jamming the
radars. Unlike the electronic warfare officers of the C-models, he had no ability to adjust
the frequency of the jammers in flight Therefore, if the North Vietnamese radars changed
operating frequencies, the effect of any jamming pretty much would be negated.(18)
Nevertheless, both versions of the EB-66 were the workhorses of Rolling Thunder
operations.
Although the EB-66's played important roles in countering the radar-based air
defenses, the entire strike mission was doomed to failure if the tactical combat system was
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not effectively integrated. The various elements of the air combat system flew in relatively
close proximity to one another to provide mutual support. All were tied together through
radio communications, and all the air crews were highly trained in the use and employment
of their respective technologies. The system also had adjusted combat tactics to some
degree based on the strengths and limitations of these technologies.
In many respects this Air Force system tended towards inflexibility making it
difficult to respond well to changes. At times, most elements lacked autonomy, while at
other times many elements were prone to act quite independently to the detriment of the
whole system. Relatively efficient mechanisms for instituting technological and doctrinal
change were not formally in place.(19) The integration of, and the relative inflexibility
shown by the tactical air combat system is evidenced by detailing a typical F-105 strike
mission of 1965.
The flight path of each strike aircraft was designed to provide mutual support for
the other elements of the combat system; in fact the very heart of American tactical
doctrine regarding fighter operations was based on this support with the combat-proven
concept of wingmen where the lead aircraft generally initiated an attack while the wingman
proved cover. Not only was it necessary for mutual support to occm between the F-105's,
but other aircraft like the EB-66's , Phantoms and tankers had to be at the right place at the
right time, immediately available to respond to unplanned changes. This was accomplished
through detailed planning of each strike mission. Even if communications between the
various elements broke down for some reason dming the flight, this immense effort at
coordination would allow the mission to proceed with some degree of efficiency.
For a typical strike mission over North Vietnam the overall plan of attack would be
made at a command level higher than the flying units, often at the Second Air Division in
Saigon or even HQPACAF in Hawaii. This plan was analogous to a huge puzzle; each F-
105 wing in Thailand would receive only the piece of the puzzle that was necessary to plan
their wing's missions. This came in the form of a "frag" or "frag sheet", which was slang
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for "fragmentary order." Infonnation on frag sheets would contain infonnation such as:
the latitude and longitude coordinates of the target, the time at which the target was to be
struck, recommended (or even mandatory) routing to the target, radio frequencies and call-
signs of other types of aircraft operating in the area, infolll1ation for air refueling,
infolll1ation pertaining to alternate targets in case the primaty could not be attacked, and
any other special instructions required for the completion of the mission.(20)
The force commander for a particular strike mission was one of the most seasoned
flight leaders in the entire fighter wing. He was responsible for the planning of the mission
and that all the necessary mission infonnation was made available to the strike pilots,
usually by the evening prior to the mission. It was not unusual, however, to have last-
minute changes in missions while the aircraft were preparing to take-off, but the essential
mission information could often be gleaned the night before the strike. This infonnation
was passed to the flight leaders, each a highly experienced instructor pilot in his own
right.(21) Each flight leader led a flight of four F-I05 aircraft and made sure that his flight
was familiar with all the necessary mission details.
Details were by no means trivial. On their individual maps, or charts, the F-IOS
pilotS marked special locations in addition to their route of flight For example, these
locations might include predicted locations of the tanker aircraft for post-strike refueling
and locations of support aircraft like MIGCAP or EB-66's. Photographs of the target area
and surrounding countryside were closely studied, as were the anticipated locations of the
air defenses. Other factors were given careful consideration as well. These included: the
time of day, position of the sun, and unusual terrain features near the target. The value of
pre-mission study was constantly driven home to each pilot.(22) "Mission planning,"
according to a fighter wing's tactics manual, "will detennine whether the mission will be
well executed or a confused sequence of events .. ,"(23) Those not familiar with the mission
courted the possibility of making costly, even deadly mistakes during the flight.
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Once he was confident that his flight had digested the necessary infonnation about
the mission, the flight leader conducted what was called a flight briefing. Here, the basic
infonnation regarding the mission was reviewed together by all the flight members. A key
point covered was determining who was to lead the flight if the flight leader had to abort
the mission. Another very critical area to be reviewed by the flight was what they were
going to do in the target area. Each had to be familiar with the planned approach to the
target, how each would maneuver, or "roll in" to attack and how all foW' were to re-fonn
their flight aftetWards. The use ofproper radio procedures was also a very important
detail. A large strike force needed to use a single radio frequency, called a "strike
frequency, " common to all strike aircraft. The mere fact that scores of airmen would be
conversing on this frequency at one time or another, often simultaneously, meant that radio
calls needed to be as short and to the point as possible.
These radio communications kept each ainnan in almost continuous contact with
the others in the strike force. Typically, the aircraft radios were limited in range, often less
than one-hundred fifty miles. Because of this, strikes over much of Vietnam, especially in
the North, would be out of contact with Second Air Division Headquarter near Saigon.
Most certainly, the tactical radio communications would never reach PACAF
Headquarters. Since Rolling Thunder missions extended beyond the range not only of the
higher headquarters' tactical communications but also the American ground control radars,
forward-based central coordinating authorities were established to handle unplanned
circumstances.
A typical example of a coordinating authority was the Tactical Air Control System,
or TACS. It was designed to allow aircraft to effectively respond to changing situations on
the ground. For example, ifan Anny unit urgently needed an unplanned air strike, the
TACS would direct nearby aircraft to the scene. This system took root with the Army Air
Forces in World War II, but largely died out with the cessation of hostilities. Although a
ground-based Tactical Air Control System had been re-established for the Korean conflict,
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the system was again left to rot in the post-Korea years.(24) Even in the veri early S+L4ges
of American involvement in Vietnam 1962 an Air Force report characterized the TACS as
being "incapable of handling the expanded air operations throughout this (pre-1965)
period," which was small cornpared to the American force in place by the end of 1965.(25)
Although the TACS typically coordinated close air support and interdiction
missions in South Vietnam rather than in the north, its sorry state in the early 1960's was
indicative of an Air Force system geared toward full-scale nuclear conflict where large-
scale, sustained conventional operations like that had occurred in Korea were but
"aberrations."(26) The Air Force in Southeast Asia spent much of the 1960's relearning
past lessons and trying to improve their at-the-scene tactical coordination.(27) The aerial
conflict over Southeast Asia set the slow-turning gears of doctrinal and technological
change in motion, and new airborne technologies appeared in attempts to address problems
of coordination and allow fast response to changing tlrreats.
There were several new technologies of these types that appeared dwing Rolling
Thunder. For example, the EC-121 Big Eye provided a measure ofwarning from enemy
aircraft and could direct forces to engage them. Crown took control of unforeseen hazards
such as combat rescue operations.. The year 1965 also saw the initial deployment of the
Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), which was essentially an
airborne extension of the Second Air Division. The ABCCC purpose was to make sure the
strikes went according to plan while also coordinating last-minute strikes of secondary
targets. Later during the Rolling Thunder Campaign, large aircraft with names like "Rivet
Top" and "College Eye" would orbit the skies, looking for radar emissions from surface-to-
air missile sites and enemy fighters, respectively.(28) These developments were indicative
of the most important process in integration where new technologies and the system are
made to adapt to each other. It is a process that begins and ends with the operators of the
technologies, and relies much on the skills of these individual operators.
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The level of experience and professional competence of the operators is
tremendously important in a military system. In this particular air combat system, pilots
had to be familiar not only with the capabilities and limitations of their aircraft but also the
"rules of engagement" pertaining to their combat flights. What targets could be hit? What
could not? For example, most airfields were offlimits to American strikes, and it took a
high degree of American tactical discipline not to pounce upon North Vietnamese fighters
while the latter waited on the airstrips, armed and engines running, in complete safety.
Adaptation also applied to the immediate problems of combat.
Each weapon carned on board required a different bombing technique. Napalm
tanks or CBU-2A cluster bombs, for example, required relatively level flight at low altitude
in order to drop them accurately and effectively.(29) Standard "iron" bombs. like the five-
hundred pounders~ were best delivered in a dive. Actual combat missions were often used
for training opportunities. Some flight leaders were in their position for the first time under
the watchful eye of an flight lead-qualified wingman. Even the most experienced of fliers
needed time to adjust to the "local procedures" of a combat zone, far different than what
one encountered stateside.
These aircrews were well-trained in aircraft operations and combat tactics. For
example, over fifty percent of the USAF fighter pilots flying in Southeast Asia prior to
1966 had over 2,000 hours total flight time. The average pilot had almost ten years of
flying experience and had over 500 hours in the particular aircraft they were flying in
combat.(30) The wing commanders were typically veterans of the Second World War and
Korea. Many of the squadron commanders were at least veterans of Korea. Authors
including Earl Tilford have convincingly argued that the Vietnam air war, Rolling Thunder
included, was prosecuted with a World War II mindset by higher headquarters officers in
organizations such as the Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces and the Pentagon's Air
Staff.(31) Decision-makers' doctrinal liabilities aside, the operators in Southeast Asia were
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familiar ~ith the dynamics of tactical air combat. These airmen were no neophytes. There
were, however, problems to be overcome.
The Air Force's system in 1965 was technologically limited in carrying out
conventional air operations. Many weapons were outdated and the airmen were far more
familiar with flying procedures appropriate for a nuclear environment than they were for
the "brushfire war" ablaze in Vietnam.(32) Rolling Thunder pilots too often were plagued
by problems with their bombs. Many of the available bombs were of World Warn
vintage, designed to be carned either internally, in a bomb-bay, or externally at much lower
airspeeds than what the jet fighters typically experienced. Bomb fins cracked under the
strain of the powerful air flows and some fins were simply blown off. Fuze anning wires
broke and, even worse, some' caused the bomb to be armed while it was still carried on the
aircraft. Close formations often altered the air flow to the point where it caused these
bombs to detonate. (33) In November, for example, an F-105 of the 335th Tactical
Fighter Squadron exploded in mid-air on its way to a combat mission, an incident caused
by faulty fuzing. Further use of those fuses was immediately suspended by that squadron,
which meant a lot of bombs could no longer be dropped.(34) A strike force did not need to
lose aircraft in needless accidents. Most certainly they did not need to toss bombs wildly
off target due to cracked funs, or worse yet, hit a target with duds after penetrating heavy
air defenses. One F-I05 pilot recalled a 1965 mission where he saw his six bombs hit
squarely on his target, a bridge, and then bounce and skid across it into some nearby huts
without exploding. (35) A further concern was that most of the bombs could only be
dropped in daylight.
Although the F-105 was the primary strike aircraft and had an "all-weather"
bombing ability, it was designed for dropping a nuclear bomb. The Thud was not well
suited to the role of an "iron hauling" conventional strike aircraft, because the F-105's radar
did not have the resolu.tion required for all-weather, day or night conventional bombing
operations. There is a common expression pertaining to the value of accuracy: "being
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close only counts in horse-shoes." This also applied to nuclear we~ons delivery in the
1950's and 1960's where pinpoint accuracy was not important. The Thud's radar scope did
not have to depict a comer of a building to allow a nuclear weapons release, it merely had
to display the city. This meant that the Thuds could not usually find specific targets very
well while flying either in cloud cover or at night in Southeast Asia. EB-66's had a better
bombing radar than the F-I05's and were sometimes used to lead F-I05 strikes over areas
outside of SA-2 range beginning in 1966. Although some F-I05 and also some F-l00
fighter pilots were well-trained in night operations, their number was few and
consequently, so were the night missions by fighter-bombers.(36)
Night operations in Southeast Asia during the 1965-1968 time period were more
often seen over South Vietnam and Laos because the ground-based anti-aircraft defenses
there against high-flying aircraft were relatively weak. These missions could be conducted
by aircraft like the B-57 Canberra medium bomber and the huge, heavy B-52
Stratofortress.(37) Neither aircraft was allowed by the USAF to fly in the SA-2 dominated
areas of North Vietnam mostly because the B-57 lacked adequate speed and had no radar
jamming devices while the B-52 was also relatively slow but also had poor maneuverability.
The Navy possessed the only true night-capable fighter bomber in the fonn of the A-6
Intruder. Night missions were to increase as aircraft like the AC-130 and F-l11 appeared
later in the war, but throughout Rolling Thunder fighter bombers like the Thuds would
have to rely upon good weather, which, unfortunately, is what most of the anti-aircraft
artillery and small arms fire preferred. The previous chapter showed how the effectiveness
of anti-aircraft artillery stimulated tactics changes within the air combat system. How fast
and effectively the Air Force system responded to change appeared to be mostly affected
by forces other than technology.
Air Force operations in Vietnam were but one picture of a much larger puzzle that
involved the entire Defense Department. The combined operations of the services were
marked by a distinct lack of centralized authority. For example, overall authority for all
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Vietnam operations might logically have rested with the Commander of the United States
Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), who at this time in 1965 was General
William Westmoreland. Westmoreland, however, had little opportunity to step back and
look at how all the American forces could best be used in Vietnam. He was directly in
charge of all groood operations in Southeast Asia, a task that consumed so much of his
effort that, according to an Air Force report, he had little time to devote to the full use and
exploitation of air power.(38) In other words, there was nobody at MACV who could
speak with full authority for all the military forces committed to Southeast Asia nor was
-
there a single voice for the air assets.
The Commander of the Second Air Division was in charge of all US Air Force
operations over Vietnam, but did not have direct control of all the Air Force's aircraft.(39)
Aircraft like B-52's and KC-135's were still directly attached to Strategic Air Command,
the headquarters of which was in Omaha, Nebraska, and not under PACAF control This
required another bureaucratic layer to be penetrated just to coordinate actions with these
aircraft. There was no hope of merging Air Force aircraft with Navy aircraft, as each
service jealously guarded its assets. Control of Navy aircraft remained ultimately with the
Cornrnander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, but for all practical purposes control rested with
L4
Task Force 77 floating in the Gulf of Tonkin. Marine air operations were practically
autonomous, concentrating primarily in support of Marine groood forces. Chaotic,
haphazard arrangements "permitted varying degrees of confused responsibilities,
overlapping authority, and inadequate controls" between these agencies were the order of
the day.(40)
Further exacerbating the command and control situation in 1965 was the way in
which North Vietnam was divided between the Air Force, Navy and Westmoreland's
MACV. North Vietnam was geographically divided on a flight chart into six "Route
Packages", known as "Route Packs", each labeled one through six. Route Pack "Six" was
further divided into "Six-A"(6A) and "Six-B"(6B). Generally speaking, the air defenses
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grew in intensity as the Route Pack nmnber grew. Thus Route Packs 6A and 6B, the areas
around Hanoi and Haiphong, had the highest concentration of air defenses. Westmoreland
had jurisdiction over Route Pack 1, since that was closest to the ground troops fighting in
South Vietnam. The Navy presided over Packs 2,3,4, and 6B, and the Air Force had
Route Packs 5 and 6A.(41) Operations by the Air Force into zones "controlled" by the
Navy and vice versa did occur but were relatively infrequent when compared to operations
within a service's own zone. Coordination between the various agencies was done on an ad
hoc basis. There was no fonnal mechanism for inter-service coordination. Even within a
single service there were problems of command and control. These problems became
manifested in the system's inflexibility, as seen by the tight control over mission planning.
Although the strike force spent a great deal of time studying the plan for each
mission, the details of each strike plan were usually products of an Air Force planning staff
located in Saigon or at PACAF Headquarters in Hawaii. In either case, actions seen as
relatively minor details on one end were major events on the other end. One example of
this occurred on a strike of 27 July, 1965. The strike was set to hit the missile sites that
fired on Leopard flight earlier in the week. Mission planners from the higher headquarters
imposed routes of flight that the strike pilots believed, correctly as it turned out, to be
unnecessarily dangerous. Ordnance loads on the aircraft were changed :frequently prior to
takeoff, up until the very last minute. It got to the point that the maintenance crews could
not keep up with these changing weapons requirements. As a result, some aircraft were
made to fly without any bombs. Despite the fliers' strenuous objections and suggestions
for change, neither Second Air Division nor PACAF budged.(42) By itself, the centralized
control of Rolling Thunder mission planning was not necessarily causing the system to be
either inflexible or inefficient. The problems arose when the centralized control took hold
of the execution of the plans as well.
It wasn't wttil the Rolling Thwtder strikes had gone on for over a year that the
tactical fighter wings finally convinced somebody above them in the pecking order that the
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~ings doing the flying might best provide inputs as to how these strike missions might be
accomplished. The wings proposed that a list of potential targets be sent ahead of time so
that the wings might develop a detailed plan to include routes, timing, and ordnance loads
based on the latest infonnation concerning tactics and aircraft capabilities. This plan could
then be forwarded back up the chain of conunand for consideration.(43) There is little
evidence that suggestions like these were heeded during Rolling Thunder. The
intransigence of higher headquarters later led to bitter condemnations, like those of Colonel
Jack Broughton, who saw this inflexibility as leading to an unnecessary waste oflife in
tactical air operations.(44)
Much of this inflexibility resulted from political control over the military's activities
in Vietnam.(45) "The military," according to a post-Rolling Thunder Air Force report on
the conduct of Southeast Asia air operations, "must not only acknowledge close political
control but understand the necessity of it in the modern world and then get on with the job
of operating within the established bounds."(46) These boundaries were not well-defined in
1965. For example, the selection of most tactical targets was a ftmction more appropriately
and effectively perfonned by teams of specialists trained in fields such as air tactics,
intelligence, and weaponeering. Instead, Rolling Thunder target selection took place at
intimate Tuesday luncheons between Johnson and his closest advisors, without the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
President Johnson and his staff micromanaged the air war and selected every
Rolling Thunder target in 1965. "By keeping a lid on all the designated (bombing) targets,
" recalled Johnson, "I knew 1could keep control of the war in my own hands."(47) This
meant attempting to control not only the pace of the war but also its scope. Johnson was
greatly concerned about accidentally bringing China or the Soviet Union into the war.
"Johnson," wrote Doris Keams, "lived in constant fear of triggering some imaginary
provision of some imaginary treaty (between North Vietnam and the Comnlunist
superpowers). "(48) The controls were politically justifiable but tactically insane. Missile
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sites under construction were off-limits to bombing, as were airfields full of North
Vietnamese fighters. Many SA-2 sites found a comfortable refuge within the thirty
nautical mile restricted ring around Hanoi or the ten mile circle drawn about Haiphong.
The end result was a severe constriction on tactical air combat operations.
It remains open to debate whether or not Rolling Thunder, as either the President
or the Joint Chiefs envisioned it, would have ever achieved its lofty objectives of stopping
the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam and compelling the
North Vietnamese to negotiate an end to the conflict.(49) Regardless, it is clear that the
airmen flying these missions were hampered not only by the restraint of force associated
with limited political objectives, but also by their own Air Force leadership. This is not a
new revelation, but in light of this discussion on air defenses these restraints are of great
importance with respect to the nature of PACAFs air attack system. Neutralization of the
North Vietnamese air defenses was absolutely essential to achieve the limited, if even
unreachable, political objectives. The North Vietnamese defenses, rather than being
neutralized, were instead allowed the opportunity to deny the use of their airspace to the
Air Force. The defenses took every advantage given to them.
Those manning the North Vietnamese air defenses were as familiar with the niles
of the game as the Rolling Thunder pilots: where to bomb and where not to bomb, where
to fly and where not to fly. As a result, the North Vietnamese could shift their defenses
and concentrate them along the predictable American air routes. Long after the Rolling
Thunders1rikes ended, the Soviet advisor to the commander of the North Vietnamese air
defense forces noted how the stereotyped missions made the task of defense far easier than
it could have been.(50) Because tactical flexibility had been forfeited by the United States
Air Force, the need for an effective technological solution to the air defense problem
became of paramount importance to the Air Force decision-makers.
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Chapter Five
Decision: Choices Made To Counter The Air Defenses
"SAMs probably cannot be eliminated from Vietnam," wrote the Pacific Air
Forces Commander to his immediate subordinate, "but must be lived with."(l) The
problems of "living with" SA-2 battalions in late 1%5 will be shown in the next chapter.
The commander, however, also knew that back in the States, methods of neutralizing the
missile sites were being studied. Silencing these SA-2s would enable a medium-altitude
strike mission to safely ingess and egress the target areas that were within the missile's lethal
envelope.(2) Since every SA-2 battalion was integrated into a larger air defense system, the
~ battalion's supporting elements, such as long-range target acquisition radars, anti-aircraft
artillery, and fighters also had to be degraded, or somehow inhibited from passing vital
information to the waiting SA-2 battalions. Therefore, the Air Force was faced with the
task of neutralizing an entire combat system, or at least many of its key components. There
were a number of possible ways to do this.
Were these options necessarily "logical" or "right" responses? To imply that there
would be a logical technological response to the SA-2 would be to assume that social
factors, like human judgment were relegated to a minor rote in the Air Force's decision-
making process.(3) For example, historian Robert O'Connell viewed the surface-to-air
missile as a "natural, tactical opponent to the bomber." (4) Thus, the nature of the strategic
bomber and the way in which bombers were employed in combat were more responsible
for the evolution of these missiles than any particular social factor, like national
characteristics, ethnic culture or tactical doctrine. Bombers, according to O'Connell,
waged predatory warfare on cities and civilians.
O'Connell characterized predatory warfare by the drive for pure destruction and
annihilation of the opponent than by traditional political or tactical military objectives.
Accordingly, combat during the Second World War on the Eastern Front and in the Pacific
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was far more predatory in natw"e than in France, Africa or Italy. On the Eastern Fron~
neither Gennan nor Soviet troops gave any quarter nor expected any from their opponent.
The Pacific island-hopping campaign waged by American forces was a continual struggle
to dig out fanatical defenders at places like Iwo Jima, Peleliu or Okinawa. The word
predatory was also used by O'Connell in reference to specific weapons technologies
designed to attack relatively defenseless targets.
Predatory weapons were also unique in that they generated a counter-response
from the opponent. Gennan V-Boats, for example, waged predatory warfare against
Allied merchant shipping. In response to the marauding V-Boats, Allied navies developed,
not other submarines, but sonar equipment and depth charges to install in fast escort ships
and airborne radar for maritnne aircraft. lbe counter-response was a different class of
weapon entirely, designed at first not to overwhelm but to neutralize the looming
technological threat(5) A counter response triggered a volatile series of developments in
efforts to hold the technological "high ground" on the battlefield. Neither side held a
pennanent edge, for each new response that gave an advantage was immediately followed
by a counter-response designed to neutralize it. Radars and radar-countermeasures in the
V-Boat campaigns of World War IT are particularly illustrative for counter-response
patterns, for the submarine was a prime example of a predatory weapon. (6)
In 1942 Gennan V-Boat commanders surfaced at night to recharge their batteries
and even conduct attacks on convoys, since darkness brought some measure of safety from
attack. Soon the Royal Air Force (RAF) employed airborne metric radars that transmitted
radio waves of about one and one-half meters in length. A surfaced V-boat after having
been located by one of these radars was illuminated by an 22-rnillion candlepower "Leigh
Ught" from the same aircraft. This technique sent a number of V-boats to the bottom of
the ocean, while merchant shipping losses to submarines began to decrease accordingly.
Shortly thereafter, a radar detection device for these metric radars was installed on V-
boats. Merchant shipping losses again skyrocketed because Gennan V-boat commanders
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were forewarned of marauding Allied bombers. By 1943, revolutionary microwave radars
operating on centimeter length radio waves were installed on RAF bombers and U-Boat
losses climbed dramatically because the submarines were not forewarned of the bombers'
presence. It would take a year of frightful V-Boat losses before the Gennans received
appropriate detection gear. (7) The SA-2 missile systems, like the German U-Boats, can be
viewed not only as counter-responses to strategic bombers but also as predatory weapons
because slow, lumbering bombers were exceptionally vulnerable to the much faster guided
missiles.
SA-2 battalions deployed near a likely American bombing target in Vietnam were
much like duck hunters near a body of water. The hunters waited patiently in their blinds
for the ducks to show up, and opened fire when the birds were within range. Each shot
was aimed at a particular duck. How would ducks respond? The natural response in such
a desperate situation would seem to be what is popularly known as a "fight or flight"
response. Let us assume that the ducks decided upon the former: to shoot back in self-
defense to stop -- either by pinning down or killing -- all the hunters. Is this the limit of a
natural response, to neutralize the immediate threat? What if instead these ducks chose to
go beyond shooting just to keep the hunters' heads down? What if they also decided to be
predators themselves by flushing the hunters out of the blinds so as to get a clearer shot?
These particular ducks would then attempt to evict all the hunters out of the area, dead or
alive, so future flocks could come and go as they pleased. What started out as the ducks'
attempt at simple neutralization would in this case evolve into a systematic method of
wholesale disruption and destruction.
In this analogy did the hunters' guns alone motivate the ducks to go to such an
extreme? Translating the analogy back to Vietnam, then, what would be a "natural-tactical
opponent" to the predatory SA-2 missile systems? Was it to be a different airplane, another
missile, a sophisticated radar jammer or simply different tactics? That it came to be a
combination of all these possible responses indicates the complexity of the situation, rather
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than that the Air Force's response was overkill. The dynamics of a combat system are such
that its responses to a certain outside stimulus, such as new enemy weapons, are not always
so straightforward and easily anticipated. It is difficult, ifnot impossible to predict a
response from a system like that used by the Pacific Air Forces, much less assume that
what seems logical must have been right, or natural.(8) Trying to mold the specific
historical or decision-making model of counter-responses onto this situation is useful but
fails to adequately explain why certain choices were made.
Many possible American responses to the SA-2 were logical.(9) For example, one
could simply take one's chances and fly at medium altitudes near active missile sites. This
would present a single SA-2 system with more targets than it could possibly attack. This
tactic was questionable in 1965 given that evasive maneuvers, the jettisoning of ordnance,
confusion, and the loss of flight integrity were results ofmany medium-altitude flights by
ill-equipped aircraft near SA-2 sites, as will be shown in the next chapter. Another
approach would be to deny the SA-2 battalions their reserve of missile supplies. This was
not possible because these supplies were usually located in restricted zones. For example,
the North Vietnamese could store new missiles in the port of Haiphong where Soviet ships
offloaded them, because the city was off-limits to American air strikes. Because of these
problems, neither of these alternatives appeared to have been practical.
There were other options available. Blinding the Fan Song radar was a possibility,
as was disrupting either the SA-2 battalion or the entire air defense system by severing the
links between the various elements. The most obvious, but also most difficult option was to
lash out and destroy active SA-2 sites. Blinding the radars, disrupting the syst.ems and
seeking out and destroying active SA-2 sites required expert knowledge of radar operations
and characteristics.
Neither the American military nor most major world powers were strangers to
radars or electronic warfare in 1965. Simultaneously but secretly, radars were developed in
several countries during the 1930's primarily because of an international boom in short
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1920's and into the early 1930's.(10) Radar, of course, was one ofthe major technological
breakthroughs of the Second World War. In every year since that war, new developments
in radar technology continued to be secretly and continuously introduced by most of the
world's military powers, particularly the United States and Soviet Union. Finding out
details of the adversary's new radar developments was of particular interest to these
countries, for such knowledge was paramount for success in a highly dynamic yet invisible
battle known as electronic combat.
Spying on the adversary's radar development represents just one of the many
struggles in electronic combat. Electronic combat, also commonly referred to as electronic
warfare or electronic countermeasures, actually involves the entire electromagnetic
spectrum including radio, radar, visible light and infrared waves, among others, as· seen in
Figure III. Probably the most famous description of this kind of warfare is Sir Winston
Churchill's "Battle of Ihe Beams," which referred to successful British radio
countermeasures in 1940. British "beams" confused the Luftwaffe's night bomber crews by
disrupting their air navigation systems.(11) This study will be concerned mainly with
electronic warfare as it applies to radar and the radar-related options for dealing with the
Soviet-built SA-2 missile system. These options involved the merging of electronic
countermeasures with tactical combat operations. Radar jamming is the most common of
these electronic countermeasures.
It was possible to jam the Fan Song radar in order to "blind" it, given either
sufficient power to saturate the Fan Song's radar receivers or the proper januning technique
to prevent the fire control battery's radar operators from distinguishing between what was
real and what wac; not. The ultimate goal of electronic warfare is to create confusion in the
opposing forces by denying them either correct or timely information pertaining to one's
own combat forces. In modem aerial warfare, where aircraft often fly at high subsonic
speeds, only a few seconds' worth of confusion may be all that is needed for an attacker to
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remain WlScathed. Confusion works both ways, for electronic countenneasures can induce
the attacking force into hitting the wrong target or even no target at all.
There are two fundamental types of electronic countenneasures)mown as active
and passive. For the purpose of this study, active countenneasures refer to actual
transmission of electromagnetic energy whereas passive countermeasures involve the
reception of electromagnetic energy. Passive countenneasures like ground-based radar
reflectors or the more well-known World War ll-era "window" or "chaff' (radar reflective
material dispersed from aircraft) will not be treated in this study.(12) Active
countermeasures such as radar jamming will be covered here. These countermeasures can
be further divided into two basic types called noise jamming and deceptive jamming.
Noise jamming is designed to saturate radar receivers with excess electromagnetic
radiation, or noise. This noise, in order to be effective in preventing a radar from detecting
a target, must be greater in power at the receiver's antenna than the radar's own pulse that
is reflected off the target and returned. The receiver will thus be overwhelmed by this
intrusion of jamming energy. The radar operator's scope will immediately become
unusable, because any potential targets will literally be "washed out" and therefore
impossible to see, as in Figure IV. A typical employment of noise jamming is most clearly
illustrated in EB-66 operations during Rolling Thunder.
During Rolling Thunder strikes, the EB-66's would orbit between twenty-five
thousand and thirty-thousand feet in altitude in elliptical, or "racetrack" patterns. These
orbits would be positioned so that the EB-66's were out of range of any known operational
SA-2 sites. In day-to-day Rolling Thunder operations from late 1965 through 1966 the EB-
66C's typically provided SA-2 warnings for the strike forces while the EB-66B's flew
radar-jamming orbits. These orbits would be flown in such a way that the EB-66B's
fOlWard-directed jammers would be radiating along the same path as the attacking force
when the latter penetrated the NVN air 4efenses. Ideally, this would hide the strike force
"-
"underneath" the EB-66B's noise jamming that interfered with the North Vietnamese radar
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-displays-;- A{iditional-EB-66s, if available, would be radiating from other directions to
confuse the North Vietnamese radar operatoiS and help to screen the attacking force. It is
important to tmderstand, however, that different kinds of radars are different in their
susceptibility to noise jamming. Some radars are less vulnerable than others.(13) This gives
rise to the use of.deceptive jamming that relies more on "finesse" and less on "brute
strength."
Deceptive jamming. like noise jamming. is designed to confuse the enemy. It takes
advantage of the peculiarities of specific radars by turning these characteristics into
weaknesses. For example, the particular scan pattern of a radar antenna -- how it
physically moves and searches the sky -. might lend itself to a particular technique of
jamming as would the specific pattern in which pulses are transmitted from the antenna. A
radar's electronic hardware or signal processing methods might be another potential
weakness. This is why radar development has been characteristically secretive because to
know how a radar works is to also know how it can be jammed.(14)
In order to successfully disrupt a radar, the equipment doing the jamming must
meet some conditions. First and foremost, the jamming transmitter must be matched to the
correct frequency. All the jamming power in the world is of little value unless it is tWled
into the correct "channel." This requires detailed intelligence from electronic
reconnaissance aircraft or other gatherers of electronic infonnation. This data is called
electronic intelligence, or ELINT. The Navy, for example, had ELINT ships in the Gulf of
Tonkin to monitor North Vietnamese air defense radars and record their operating
frequencies. The Air Force's ELINT efforts date back to World War n.(IS) Matching the
frequency is only part of the battle.
Jarnming also needs to be continuous and, especially with respect to deception
jamming, able to match the characteristics of the victim radar. Competent radar operators
are often able to "work through" or compensate for jamming and still identify and track
their targets.(16) If the jamming is not continuous, for example, these operators can gather
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themselves. Deception jamming must be able literally to mimic- the radar's own pulses so
they will be processed nonnally by the radar's logic circuits to present false information,
often without the operator realizing that something is amiss. If these deception signals do
not exactly match the outgoing radar pulses, they will be rejected by the radar's processor
just as soon as they are received through its antenna. Deceptive jamming can be clearly
illustrated in the case of a track-while-scan (TWS) radar.
There have been many TWS radars developed throughout the world over the
years, with the SA-2 being among the first of these ever employed.(l7) A track-while-scan
radar typically uses two radar antennas, each operating on different radar frequencies and
both capable of scanning a section of sky at a rapid rate, as seen in Figure V. One radar
antenna determines the range and elevation of the target, while the other determines the
range and azimuth. Once a target is selected for missile launch, the information, combined
from the two antennas, is fed into a computer and converted into a guidance signal for the
outgoing missile. The radar is called a track-while-scan because it is able to provide this
missile guidance information on one target while simultaneously tracking many other
potential targets. Most other types of radars in that time period immediately lost the ability
to "see" other targets once they were "locked on" to a specific target of interest. By
contrast, a TWS radar technically did not "lock on" to its target.
One kind ofjammer that can be used against a track-while-scan radar is called a
modulated noise jammer. What this jammers does is deny tracking capability to the victim
radar. To accomplish this, the jamming waves are modulated, or shaped, by a modulating
signal in a process roughly similar to the way in which music being transmitted from a
commercial radio station is superimposed onto a frequency modulated (FM) or amplitude
modulated (AM) wave. The shape of the modulating wave is determined by certain scan
characteristics of this radar. The effect on the victim radar can be devastating.
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electronics and methods of operation. The following example illustrates what might dceur
dwing active jamming of such a radar. In Figure VI, we see what might be seen as a
"typical" operator's radar scope of a track-white-scan radar. The target is clearly seen at
ten degrees of elevation at a range of five miles. Noise jamming, when introduced,
immediately denies range information. (.Figure Vll) The operator knows that something is
out there at 10 degrees elevation, but not how far away it is. Figure vm shows the effect
of modulated noise jamming. Range information continues to be denied, but now the
operator has four possible elevations from which to choose.(18)
In 1965, the specific jamming techniques required to jam an SA-2 were known in
the American military, but testing efforts had almost always involved Strategic Air
Command (SAC) bomber aircraft, like the B-52 Stratofortress and B-58 Hustler. Rarely
were Tactical Air Command (TAC) fighter aircraft like the F-I05 or F-l00 participants in
these tests. The bombers were outfitted with extensive arrays of electronic warfare
equipment and had an electronic warfare officer on each crew to operate it. SAC B-52's
often flew simulated bombing runs in special training ranges where "surrogates" of Fan
~ong radars operated.
These surrogates were American-made copies of the SA-2's Fan Song radar. The
design was based on the best intelligence information available. General Dynamics
Corporation in Fort Worth, Texas had what was called an Electronic Warfare Evaluation
Simulator, which, after technical help from Cornell University researchers, was able to
evaluate many different American radar jammers and countenneasure techniques.(19)
Through a computer, this equipment was pitted against most every known Soviet-built
,
radar and radar-guided missile system. "By 1964," recalled a Cornell researcher, "we had
-a very good handle on what would jam an SA-2. The knowledge was there, ready for
whe~ it w~uld be needed. "(20) Tactical Air Command and the Pacific Air Forces had be~;<- - -
. .-
rudely awakened to the fact that they very much needed that knowledge.
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Radar jamming was not the only way toneutraJizetheS-A-2.Another alternative
was to sever or at least disrupt the links between the elements that made up the SA-2
system. For example, Radio transmissions within the SA-2 battalion or between the SA-2
battalion and its commanding regiment could have been vulnerable links. These links could
be jammed, provided the frequencies were known and the appropriate jammer with enough
power could be positioned close enough to the SA-2 site to be effective. If the SA-2 had
been in position for any appreciable length of time, then certainly the crew could have
connected communications cables, thus hampering attempts at radio jamming. Missile sites,
-
it will be recalled, were built with these cables already laid out and only in need of
attachment. There were other vulnerable links that could not protected by a cable.
One of these links, for example, could have been the radio commands from the
ground to the missile. If it were unable to receive various guidance commands :from the
fire control battery, the missile might simply follow a ballistic flight path and miss its target
entirely. Another link might be the proximity fuse of the Guideline missile itself. This fuse
could be fooled through the use of decoys or actual jamming of the missile's fuzing radar.
Feeding the wrong information into the fuse. could cause a premature detonation of the
warhead. This was not new knowledge in the American electronic warfare community
because similar options were considered almost three years before the missile's deployment
to North Vietnam during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis.
Cuban SA-2's directly threatened the reconnaissance flights by U-2 aircraft, which
generated a crash program within the American military to find out what radio frequencies
were used on the Guideline missiles' proximity fuse. This required monitoring activity near
the Cuban SA-2 missile sites. The US Army had become adept at intercepting electronic
emissions from Soviet tests and exercises in Europe. One of the most sought-after Soviet
frequencies was that for radar proximity fuses in artillery shells. (21) Finding such a
frequency in a guided missile was relatively more difficult than in a artillery shell's fuse,
because the former's radar fuse transmitted in a limited direction. This transmission was
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confined to a narrow "cone" projecting fOlWararrOmtlie rriissiIe's nose:-Unf()rtUnately,the
only way to intercept this frequency was to send up a juicy target for a missile crew,
provoke a launch, and record the radar transmission just prior to the missile's detonation
next to the aircraft doing the recording. Although the Air Force often got volunteers for a
variety of dangerous missions, this one exceeded what might be considered "aboye and
beyond" the call of duty. It was highly unlikely that anyone would knowingly fly as a
sacrificial lamb to record proximity fuse transmissions just prior to vanishing in a large
fireball. The solution, therefore, came in the fonn of a target drone modified not only with
special radar detection gear, but also deception equipment which made the drone appear on
radar to be a large aircraft These drones were on hand by 1965.
Starting in October, 1965, the Air Force launched four of these drones under the
code-name of "United Effort. "(22) A drone was sent at high altitude right over the North
Vietnamese air defenses on each occasion to collect and re-transmit the proximity fuse
:frequency. Nearby, but far out of therange of SA-2 missiles, orbited a Strategic Air
Command RB-47H, a B-47 bomber re-configured for electronic intelligence missions,
which would receive and record the drone's signals. All four United Effort drones
succeeded in provoking missile launches and were subsequently shot down by SA-2
battalions. Although the RB-47's gathered important guidance signals from SA-2 fire
control batteries, it wasn't until the fourth mission, on 13 February, 1966 that the missile's
proximity fuse radar transmissions were successfully collected. That particular drone was
blown to pieces by two Guidelines over Thanh Hoa, North Vietnam.(23) Countering the
SA-2's electronics was a significant but incomplete solution to the problem faced by the US
Air Force.
Consideration also had to be made for the North Vietnamese integrated air defense
system. Even if an SA-2 battalion did not bother to turn on its Fan Song radar, chances
were good that the other defense elements could provide the battalion with accurate
tracking data regarding the attacking force. A hidden SA-2 site could therefore remain in
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ambuslruntiI-tlre-lascp-ossible-moment; tumitrg~onits -radanmly to effect a missile launch
since the battalion already would know the direction in which to point its radar. Efforts to
blind or destroy large radar-based air defenses, or even attempts to sever certain key links
of that system, were correspondingly massive, complex tasks.(24) Less massive, but no less
complex, were attempts to destroy occupied SA-2 sites.
The physical destruction of an SA-2 system would first require knowledge of its
precise location. Visual identification of a site, either through photo-reconnaissance or
pilot obsetVations, was difficult due to the excellent techniques of concealment practiced by
the North Vietnamese. To help overcome this problem in finding the site, the approximate
position of an SA-2 could be revealed through a combination of radar direction-finding
equipment and triangulation. Direction-finding equipment installed on an aircraft could
provide the relative bearing of the emitting radar to the aircraft, the latter always at a
known location. Figure IX shows typical airborne electronic intelligence equipment and a
route of flight. The derived positions, no matter how carefully taken by the operator, were
limited in accuracy because of limitations in the detection equipment. Also, ifalerted in
time by the other elements of the air defenses, the Fan Song crews could shut down their
radars when an EB-66C passed nearby on such a reconnaissance mission. Despite these
difficulties, the actual process to derive the approximate location a site was relatively simple
in nature.
At three different times along the route of flight, the relative bearing of the desired
radar signal to the aircraft were recorded, provided that the radar was transmitting in the
first place. This information can be used to derive three lines of position, or LOP's, as seen
in Figure X. Ideally, all the LOP's would intersect at a common point. This point
represented the position of the radar site. If the lines did not intersect in the same place, the
result would be a triangle, with the radar located somewhere within the boundaries of that
triangle. In any event, the derived location was approximate, and there still remained the
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problem actually findh,g it Evenihen,thesernissilesites were well-endowed with
supporting batteries of anti-aircraft artillery, making aircraft attacks a risky proposition.
As the above analysis indicates, the Air Force was faced with a problem which had
no simple solution. Further compounding the problem was the complete lack of electronic
warfare expertise among the ranks of both the Tactical Air Command and the Pacific Air
Forces decision-makers. They would come to learn that an implicit first step in the
countering of such a lethal, radar-based system was having a firm program of electronic
warfare already established. In 1965, however, this was not the situation at either the
Tactical Air Command or PACAF, where electronic warfare operations in each had long
been relegated to the backburner of daily operations. According to a contemporary Air
Force report, "the SAM (missile) threat triggered a flurry of activity at PACAF...a 'wait
and see attitude' had been rudely confronted with a 'what do we do now' attitude."(25)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Air Forces lamented the state ofhis
command's electronic warfare in 1965 as "practically devoid of electronic warfare
equipments (sic) and personnel." The tactical air units were faced with implementing a late,
costly effort in the electronic warfare arena. He thought it was a situation "fostered by lack
of emphasis on electronic warfare equipment, manpower and organization." When
PACAF finally got its anti-SA-2 act in gear, efforts at countenneasures were hindered by
"lack of proper manning and organization throughout the entire Tactical Air Forces. "(26)
As was written in a contemporary Air Force report, this was a "rerun of an old movie
based on a Korean war script. "(27) Old lessons in electronic warfare were going to have to
be relearned, and the Air Force was finding out the hard way. More than two weeks after
the downing of Leopard 04, the decision to counter the SA-2 came straight from the top of
the Air Force command structure.
A task force to study the situation was officially created on 13 August, 1965 by
the USAF Chief of Staff, General John McConnell.(28) This came a day after the Joint
Chiefs of Staff created a similar committee under the code-name of "Prong Tong" to study
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the same problem.(29) The independent Air Force committee, headed by Brigadier
General K.C. Dempster, was directed to study the SA-2 and detetmine possible ways to
counter it It was comprised of representatives from the Air Staff, major air commands,
industry, and the scientific community. One of the members of the task force, who had
been associated with Air Force research and development for many years, described it as
"ten or twelve guys who sat in smoke-filled rooms and brought contractors in to figure out
what to do. "(30) In a very short time the task force had come up with several
recommendations, and Dempster went over these proposals with everyone up the chain of
command, starting with the Commander of the Pacific Air Forces and ending with the
Secretary of Defense.(31) Ironically, Dempster's task force only echoed earlier cries for an
airborne tactical electronic warfare program long since buried in a massive avalanche of
military documents.
As early as 1952 Tactical Air Command had convened an Electronic
Countermeasures board modeled after that of the Strategic Air Comrnand.(32)
Furthermore, Tactical Air Command had also published a document entitled "Doctrine
Governing Mission and Command functions of Electronic Countermeasures in Tactical Air
Operations" in November of that same year. Both the board and the doctrine pointed to a
pressing need to integrate this capability with the current tactical air operations, including
the means to locate and destroy threatening enemy radars.(33). Visionary statements aside,
the fact remained that TAC had at this time but a handful of personnel familiar with
electronic warfare. The organizational structure to implement any electronic warfare
program simply could not come into being without the properly qualified people to support
it. Whether this small-scale effort was the result of decisions by only a few influential
officers or more: of a general feeling of animosity toward such a secret program, or both,
remains to be fully investigated. However, the contrast with the Strategic Air Command is
rather striking.
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Historians Alfred Price and Daniel Kuehl to some extenthave contrasted th~
electronic warfare policies of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command
(TAC), but the subject is open for a much more detailed examination.(34) This is
especially true for the time period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. However, it is
obvious that SAC placed a much greater emphasis on electronic couptenneasures. General
Curtis Le May, the long-time Commander-in-C~ of SAC, held up the production of the
new B-52 Stratofortress bombers in the early 1950's Wltil Boeing redesigned the crew
compartment to include space for an electronic warfare officer, not to mention an extensive
electronic cOWltermeasures suite.(35) Kuehl noted that for large exercises, SAC regularly
showed up with dozens of electronic combat-capable bombers and dedicated electronic
countenneasures support aircraft. On the other hand, TAC only scraped up a few such
aircraft, and these were relatively obsolete bomber airframes with out-moded
countermeasures equipment. The tactical fighters, too, had a paucity ofjamming
equipment, most of which was in storage on a Pacific Island. Suffice to say that throughout
the 1950's and most of the 1960's SAC possessed the personnel and infrastructure to
quickly expand any electronic warfare program while TAC did not.
Despite its lack of a sizeable electronic warfare program, TAC's immediate task was
the installation of radar detection equipment onto Air Force combat aircraft. This was
called Radar Homing and Warning, or RHAWgear. According to author Larry Davis, the
Bendix Corporation had made this very same proposal to the USAF earlier in 1965, about
the sarne time the first SA-2 sites was discovered in North Vietnam.(36) Bendix wanted to
install RHAW gear in the F-lOO fighter, but the proposal was rejected. The Air Force
officers making the decision at the time perceived no need for such equipment in fighter
aircraft. A second example contrasting what the tactical air forces perceived as threats
before and after the July 1965 missile firing was the development of the F-105. The
manufacturers of the Thud had in the original contract a modest array of electronic
countermeasures to include a radar warning receiver, chaff dispenser and jammer. This
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was also rejected in the name of $105,000 in cost savings per aircraft.(37) On 14 October,
1965, however, the Headquarters, United States Air Force ordered its Air Force Logistics
command to install RHAW equipment on the F-100 in ten days. lbe installation and initial
equipment testing took place at the Sacramento Air Materiel Area, McClellan Air Force
Base, Califomia.(38)
Radar homing and warning gear would allow the air crews to continuously receive
information as to the approximate location and intentions of active SA-2 sites and other
threat radars. A missile launch warning light, accompanied by an ear-piercing tone would
be triggered when the RHAW gear detected the radio guidance commands from the SA-2
fire control battery to the missile. Clear visibility to the actual launch site would no longer
be the only means for a pilot to be aware of an approaching missile. This was an
important consideration while operating in the variable weather conditions over the heavily
defended North Vietnamese targets.
Another recommendation was that jamming equipment designed to confuse the
SA-2 system be developed for mounting onto fighter aircraft. These were called pods,
long, hollow aerodynamic containers with jamming equipment installed inside. Prior to
take-off, the pod was attached underneath the fighter and the jammers were tuned to the
frequencies of the radars which threatened the aircraft, like fire control radars for anti-
aircraft artillery and the Fan Song. Pods also had their limitations. As the aircraft's speed
increased, the pod would induce greater drag. The pods also took up space under the
aircraft that would otherwise be used for ordnance.
The jamming pod was not a new idea to the tactical community. In the late 1950's
Tactical Air command bought a few ALQ-31 pods from North American Aviation for use
of the F-l00 and F-105. Thesc hugc, 12-foot, twenty-cight inch diamcter pods caused so
much drag that the fuel consumption on these fighters was substantially increased. The fuel
bum rate was so high, in fact, that the ftghters would not have enough fuel to return from
striking their assigned wartime nuclear targets.(39) A couple years later,Tactical Air
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Command procured a large number of smaller QRC-=I60 jamming pods for fighter aircraft
under the Quick Reaction Capability program, or QRC.(40) General Electric produced
these pods, with the first arriving at operational USAF units in the wake of the Cuban
Missile crisis in 1963. Many of these pods wound up within PACAF where they went into
storage at Kadena Air Base. Few commanders at the time were inclined to attach the pods
underneath their fighters. Neither the length of time in storage nor the humid conditions
on Okinawa were favorable for these pods when they were brought out for later use in
Southeast Asia.
These QRC-160 pods were sent to Southeast Asia's hostile skies by 1965, but only
for a short time. RF-I0l "Voodoo" reconnaissance aircraft based out of Tan Son Nhut
AB, Vietnam, carried these pods on their missions. Qualified technicians and spare parts
for the QRC-160, however, were in short supply. That wasn't half the problem. Not
designed to withstand sustained in-flight vibrations, many of the internal parts of the pod
came loose, rendering the jammers useless. An Air Force report said that the pods "also
seemed to cause the RF-101 wing tips to tuck and some thought this could be (very
unsafe)." These pods, viewed with a "shadow of suspicion" were sent back to the
States.(41) The pods recommended by Dempster's task force needed to overcome the
QRC-160's deficiencies, and the first improved models would not arrive in theater until late
1966.
A third recommendation was to build and employ a missile capable of homing in on
the Fan Song's radar emissions and destroying the radar itself. Such a missile was
designated an anti-radiation missile (ARM) and its origins trace back to World War IT,
where scientific hotbeds like the Radiation Laboratory and Radio Research Laboratory in
Massachusetts produced a plethora of technologies, many of which were "reborn" for use
in Southeast Asia.(42) One example of the several ancestors to modem ARM's was the
Moth, originally conceived as a radio-controlled, radar-homing glide bomb. Designed to
knock out German radar warning stations along the northern French coast. the Moth
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program was eased out of the US 8th Bomber Command's Radio and Radar
Countenncasures program in November of 1943 on the grounds that the Moth tests in the
United States were not proceeding at a satisfactory pace. The Anny Air Forces opted
instead for low-level attacks over the water by medium bombers.(43) The Moth, like so
many scientific programs of that era, vanished after V-J Day.
Years later, the US Navy developed an ARM that was based on the Sparrow air-
to-air missile. (44) This particular missile, known as a Shrike, was tested as early as 1958 at
the Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, Nevada.(45) By 1962 the Cuban missile
crisis accentuated the perceived need for an ARM and so the Navy accelerated the Shrike's
development. The first operational shrikes arrived for use over North Vietnam by April,
1966.
The most significant recommendation by Dempster's task force was that it called
for the development of a fighter aircraft designed specifically to locate SA-2 sites and mark
them for immediate attacks by accompanying flights of fighter-bombers. The equipment
used for this mission was to be off-the-shelf equipment installed into an existing fighter.
Moreover, the fighter had to be a two-seat aircraft allowing for both a pilot and an
electronic warfare officer, the latter's job being to operate the radar direction- finding
equipment.
This idea, ironically, came from a fOlmer SAC electronic warfare officer who was
now out of the service and working for North American Aviation.(46) This proposal for a
modification to North American's F-I00F fighter aircraft was outlined on the back of an
envelope on his flight over to where the task force was meeting at the Pentagon. Dempster
was quite impressed with the plan but was not too confident about pushing the program
through the standard Air Force acquisition routine that seemed to require, according to one
,.
member of the task force, "a development plan thirty-five feet thick that had been (outlined
and coordinated with) the whole world." Convinced by the task force to bypass the
cumbersome process due to the desperate nature of the situation, Dempster left the room
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and "fifteen minutes later he was back with two million dollars," which was sufficient to
begin a program called "Wild Weasel 1." The program was given the_highest priority
possible to ensure its fast completion.(47)
Unfortunately for the airmen flying combat missions in Southeast Asia, the
manifestations of the task force's recommendations were still months away when the
remnants of Leopard flight touched down on the airstrip at Ubon Air Base, Thailand in
July of 1965. Until the new assets to counter the SA-2 anived, the aviators would have to
quickly come up ~th some ideas to deal with the SA-2 and the North Vietnamese air
defense system.
67
Chapter six
Desperation: The SA-2 Denies The Medium Altitudes
The SA-2 missile system dominated North Vietnam's aerial arena throughout the
fall and winter of 1965 and throughout most of 1966. This weapon helped to allow the
North Vietnamese defenses to effect a situation that historian Earl Tilford termed air
denial.(I) This meant that the air defenses, at a time and place of their own choosing and
within certain altitude regimes, could often prevent the American aircraft from operating
freely. For example, F-I05 pilots preferred to approach their targets from medium altitudes
between 12,000 to 15,000 feet (2). If the target was defended by SA-2 battalions then the
F-lOS's would be forced to change their plans. Often this meant approaching at a much
lower altitude or even bombing another target entirely. It has been previously argued that
the SA-2 was well integrated into the North Vietnamese air defenses and that this same
defensive system was relatively inflexible, yet the SA-2 appears to have been an extremely
effective weapon during this time.
This weapon should be considered by historians as one of the most significant
weapons ever introduced into air combat. The SA-2 transformed tactical air warfare much
like the rifle or machine gun changed land warfare. It broUght a sense of desperation and a
major shift in tactical doctrine in the forces that opposed it over North Vietnam in 1965.
The SA-2 dominated the skies but a short time in a long war. It exacted a relatively small
human toll and only a small number of launched missiles managed to down a target
These facts, combined with its subsequently poor performance in the Sinai has led some
writers to question the effectiveness of the SA-2.(3)
In the 1967 Six-Day War, Soviet built SA-2's were used by the Arab ground
defenses, but were rarely fired at Israeli Air Force aircraft. The Israelis did not use Wild
Weasel-type aircraft, nor were they forced out of their preferred operating altitudes. A
closer look at the combat effectiveness of an single weapon or element in a large military
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system might shed light on how the Israelis dominated the air in 1967 and the US Air
Force was denied its operational freedom in 1965, even though both air attack systems
faced the SA-2 missile system. Historian Martin Van Creveld"offered a possible
explanation in his aforementioned chapter on modem, integrated war.
To illustrate the relationship between an individual weapon and a highly integrated
system, Van Creveld used the case of a fighter-bomber type aircraft. He called this airplane
"a self-contained platfonn" which made it autonomous in nature with respect to the greater
system. Such a weapon was therefore capable of inflicting tremendous damage to
opposing forces as evidenced by the Gennan Blitzkrieg early in World War II and in Allied
tactical aircraft operations a few years later. Van Creveld asserts that this was also true in
the Israeli Air Force as late as the 1967 Six-Day War. "A single pilot, " wrote Van Creveld,
"requiring comparatively little outside assistance, was able to loiter above a battlefield,
conduct reconnaissance, acquire a target, and hit it with the aid of weapons carried
aboard. "(4)
As anti-aircraft defenses became more formidable with the passage of time, the
fighter-bomber became "increasingly dependent" on other technologies. The aircraft grew
less effective as it became part of this growing system of integrated technologies.(5) In Van
Creveld's view, integration contributed to the demise of this aircraft's effectiveness just as
much as the threat posed by the modernization of anti-aircraft defenses. Furthermore, the
growing system of which the aircraft was a part became less flexible as the fonner grew in
size and degree of integration. Modem aerial warfare subsequently evolved into two huge
systems engaged in a slow war of attrition with the individual elements hampered in their
use and effectiveness because of the systems' growing rigidity.
. However, the application of his model to the 1%7 Israeli air war example seems to
paint an incomplete picture. True, this 1967 air battle was a clash of two large systems --
the Israeli Air Force (IAF) on one hand and the Arab air defenses on the other. It is also
true that the Israeli Air Forces facilitated the tasks of the Israeli antlored and infantry units
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in the Sinai by pwnmeling the Arab ground units. If these two systems slugged.it out toe-
to-toe in the skies above the Sinai we are to further infer that the nimble Israeli fighter-
bomber wrought havoc upon the Arab ground forces because it was independent from its
own encumbering system and therefore free from this greater war of aerial attrition. Using
the word "autonomy" as an explanation for the effectiveness of the Israeli fighter-bombers
appears to fall short.
The 1967 Israeli pilots roaming the sky at will in search of targets could do so
because the Arab air forces-- a key component of the integrated Arab air defenses-- had
been smashed by the Israeli Air Force on the first day of the war. Surprise was complete,
and the Arab defenses were completely shattered in a matter of minutes. Many of the
same Israeli fighter bombers roaming the skies above the Sinai had been the same ones
over the Arab airfields on that opening strike. After that day, nothing short of a nuclear
detonation in the sky could have stopped the Israelis from loitering above the battlefield
and commencing their long, diving bomb runs once a target had been located. Most of the
Arab anti-aircraft artillery pieces positioned in the Sinai could not accurately reach the
operating altitudes of the Israeli aircraft in order to effectively harass the pilots. Arab
surface-to-air missiles, SA-2's in particular, were not even a factor to consider on the
battlefield; they were too far away to stop these Israeli close air support missions.(6)
Ihe Arab air defense network had been tom asunder, allowing the Israeli pilots to
choose the time and place of their attacks. Although this appears to have been the main
reason for the success of the Israeli fighter-bombers, there were other reasons. It should be
kept in mind, for example, that man-made machines like tanks, trucks, vans and radars arc
relatively easy to spot in nat, open desert from great distances. This is especially true when
they are in motion, since much dust is kicked up behind them. Factors such as a
neutralized air defense system and open desert warfare, not necessarily a high degree of
independence from an inflexible system made the Israeli fighter-bombers so effective. The
1967 conflict was a case of Israeli air superiority, which allowed it to spend most of its time
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doing what they pleased at medium altitudes often far above the small anns fire, automatic
cannon, and other antiaircraft artillery pieces situated with the beleaguered ground forces.
Despite this relative freedom, about three-quarters of the approximately forty-five
Israeli aircraft were downed by Arab ground fire. The rest were shot down in air-to-air
combat: none were lost to missiles.(7) This should come as no surprise. Anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA), consisting of everything from automatic weapons to heavy cannon, has
usually out-performed guided missiles in exacting tolls from modern combat aircraft. This
was as true in the Sinai as it was over Vietnam. Over 80 percent of the USAF aircraft
-
combat losses in Southeast Asia during the course of the war were due to AAA fire and
not guided missiles.(8) Most aircraft, in fact, escaped the wrath of surface-to-air missiles in
the sorties flown during the course of the Southeast Asian conflict. Of over 9000 SA-2s
fired between 1%5 and 1972, only about 1.5% of the missiles actually brought down
aircraft.(9) To use a more specific example during the 1972 Linebacker II operations, the
so-called "Eleven-Day War" in which US aircraft mounted a devastating precision air
bombardment of Hanoi and Haiphong in December, over one-thousand SA-2s were fired.
This cost the US Air Force fifteen B-52 bombers and no fighters.(lO) How much damage,
then, is "enough" to make a weapon "successful?"
For the traditional measure of achievement in the form of body COWlts, one only
need to review the employment of the rifle in the American Civil War or artillery and
machine guns in the First World War. The tremendous loss of life caused by the rifle in
the Coo War eventually led to the abandonment of tactics originally conceived around the
inaccurate smoothbore musket. Fifty years later, the machine gun mowed attacking
infantrymen down by the thousands and brought trench warfare to World War I, while
artillery accounted for about sixty percent of that conflict's casualties.(ll) These weapons
were frightfully effective killing machines. The thousands upon thousands of dead were
silent, yet powerful testimony to this fact. In 1862, over 24,000 men fell at Antietam in
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one day. Well over one million fell during the agonizingly long Battle of the Somme
during the latter half of 1916.(12)
As long as opposing commanders had not adjUsted their way ofthinking to the
threat posed by advances in destructive technology, these weapons would continue to
wreak havoc with men-at-anns. Until changes occurred in tactical doctrine, the particular
weapon in question would dominate the field. For many reasons, large military
organizations are very resistant and thus notoriously slow in radically changing their
doctrines to accommodate new weapons. To be sure, the fact that the aforementioned
weapons were the direct cause of so many casualties greatly magnifies their impact on
warfare. However, this also serves to obscure the major doctrinal changes that other less
destructive weapo~ or technologies may have caused, simply because these other weapons
failed to sweep the battlefields clean ofhuman lives.(13) In light of this, one indication of
a weapon's impact in warfare might simply be whether or not it induces a significant
change in the combat doctrine of the opposition.
The Soviet-built SA-2 is an example of such a weapon that produced a major
doctrinal change. The SA-2, shown previously to playa key role among the response
elements of the North Vietnamese integrated air defense system, also wreaked havoc with
the Pacific Air Force's aerial combat system in a number of ways. The initial response to
the SA-2 was desperate and short-sighted. As was noted in the previous chapter, it was
also severely hampered by a lack of tactical flexibility. This reaction came on 27 July,
1965. Fifty-four F-I05s flew a poorly-planned mission against the suspected location of
the SA-2 sites (known as SAM sites 6 and 7) that had fired on Leopard flight
This mission came directly as a result of orders from the White House under the
code name "Spring High." (14) Although the sites were demolished, aerial reconnaissance
photographs taken after the strike showed that both sites were fakes. The real equipment
~
had been pulled out by the North Vietnamese and fake SA-2 equipment set up, along with
multitudes of anti-aircraft guns in anticipation of the American strike. This was a "flak trap"
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which had used the dummy SA-2 sites as bait. iv1aking matters worse was that the
attacking aircraft were directed by higher Air Force authorities to follow each other using
the same low-level ingress routes to their target. This all but negated any element of
surprise and practically handed the strike formation's trailing aircraft on a silver platter to
the North Vietnamese gunners.(15)
"The mission was just stupid," recalled Charles Homer, who was a captain and F-
105 pilot at the time. "(It was) like a North Vietnamese firepower display. We were flying
right into a barrage of anti-aircraft fire. "(16) The flak was so intense that the last flight of
four F-105s dropped down to fifty feet off the grO\Uld at almost the speed of sound in an
attempt to fly under the shell bursts. "rve never seen a sky like that," observed Captain
Marty Case in that last flight, "and I never want to see another one." Six F-105 aircraft
and one RF-101 "Voodoo reconnaissance aircraft were shot down, and only one of the
pilots was rescued. (17)
All those aircraft were lost for an imaginary SA-2 site. It was clear that better
plans for attacking the sites had to be devised, not to mention finding the real ones in the
ftrst place. Regardless of the faults of the approach used in that first retaliatory strike, it
was clear that the mobility of the SA-2 was an important planning consideration. Once an
SA-2 site had been located, it was important to attack it as quickly as possible, lest the
missile battalion pack up its gear and drive away elsewhere.
Special flights were created to go after SA-2 sites, but the methods employed to
hit the sites were quite unwieldy. It wasn't unti13 August, 1965 that the Pacific Air Forces
received permission to send out photo-reconnaissance flights at low altitude over North
Vietnam to take pictures of suspected SA-210cations. "Suspected" because, electronic
intercepts of the Fan Song radars alone were not deemed accurate enough to launch a
strike in that location. A site discovered by interceptions of Fan Song radar transmissions,
like intercepts made from an EB-66C, had to be further confirmed through photographs.
This was a lengthy process, because reconnaissance aircraft had to first obtain the
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necessary target infonnation by launching and then perfonning the mission. Once the pilot
landed, his photographs had to be developed and interpreted by intelligence experts. Only
after this process was finished were evaluations sent "up the line." Once in possession of
positive identification, Second Air Division or Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces could order
a strike. For example, on the 9th of August, the first strike was made on an SA-2 site
(SAM site #9) through these methods, a full 25 hoW'S after the initial ELINT reports. (18)
There had been more than enough time for the SA-2 battalion to move away by the time
strike aircraft showed up to bomb it. Remaining behind were anti-aircraft guns, which
according to post-mission reports put up "intense ground fire."(19)
In August, both the Air Force and Navy established what were known as "Iron
Hand" missions. These were'missions planned specifically to attack SA-2 sites, and they
soon became a significant portion of Rolling Thunder sorties (20) On 12 August, the Navy
lost an A-4E to an SA-2 missile. On that day and the next, nwnerous Navy aircraft were
launched on Iron Hand missions in an effort to find and destroy any SA-2 sites in the area
of the downed aircraft. They found no sites and lost five aircraft for their efforts. In the
case of the Air Force, Iron Hand fell to the Thuds.
Initially, Iron Hand F-I05s were directed to wait on the ground in an alert status
Wltil an SA-2 site was detected by some source. Upon notification of an active SA-2 site,
the Thuds would take off and try to find it. Lacking any electronic gear and hampered by
excellent North Vietnamese camouflage techniques for hiding the missile sites, the F-105s
were not very successful. This particular technique of ground alert was abandoned after
only a week, because the Air force planners in Hawaii preferred to see the ground alert
sorties in the air on a strike mission rather than idle. Ground alert sorties for Iron Hand on
12, 14 and I? August, for example, were never launched.(21) To avoid losing sorties on
paper, these ground alert sorties were flown as anned reconnaissance sorties, searching for
North Vietnamese targets along suspected lines of communication, like roads. The efforts
to seek out and destroy SA-2 sites became a part of daily Rolling Thunder operations.
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One example of an effort organized to flush out these North Vietnamese SA-2
predators was operation "Left Hook." The plan behind this was to launch an unmanned
target drone aircraft high over the air defenses to provoke the latter into directing a missile
launch. Waiting near the drone -- but safe from the NV defenses -- would be electronic
reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft, upon detecting Fan Song emissions, would relay
the relative bearings to an airborne command post. From these bearings the command post
would plot the sites' location and direct strike aircraft into the area. Additional aircraft
would be on patrol in the vicinity of suspected SAM sites, waiting for the launch of the
Guidelines to give away the site's location. Left Hook I took place on 21 August, 1965, but
no missile radars were turned on by the North Vietnamese. Ten days later, Left Hook IT
flushed out a Fan Song but the strike aircraft were unable to spot the SA-2 battalion. An
F-105 was lost to AAA on an attack on an alternate target. (22)
Thereafter~ the Thuds flew armed reconnaissance over North Vietnam in search
of active SA-2 battalions. Certain geographical areas in North Vietnam were cleared by
President Johnson and his advisors for strikes against these missile sites no matter how they
were located. Sites found outside these cleared areas still had to be seen on reconnaissance
photos before a strike could be authorized.(23) Although clearing out strike zones for the
purpose of hunting SA-2 battalions decreased the time lag"between initial site location and
the launch of strike aircraft, the problem of pinpointing the sites had yet to be solved. Air
Force aircraft continued to be traded for attack opportunities on suspected sites. For
example, on 16 September, six F-I05's attempted to seek out and strike three suspected
missile sites, only to be met with fierce anti-aircraft fire from waiting guns. One F-I05 was
lost before it reached a sU$pected site, and another went down somewhere near that same
site, but the SA-2 itself was never located. The remaining four aircraft found an
unoccupied site and bombed it.(24) Fourteen days later another F-I05 went down, this
one victim to a Guideline. The pilot, a squadron commander, had been warned of SA-2
activity, but was occupied in directing his squadron's attack and could not see the rising
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SA-2 due to clouds. Eight prepared SA-2 sites, some not yet occupied by SA-2 battalions,
were found and destroyed between July and November by Iron Hand Missions, but the
,
cost to the Air Force in downed aircraft was unacceptable.(25) The North Vietnamese
seemed to be building sites faster than the attacking aircraft could destroy them, shuttling
their battalions around from site to site in a deadly shell game.
On 31 October, 1%5 the USAF borrowed the services of a Navy "Hunter-
Killer" A-4E, an aircraft which could detect and pinpoint the SA-2s radar emissions. The
Navy was far better prepared than the tactical Air Force in regards to the SA-2. Their
"Project Shoehorn" literally crammed RHAW gear and other appropriate electronic
equipment into any available nook and cranny in certain attack aircraft, like the A-4E
Skyhawk. One of these jets, from the aircraft carrier USS Oriskany, landed at Takhli Air
Base on 30 October so that the Navy pilot could discuss the upcoming mission with the F-
105 strike pilots. This mission was a Navy strike on a highway Northwest of Hano~ with
the F-105's assigned Iron Hand duties in support of the operation. (26)
Eight F-I05's accompanied the A-4 on this mission, and the Navy pilot quickly
located two active SA-2 sites. In the wild attack that followed, six Guidelines were fired,
two radar sites were confmned destroyed, and the A-4 was lost. It had dropped it's bombs
on an SA-2 site from an altitude offtfty feet and was caught in a barrage of ground frre as
the pilot desperately cUmbed to a safe altitude. Since the A-4E was a rare and valuable
Navy asset, the Navy husbanded the rest for their own air strike operations.(27) A
promising prospect of inter-service cooperation thus went down with the Navy fighter.
Still, this mission was an indication of what was to be brought to bear against the North
Vietnamese air defense system.
Weapons, too, had to be developed to counter the SA-2 sites. During this time
period in late 1965, air crews were instructed to use weapons designed to cover a large area
when detonated. Their advantage lay in the ability to devastate a wide area and increase the
chances of hitting an SA-2 battalion even if the pilot had problems pinpointing the hidden,
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dispersed site. The weapons initially chosen were napalm and cluster bombs, both deadly
weapons against "soft" targets such as exposed personnel and unarmored vehicles. Both
types of ordnance necessitated leveL low-altitude deliveries -- rather than·dive-bombing
from a higher altitude -- which left the aircraft exposed to ground fire for long periods of
time. (28) Iron Hand missions were dangerous propositions for the air crews involved, but
there were other means for countering the missile systems. )
Ihe only Air Force aircraft capable of taking on the SA-2 in the electromagnetic
spectrum were the relatively few available EB-66's. At the time of the loss of Leopard 02,
there were a total of nine EB-66C's available for operations in this theater.(29) This aircraft
became the workhorse of the electronic warfare campaign against the North Vietnamese air
defenses despite being plagued by electronic equipment maintenance problems and high
operating costs. (30) Fighter pilots, according to the 355th unit historian, were "high in
their praise of the EB-66C's and their crews for the protection they provided," even
dubbing the EB-66C unit "The Second Best Fighter Squadron in Southeast Asia. "(31)
The success of the SA-2 forced a change in EB-66 operating procedures. The
EB-66 jamming could no longer significantly degrade major portions of the North
Vietnamese air defenses because the aircraft were thrust into a role of directly defeating the
SA-2 battalions. EB-66 jamming targets became the radars which most immediately
threatened the attackers -- SA-2 radars and AAA fire control radars. Receiving less
emphasis than before were the other warning radars of the North Vietnamese air defense
network, which meant that much of the information that the EB-66's were trying to deny
the SA-2's through jamming was being supplied by other, non-jammed radars in the
defense system. The high degree of North Vietnamese integration prevented the
American countenneasures from being effective. This unhappy fact, added to the
predictable routes and timing of the Rolling Thunder attacks made tough going for the
strike forces. (32) In 1965 the USAF fought an air war of desperation, a condition brought
on largely by the introduction of SA-2 battalions.
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The first and most obvious impact of the SA-2 was that it forced the USAF aircraft
into flying back down into the very low altitude regime -- often only a few hundred feet in
the air-- to avoid the missiles. These tactics served two purposes. First, the low altitude
approach greatly decreased the range at which the attackers could be detected by radar,
thus cutting down the North Vietnamese reaction time. Second, and most important, the
SA-2 perfonned very poorly at these low altitudes so this tactic practically negated the
SAM threat. Unfortunately the low-altitude approach brought the pilots into the lethal
range of a myriad of anti-aircraft guns.
This was also far from an optimum bombing situation. Flying at high Speeds while
at low altitude increased the pilot's chance of survival, but it was quite a difficult task to
find his target from this viewpoint. Prominent terrain features like mOlUltains, hills and
trees served to block a pilot's view from the aircraft to the target. To compensate, pilots
perfonned a "pop-up" maneuver prior to the target area at some specific time or place after
passing the "initial point."
The last navigation timing point on a bombing mission is called the initial point, or
IP. The IP was usually some significant or recognizable landmark, and from this point the
aircraft would be flown at a constant heading -- provided the pilot wasn't busy dodging flak
--until the target was attacked by releasing the weapons. Long before the IP the aircraft
had descended to an extremely low altitude, perhaps only a few hundred feet above the
ground. Shortly after passing the IP, at a pre-detennined location called the "pop-up" point,
the pilot climbed to an optimwn attack altitude.(33)
This maneuver caused the aircraft to climb rapidly to at least a few thousand feet
in altitude (sometimes higher) which gave the pilot greater visibility needed to find his
target. Once the target was found, the pilot would immediately dive upon it and release his
weapons. Unfortunately, it was not easy to find a target in such a short time period, and
the rapid climb served also to reduce the aircraft's speed, thereby making it more vulnerable
to AAA fire. Bombing accuracy was significantly affected, also. According to one F-I05
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~ing commander's end-of-tour report, "numerous targets have not been hit because the
strike force could not go to the target at the desired altitude and (aircrews) were forced to
use 'pop-up' tactics which allow only a few seconds to acquire the target and (this)
.,
decreases bombing accuracy."(34) Not only were the strike aircraft forced to fly at lower
altitudes, the support aircraft were driven farther away.
The increased number of SA-2 sites also drove the slow, less maneuverable EB-66
electronic warfare support aircraft farther from the'aerial battlefield to escape the missile
threat. The farther away the EB-66s were, the less effective their jamming was on SA-2
radars or any other North Vietnamese radars. Although the jamming efforts of these
aircraft only marginally degraded the SA-2s radar at best -- the effect of aniEB"-66C's
jamming was reportedly overcome by relatively simple and easily acquired radar operator
techniques -- it was at least better than no help at al1.(35) Even a few seconds' worth of
confilsion among the operators in the SA-2s fire control battery could mean the difference
between a missile hit or miss. Therefore, the once closely-integrated support elements for
American air strikes were stretched out and the overall system weakened. This made the
individual aircraft elements more vulnerable.
If fighter-bombers, like the F-105 "Thud," pressed home their attack from higher
altitude such as 15,000 feet to avoid the AAA, they still ran the risk of encountering the
SA-2s. In these cases a medium altitude was chosen for F-I05 operations. The SA-2 was
slower and less maneuverable at these altitudes and flight above 10,000 feet was beyond
the reach ofmost AAA pieces. For most of the F-I05's, the recommended altitude for air
strikes against fixed targets was usually between 12,000 and15,OOO feet. This altitude
range would vary depending upon the heights of the cloud layers. Air crews preferred to
fly at least 7000 feet above the undercast, which allowed at least some opportunity to see
and,react to an SA-2 coming up through the clouds. Lacking any protective electronic gear,
the only hope for a Thud pilot who faced a climbing SA-2 was to perform a drastic
maneuver. Often this involved heading straight for the missile, and waiting until the last
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possible instant to pull down (or up) into a new direction perpendicular to the missile's
flight path. (36)
These evasive ntaneuvers often generated forces of at least four times that of
gravity, or 4"G's" to be thrust upon aircraft and crew. This force and the resultant stress
on the airframe was complicated by the weight of additional ordnance of the aircraft's
wings and fuselage. Fighters could out-maneuver the missiles faster and in a much safer
fashion if they weren't laden with their heavy bomb load. Also, such a maneuver with full
ordnance loads caused losses in speed and maneuverability after the it was completed. By
dumping ordnance, a fighter would significantly reduce its drag and weight and be better
able to maintain its precious speed throughout the evasive maneuver. According to a post-
war repo~ "the USAF aircrews (regularly) avoided oncoming SAMs by jettisoning
ordinance immediately and using a high 'G' turning maneuver to make the missile
overshoot." (37)
The SA-2, despite its radar guidance and maneuverability, was not physically
capable of making drastic changes of direction to compensate for significant evasive
maneuvers made by its intended target. There was about a 5-second delay between the
time the Fan Song's computer recognized a need to alter the missile's course and when the
missile actually responded to the new guidance comrnand.(38) This missile, it will be
recalled, was designed to down large bombers, like the B-52. Ibe unsuspecting, non-
maneuvering F-4C's of Leopard flight made relatively easy prey for the first of those three
SAMs. The subsequent violent turns of the remaining Phantoms were too great for the
other SA-2s to follow so these missiles missed their targets.
In fact, the SA-2s became known for their lack of maneuverability against the
agile fighter aircraft, but this knowledge came out of combat experience. Former F-I05
pilot Jack Broughton wrote in that "Ifyou can see Sam (sic), you can usually escape. It has
little, stubby wings and it is going like hell, so it can't turn very well. You can take it on
just like another aircraft and ifyou force it into a commit position and out-turn it. it will
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stall out and auger in. If its radar guidance can't stick with you, it will just explode in the
empty sky..."(39) However, Ifone couldn't see the SAM because of intervening cloud
layers or simply by not looking in the right direction, then one had a problem.
Broughton relayed one episode that occurred while looking for his target on a
bombing mission. "(We) carne spitting out of the clouds," he recalled, "and we met three
Sarns in formation coming up. I never saw them. until the first two roared between John
(Broughton's wingman) and myself...between our wingtips. The first sensation was the
most god-awful noise I have ever heard. It ripped me way down in the bottom ofmy
stomach someplace, like an old stearn engine bursting out of a tunnel. The white hot light
of two rocket engines, passing vertically only feet away, was bizarre and momentarily
tumbled my emotional and physical gyros." (40) The two pilots were lucky that the SAMs
failed to detonate. Evasive maneuvers helped to minimize the need for luck.
Although these violent maneuvers made the aircraft safe from the missile attack, at
this point pilots often found themselves down at a much lower altitude, back into the teeth
of the anti-aircraft artillery. This was not a very positive experience for those flying the
,
harassed aircraft. Moreover, the aircraft usually had no bombs left to drop, either, so
there was no point in continuing their mission. Whether or not the aircraft made it back
g-afcly was not a concern to the SA-2 battalion, for they achieved their original goal of
preventing an aerial attack upon the target that they were defending. The Thuds would
return another day, but today the SA-2 and the air defenses could claim victory.
These maneuvers also tended to disrupt the integrity of a particular flight by
scattering it across a large volume of airspace. Most American aviators had long since
discarded the "lone wolf' approach to air combat and based their tactics on mutual support.
(41) Key to this concept was situational awareness, part of which entailed knowing where
your own flight was at all times. Scattering a flight of aircraft in response to a SA-2launch
only added to the confusion inherently present in combat, and made temporarily isolated
aircraft vulnerable to waiting North Vietnamese fighters. Even ifnot forced to perform a
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violent maneuver, the appearance of a SA-2 battery somewhere in the countryside ahead
would force a change in the planned route of attacking aircraft. (42) In common jargon
that meant not flying a mission "as briefed. "
As previously argued, the missions were planned for aircraft to adhere to specific
routes, altitude and airspeeds. This allowed for timely coordination and support from a
variety of aircraft operating from different air bases. Changing one's plans in such a highly
dynamic environment -- aircraft cannot "stop" to allow for careful contemplation -- greatly
adds to the already daunting tasks facing the aviator in combat. Flying as briefed was
especially critical regarding the low-level tactics which the SA-2 forced on tactical combat
aircraft in 1965.
Since chances were good that the pilots wouldn't even see his target until about the
time he popped up, it was crucial to at least anticipate where one should look. Changing
tactics and approaches after take-off greatly complicated the problem of finding the target
All the key visual reference points would either be approached from a different direction or
be completely different points altogether. The margin for error, already low, greatly
decreased in an environment where aircraft flew a mile every eight or nine seconds. A few
seconds' worth of confusion was all it took for a target to be missed entirely.
Another effect of the SA-2 was that it either diverted a large number of aircraft and
resources into specific support roles in SAM suppression or diverted many air strikes from
SA-2 defended areas. More aircraft were lost to AAA fire while attacking SA-2 sites than
were downed by the SA-2's themselves.(43) Without the SA-2 around, many of these
aircraft could othetWise have been used to strike other targets. For example, during each
two-week "period" of authorized Rolling Thunder strikes, the Navy and Air Force would
be authorized about 600 sorties -- one mission by one aircraft -- each for "armed
reconnaissance" in addition to their specific list of Presidentially-approved targets. Armed
reconnaissance sorties flew along suspected lines of communication, such as roads, in
search of truck convoys or other targets of opportunity. From 29 October to 11 November
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approximately twenty-percent of these "anned recce" sorties were originally planned to be
Iron Hand sorties. Also, one of the six specifically authorized targets was a support facility
for surface-to-air missiles. (44)
All told, over 200 Iron Hand strikes were flown between August and December of
1965.(45) but the number originally planned to be Iron Hand far exceeded that number.
Poor weather over North Vietnam, for example, cancelled many sorties during the winter
months and if there were no known SA-2 battalions operating or possible sites discovered
then those Iron Hand sorties would instead be flown as armed reconnaissance.
-
Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces noted at the time that a large number of armed
reconnaissance missions were devoted instead to Iron Hand duties throughout the fall (46)
~ 'I'-
Research analyst Mike Fossier called this diversion of aircraft to other roles as ''virtual
attrition. "(47)
Virtual attrition could take out an entire strike force. As shown earlier, the downing
ofjust one aircraft by an SA-2 could call a halt to the air strike in progress and all efforts
would be made instead to locate and rescue the downed air crew.(48) Not only would a
large: number of aircraft be stopped from striking a target, but the rescue operation was
dangerous for the aircraft involved. In November, after an F-I05 was shot down by an
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SA-2, two helicopters and two close air support aircraft were shot down in attempts to
rescue the pilot. That the air above North Vietnam was often denied to the Americans was
not in doubt, but this was not the most important result of the SA-2launches.
Probably the most significant impact of the SA-2 was that it changed the way the
Air Force fought tactical operations. Electronic combat was exhumed from the tactical
graveyard and given new life as a prominent player in tactical combat planning.(49) Air
Force tactical planners learned not to ignore the threat of surface-to-air missiles and other
developments of air defense systems. Tactical Air Command, once practically devoid of
anybody familiar with electronic warfare, now made a concerted effort to develop and test
new technology for the electronic warfare arena. This was partially shown in the last
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chapter by the actions of Dempster's task force. The remainder of this study is concerned
with some of these developments in tactical electronic warfare.
Therefore, the SAM did not have to destroy many aircraft -- 194 known missiles
fIred in 1965, for example. resulted in eleven downed US aircraft -- to make its mark on air
combat. The SA-2 greatly contributed to the overall North Vietnamese air defense system,
and that same system made the SA-2 a highly lethal threat to US aircraft. This happened
despite an apparent lack of autonomy in a system that showed a relatively high degree of
integration. The SA-2 was seen to be formidable threat by the aviators who faced it.
"While actual kills by SAMs were not excessive," cautioned an Pacific Air Forces report,
"the effectiveness of the SAM transcended this criterion because the threat was real enough
to trigger other side effects."(50)
The SA-2, in fact, dominated Vietnam's aerial arena in late 1965. The above
evidence suggests that the SA-2 would have been far less effective had it not been highly
integrated into the air defense system. This episode provides some insight into the
immediate, often desperate changes induced in one system by the weapon of another. The
days of the SA-2's dominance became numbered when a new technology appeared in
Southeast Asia, the Wild Weasel.
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Chapter Seven
Adaptation: The Wild Weasel I Program
Eglin Phase
Ibe story of technological change within a military system is usually told from the
"top-down" and thus the predominant viewpoint is that of the decision-makers. Missing
from these stories is an complete explanation as to how and why a technology changes
once it is introduced into the system. Detailed examinations of technological change that
considered the operators' perspectives -- "bottom up" approaches -- can fill in many of
these missing pieces. For example, a previous chapter discussed the problems of cracking
bomb :fins and the need for new bomb design. Operators were not mentioned (except to
illustrate the detrimental effects of the inadequate bombs) and the decisions to implement
the changes were implicitly assumed to come from higher headquarters such as PACAF.
The story about the technological response to the SA-2 was seen from the perspective of
Dempster's task force but that had little impact on how the airmen dealt with the threat until
the new technology arrived. The air combat system had already begun to change on its
own before the new technology was even built. If the story of the Wild Weasel I program
was told only from the perspective of the high-level decision-makers then it, too, would
paint an incomplete picture.
Shortly after Dempster's recommendations were made known, Headquarters, US
Air Force directed that four F-1OOF's be modified with off-the-shelf radar warning and
homing (RHAW) gear built by Applied Technology, Incorporated.. The Wild Weasel I
program received its modified aircraft in October. Volunteer crews were quickly trained
and were sent to Southeast Asia at the end of November. The Wild Weasel I "test period"
lasted 60 days, from 28 November, 1965 until 26 January, 1966. In those sixty days, 135
sorties were scheduled for the four Wild Weasel aircraft, of which 112 were flown.(l) In
these sorties SA-2 homing tactics were refined under combat conditions. Although the
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Weasels located only a few SA-2 sites, on 22 December one Wild Weasel aircraft managed
to mark a site for escorting F-105 aircraft which subsequently destroyed it. The program
was seen as successful, and in January Dempster ordered the Weasel aircraft to be changed
~
to the F-105. This version, called Wild Weasel III, appeared by the spring of 1966.
Unfortunately, this brief account leaves out specific answers to an important
question: who held the power to implement major changes in tactics,·training and
technological design? This account, like many studies of military technological change,
implicitly assumes that the system's major decision-makers, like PACAF or Dempster's task
force, held that power. Likewise the operators are assumed to have successfully figured out
how to use the new technology in battle because the test program produced a tangible
result -- the destruction of an SA-2 site. However, a bottom-up look at the Wild Weasel I
test program will show the inadequacies of these assumptions.
The idea of using specially-equipped aircraft to seek out radar sites did not originate
with Dempster's commission. In 1944, the Royal Air Force equipped some Typhoon
fighter-bombers, under a program called "Abdullah," with radar detection gear to find
German radars. These typhoons were accompanied with other typhoons who would attack
the site once the Abdullah aircraft marked it with smoke. The program, however, was not
very successfu1.(2) In the US Anny Air Forces, specially configured bombers like the B-
17, B-24 and B-29, all called "Ferret" aircraft, monitored German and Japanese radars and
gave approximate locations through triangulation of the intercepted signals. Other aircraft
were later sent out to bomb the sites.(3)
In the Pacific especially, some B-25 Mitchell bombers were converted into "radar-
busters." Radar detection equipment was installed into these aircraft. This technology,
combined with the B-25's already lethal nose armament and internally carried bombs, made
them deadly threats to Japanese radar operators. These aircraft attacked and destroyed
approximately fifty Japanese radar sites.(4) During the subsequent conflict in Korea, a
similar Air Force effort was undertaken to seek out and destroy North Korean ground
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control intercept radars. Only a few specially modified aircraft were produced. and as
historian Daniel Kuehl has shown, the program was not very successful.(5) In each of.
these cases the idea of "radar-busters" appeared to have died with the end of hostilities. A
renewal of conflict led to the resurfacing of these methods and the earlier pattern was
repeated for Southeast Asia when the representative from North ~erican outlined the
Wild Weasel on the back of an envelope. A radar homing effort again began from scratch.
As in previous programs, the aircraft chosen to pursue the Wild Weasel mission
already existed in the active Air Force inventory. A two-seat aircraft was necessary to
accommodate both a pilot and electronic warfare officer, or EWO. Obviously the pilot was
needed to fly the aircraft but the aviator in the back was needed to operate and interpret the
displays of the radar detection equipment. The aircraft chosen was a two-seat version of
the North American F-100 Super-Sabre.
The F-100, the first of the "Century-Series" aircraft, was a fighter design that
emerged out of the Air Force's lessons from the Korean War. The cry for better aircraft
performance was answered by the single-seat F-100, the first aircraft to achieve supersonic
speed in level flight. The "Hun", as it was called, was harder for the pilot to control at
lower speeds than it was flying faster, so a two-seat trainer version, designated the "F"
model, was built. This allowed experienced instructors to pair up with less experienced
pilots in the same F-1OaF. The two-seat version was longer,· heavier and slower than the
single-seat version. It was not originally intended to fly in combat. The commander of the
Wild Weasel I program, a veteran of many hours in the F-100, summed up his feelings on
the matter by saying "I sure as hell never thought I'd be going into combat in a 'Hun' two-
holer!" (6) Much less probable was the thought of this aircraft sporting radar detection
equipment and a non-pilot occupant in the rear cockpit.
This technology included off-the-shelf equipment from a small-sized defense
contractor called Applied Technologies, Incorporated (AII) based in Palo Alto, California.
1he Vector Homing and Warning System, the WR-300 Receiver, and the IR-133
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Panoramic Scan Receiver were the names given to the newly installed gear.(7) This radar
homing and warning equipment also necessitated the installation of multiple small receiving
antermas onto the nose, fuselage, wingtips and tail of the aircraft. Each piece of equipment
had a specific function.(8)
The Vector was a 3-inch diameter circular cathode ray tube (CRT) that was
installed in both the front and rear cockpit.(9) Radar energy received in the its antennas
would be processed and be made to cause a strobe to shoot out from the Vector scope's
center toward its edge. The size of the strobe varied directly with the strength of the
received signal. A radar that was tracking the aircraft would produce a much bigger strobe
than a radar that was not. Additionally, the strobe itselfvaried in its appearance depending
upon the type of threat detected, becau"e the logic circuitry of the Vector was designed to
distinguish between various types of radar types. (10) By interpreting the scope the EWO
could discern an approximate bearing of the site's position relative to the jet.(I!) Below the
screen was a panel of light" which indicated to him whether the signal was from an SA-2
site, a anti-aircraft artillery fIre control radar, or some other kind of radar. Many radars
transmitting simultaneously could pose problems for the EWO, because it was quite a
difficult task to continuously match multiple strobes with their associated radars.(12)
The WR-300, unlike the Vector, did not detect a wide array of signals but instead
focused solely on the SA-2's missile command guidance signal. The WR-300's designers at
Applied Technology were led to believe by an Air Force intelligence report that the SA-2's
radio guidance signal suddenly became much stronger when a missile launch was imminent
so they built their device to detect a three-decibel shift in signal power within one second.
As it turned out, the guidance signal did change its characteristics prior to a launch but not
due to a power increase. Nevertheless, the signal change triggered the WR-300 anyway,
for the wrong theoretical reasons.(13) The WR-300 had three lights colored green, amber
and red. If the green light was illuminated, then a Fan Song Radar had been detected.
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Amber meant that a missile launch was imminent. If it detected a lalllich, the \VR-300
illuminated a bright red "launch" light.(14)
The most sensitive and also most complicated piece of equipment to master was the
IR-133. It was a panoramic receiver, which meant not only that it received signals though a
wide band of frequencies, but it also could be tuned to a specific radar frequency and allow
individual radar signals to be analyzed. This was of tremendous value when many radar
signals had to be distinguished from one another. It was assessed to be superior to other
available radar detection equipment, even those on EB-66C's.(15) The IR-133 was
sensitive enough to pick up radars at greater distances than the Vector, and one of its
operating modes allowed for very accurate radar homing.(16)
Some Wild Weasel test personnel initially thought it was possible to determine the
range to a particular radar based on the indications of the IR-133 and Vector. (17) By
using the IR-133 to point the aircraft directly at the radar and rolling the F-100F into ninety
degrees of bank -- one wing pointed straight down to the ground and the other straight up -
- the Weasel crew, through a quick trigonometric calculation attempted to determine the
range. For example, if the aircraft was flying at one-thousand feet over perfectly flat
terrain, a bearing indication of one degree to the left meant, in theory, that the radar site
was ten miles away. However, at one-half a degree the site would be at a range of twenty
miles, and at one-quarter degree the range turned out to be forty miles.(18) The test
personnel gave up on the idea, since flying at ninety degrees of bank at extremely low
altitudes was dangerous, and at higher altitudes combat conditions would not allow for the
delicate maneuvering required for precise distance calculations.
The range to the site was a very important piece of information for the tactical
puzzle, and later modifications would address the problem. Wild Weasel I crews, however,
would not have the technology capable of providing that information. Range calculations
would have to be made based on operator judgment. In combat, range could only be
determined if the Weasel crew actually saw a missile launch from a camouflaged site, but
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Weasels maintained a sense of hwnor in light of their grim missions. When Secretary of the
Air Force Harold Brown queried Weasel pilot Captain AI Lamb on how he determined
rangeto~ SA-2sites, Lamb replied, "when Jack (GaptainJack Donovan, Lamb's electronic
warfare officer) breathes real heavy, we're close. When he stops breathing, we're
there. "(19)
Regardless of range, the Weasels were quite adept at homing in on radar sites at the
Eglin Ranges. Both the Vector and IR-133 could be used for this activity, although each
operator tended to use different techniques in using his equipment. For example, the
Vector could be used initially to provide the relative bearing of the site to the air crew. The
Weasel's electronic watfare officer (EWO), once having detennined the bearing of the site,
directed the pilot to fly toward that initial bearing. Once the aircraft was pointed roughly at
the site, the IR-133 could be used to further refine the direction for a more accurate
homing run. Other EWO's used the IR-133 from start to finish. By selecting "Direction
Finding Mode" on the IR-133, the electronic warfare officer would see two vertical lines
on the IR-133 display. Each line represented the relative strength of the signal being
received in the left and right antennas, respectively. A taller line on the left meant that the
left side of the aircraft and its corresponding antenna was receiving more radar energy than
the right side.(20) This was interpreted by the aircrew to mean that the aircraft was heading
toward the right of the site and needed to turn left slightly. The best indications of proper
homing were a Vector strobe that pointed straight up to the "twelve o'clock position" and
two equal amplitude lines on the IR-133. The trick, however, was to realize just when one
actually passed over the radar site, called "station passage."
Station passage is more commonly associated with radio navigation devices. In a
typical radio direction-fmding device, when tuned to the "station" one wishes to locate, a
needle points to the relative bearing of the destination. Assuming the station is straight
ahead and that the needle is pointing to the "12-0'clock" position, if the aircraft passes over
the station and leaves it directly behind, the needle will point to the "6-o'clock" position.
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However, as it flies directly over the station, the needle ~ill often swing back and forth
between 12 o'clock and 6 o'clock before fmally staying put at the 6 o'clock position. These
. needle fluctuations mdicate station passage:--
On the Vector, as the Weasel flew along the radar beam toward the site, the strobe
grew in length as the aircraft got closer to the radar and ultimately extended from the center
to the edge of the CRT. At station passage, the strobe "curled" at the edge of the CRT,
fonning a hook. After passing over the radar site, a short strobe appeared at the 6 o'clock
position.(2l) That a short strobe appeared at 6 o'clock and not a long one had to do with
the radiation pattern of most radars used at that time.
A radar transmits most of its energy in the direction that its antenna is pointing.
This is commonly called the main radar beam, or "lobe," but there are also other beams
called "side lobes" and "back lobes." In other words, a radar that is transmitting toward the
east with its main beam is usually transmitting to the north, west, and south with weaker
beams as well. The IR-133 was sensitive enough to pick up these weaker side and back
lobes at relatively long distances. Homing in on these lobes rather than the main lobe
offered the prospect of safety and surprise because the Weasel could not be tracked by the
SA-2 radar operators. Therefore, as soon as its Fan Song radar was turned on, an SA-2
battalion might attract a Wild Weasel from any direction, no matter where its radar was
pointed. (22)
The case in which back lobes, side lobes and main lobes of different radars could
be sorted out by a Wild Weasel crew depended upon the radar signal knowledge of the
operator in the back seat and how well he knew his equipment. In very dense signal
environments -- occasions when many different radars are simultaneously received -- the
Vector could have problems in discerning SA-2 radar from fife control radar and even
friend from foe. (23) If the Vector displayed several signals simultaneously at various
azimuths, the operator would often have to tune the IR-133 to specific signals, checking to
see if the IR-133 indicated a particular signal left or right of the airplane. He would have to
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further correlate the noises pulsating through his headsets with similar visual indications on
the displays in front ofhim. Adding to thi'l were a number of distractions such as
communicating with the pilot, busy radio traffic and the WR-300 flashing in his face, not
to mention taking time out to see what was outside the cockpit. It took a large measure of
skill not only to overcome for the equipment deficiencies but also to maintain the required
level of concentration.
The Wild Weasel pilots and electronic warfare officers were highly experienced in
their respective specialties. A total of eight F-IOO instructor pilots and five B-52 electronic
warfare officers became part of the Wild Weasel I program. Five of the eight pilots had
previous combat experience, but none of the EWO's had seen any combat time, let alone
any time in an 1'-100. None of the aviators, however, had less than 1000 total flying hours,
and the average flight time for all the fliers was well over 2000 hours.(24) Although
Tactical Air Command produced the pilots, the message had to reach Strategic Air
L--
Command before prospective electronic warfare officers could be tapped.
Messages had been sent out by US Air Force Headquarters to both Tactical Air
Command (TAC) and Strategic Air Command (SAC) as soon as Wild Weasel I began to
take shape.(25) Few had any idea what exactly it was they were volunteering for, since the
nature of the Wild Weasel program was closely held. The mission was only described as
an "F-lOO Command Post" and as being highly classified in nature. "Fortunately," said a
subsequent Air Force study on the Wild Weasel program, "the US Air Force has never
been short of highly skilled volunteers in search of a new challenge. "(26) This is an
antiseptic and rather inaccurate way of describing the volunteer process for one of the most
dangerous missions ever envisioned for combat aircraft. The truth was, at least as far as the
SAC electronic warfare officers were concerned, the Air Force did much of the
"volunteering." Former B-52 eJectronic warlare officer Captain Jack Donovan was
surprised with his orders sending him to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida for temporary duty
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in an "F-IOO Command Post." He and his fellow SAC aircrew members were hand-picked
by higher headquarters for the Wild Weasel I test program.(27)
The ''volunteer'' aviators anived in Florida a1 different times, but were all in place
by early October. Donovan and another electronic warfare officer, Captain Walt Lifsey,
were the first to anive at Eglin AFB for Wild Weasel I in late September. They were
immediately flown to Los Angeles, California, and then driven to some dilapidated, but
well-guarded, hangars at Long Beach airport. According to Donovan, inside one of these
buildings was an F-lOOF "with all its guts hanging out."(28) In other words, engineers from
-
North American had already begun the process of modifying the aircraft for its mission.
The ne? day the ainnen were driven to Palo Alto, California and met with a representative
from Demptser's task force and engineers from Applied Technology Incorporated (AIl).
The design engineers of North American and AII eagerly accepted inputs from the Air
Force captains. Donovan and Lifsey determined how ATrs equipment was arranged inside
the rear cockpit as well as gave suggestions for its operation. "We'd tell them we'd want a
knob to do this and a switch to do that," said Donovan.(29) In this fashion the procured
equipment was initially adapted to the tactical combat system.
The process of adaptation in this program involved more than learning the
operation of new knobs, dials and switches. While the some of the pilots were learning for
the first time that the position of electronic warfare officer actually existed in their own air
force, some electronic warfare officers "were reluctant to bounce all over North Vietnam in
a single-engine fighter with a wild-eyed, hot dog pilot at the controls."(30) The early
encounters between the two groups were uneasy. "We had never seen a fighter pilot up
close before." said a Weasel EWO. "They were trained to be aggressive and obnoxious and
they didn't disappoint us. " (31)
Fighter pilots from tactical air command, generally speaking, were used to being the
sole person in the cockpit of their aircraft. Initially, "we weren't happy about the team
concept," recalled Weasel pilot Captain Al Lamb.(32) Having another pilot sit behind
93
them was one thing, but these electronic warfare officers -- initially referred to derisively as
"trained bears" -- were another matter entirely. "(Pilots) were proud of the fact that they
were perfectly capable of steering themselves from place to place in the world," wrote Jack
Broughton " and the thought of having a bomber navigator sitting behind them was
completely foreign.. .I hated listening to someone else breathe into my ears on the hot mike
for hours. "(33) Initially, the controlstick in the rear cockpit was taken out when the new
equipment and its operator arrived, lest he try to fly the aircraft! Objections from the
EWO's brought the stick back, but no throttle controls.(34)
Both pilots and EWO's set aside their reservations as each teamed up to form a
combat partnership. Pilots and their back-seaters ate together, roomed together, flew
together and soon became able to anticipate each other's actions while flying. Still, old
habits died hard. Jack Donovan recalled that on his initial training mission with pilot AI
Lamb, he identified himself on the intercom with "Pilot this is EWO" before commencing
with his request. This was common procedure in B-52's because up to ten airmen used the
same intercom system on that airplane. Lamb's reply: "well I hope to God that's you back
there" indicated the different style of communication that was required in this situation.
Cockpit communications needed to be brief; sometimes a grunt would suffice to convey a
message. (35)
Since the back-seat aviators came from B-52's, the view from the rear canopy of
the F-l OOF was probably the first time since navigator training that these electronic warfare
officers could actually see where the aircraft was going.(36) Additionally, no relatively
slow, lumbering B-52 could hope to match the maneuvering characteristics of a fast, agile
F-IOO. These new, highly maneuverable fighters also brought with them a correspondingly
high potential for airsickness in queasy back-seat aircrew members accustomed to less gut-
wrenching rides in heavy aircraft! Such physical feelings could severely hinder an airman
from performing his duties, but once adjusted to the fighter's characteristics, the electronic
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warfare officers could then concentrate on their primary task of identifying threat radars
with the equipment and working with the pilot to find those radars on the ground.(37)
PtojectWildWeasellwas officially underway at the Tactical Air Warfare Center at
Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida by 4 Oct 1965, but the official reports give little
indication of what role the operators played in conducting training.(38) The detail in which
many Wild Weasel I training activities are shown in these reports can easily lead a historian
to assume that the ainnen simply assumed their position within a pre-established fonnal test
program at Eglin AFB. This was not entirely the case. The tests for the new detection
equipment had been established beforehand, but there was hardly any time originally
planned for the development of combat tactics.
Although a later chapter will outline the eight specific objectives established by
TAC and the Air Force's Tactical Air Warfare Center for Wild Weasel I it is important to
note here that only one specifically referred to the development of procedures to locate,
attack and neutralize the SA-2 battalions. The air crews would have to develop tactics on
their own time once the flying began. There were no classrooms, no periodic intelligence
briefings on American and Vietnamese air tactics used over North Vietnam, and no
training flights geared toward finding camouflaged, well-protected sites. What little time
could be found between training flights to discuss the employment of this aircraft was
supplemented by time u~ed in the donn rooms and at the bar. Discussions ensued wherever
possible about subjects such as optimum size of fonnations, spacing between attacking
aircraft, altitudes at which one could expect to acquire targets, suggested attack profiles,
and munitions loads. One of the most important issues among these was how the Wild
Weasel crew might be best able to provoke an SA-2 battalion into turning on its Fan Song
radar. The lack of fonnal training for combat was corrected in subsequent Wild Weasel
training classes.(39)
Flight training took place on the ranges at Eglin in four newly-modified F-IOOF's.
Before the crews set foot in their new aircraft, the Air Force had required that the newly
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modified Wild Weasel aircraft were ready for them. Once the specialized equipment was
installed onto the F-I00's, North American had first to test each aircraft at their Long
Beach- faciliiy-andthen fly them to Egfui AFB, where they were put through further testing
on Eglin's flying ranges. Only after the contractor's flight test were complete were these
aircraft to be turned over to the Air Force crews, but the staggered arrival of the selected
Wild Weas~i pilots led some of the electronic warfare officers to begin their flight
orientation with North American Aviation test pilots.(40)
The test flights explored the ability of ATrs equipment to detect and locate
simulated Fan Song radar signals. The Air Force possessed Soviet Air Defense Simulators,
or SADS, which imitated SA-2 radar signals based on the latest electronic intelligence
information. The SADS had" its own operators, and for all practical purposes the system
acted like a normal radar. It was paired with another radar for the purpose of tracking and
recording the test aircrafts' routes of flight to reconstruct missions. (41) The crews would
fly about in the Eglin ranges waiting for the SADS signals to be detected on the receivers.
Once the latter occurred, the electronic warfare officer in the back would direct the pilot
toward the SADS site until either the pilot or back-seater could see the site from the
aircraft. (42)
Twenty sorties were flown at various altitudes between 100ft and la,000 feet to
specifically assess the operation of the radar homing and warning capability of the
Weasels.(43) All told, approximately three-hundred practice runs were made against the
SADS site during the Wild Weasel testing. Four times during the mission the SADS site
would transmit its synthetic SA-2 signa~ and the EWO would notify the ground radar
operators as soon as he picked up the SADS signal. After carefully noting the angle
between the aircraft heading and the relative bearing to the SADS signal, the EWO would
direct the pilot to the site with the object of overflying and locating the SADS visually. By
comparing what the EWO saw on his scopes and what actually was the case, the
equipment's accuracy could be detennined. At Eglin, 235 runs gave an average 77 foot
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miss distance for overflights. (44) Similarly, ten sorties at similar altitudes were flo~n
without the benefit of homing. Once the back-seater detected the SADS signal and its
relative bearing, the SADS site would shut off its transmitter and the crew would have to
fmd the site with only that initial information. Another concern was the use of on-board
jamming pods and their possible effect on the detection equipment. Five sorties were
flown where the F-100 carried a jamming pod. Although the resultant jamming interfered
with the radar detection equipment, the electronic warfare officer still had to guide the pilot
to the SADS site.(45)
An overlooked aspect of this program, but one no less important, was that this
stateside phase had to result in some-sort of Wild Weasel organization. It was, in fact, a
system all to itself that had to be built from the ground up. Air crews had to be selected,
certainly, but so did maintenance specialists, intelligence experts and other support
personnel.(46) For example, each aircraft had its own pair of crew chiefs, who were
responsible for the overall condition of the aircraft. There were also included individual
specialists in areas like the repair of flight instruments, navigation equipment, and electronic
components. There were two jet engine specialists, weapons specialists, a parachute rigger,
and two fuel system specialists. Three representatives from Applied Technology deployed
with the team to provide their expertise. All told, about 53 people comprised the Wild
Weasel I test team, as seen in Figure XI.(47)
An interesting feature of this team was that it also included a body to evaluate the
project at each phase and continually make improvements while establishing some set of
standards for the Wild Weasel program.(48) The process by which this was to take place
was officially established about a week before the F-1 OOF's departed for Karat Air Base.
The key to this evaluation was an accurate reconstruction of the mission. A major input to
this process was a debriefing by the pilot and electronic warfare officer after each F-100
mission. Wherever possible, details were not spared. Pilots, for example, were asked about
the enemy air defenses that were encountered and what kinds of evasive maneuvers they
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Positions (enlisted onb?,J
Instrument Repairman
Aircraft Pneudraulic Repainnan
Inventory Management Supervisor
Aircraft Ground Equipment Repairman
2 Electronic Warfare Repairmen
2 Jet Engine Mechanics
Mechanical Access Repairman
Aircraft Radio Repairman
2 Flight Control System Mechanics
Weapons Maintenance Supervisor
Parachute Rigger
Egress System Repairman
Aircraft Fuel Systems Mechanic
Personal Equipment Specialist
Wild Weasel I Test Team Composition
Positions (officer/enlisted)
Commander (officer)
Administrative Supervisor (enlisted)
2 Administrative Specialists (enlisted)
Air Operations Officer (officer)
Operations Analyst (civilian)
Operations Staff Officer (officer)
Air Operations Supervisor (enlisted)
5 Tactical Fighter Pilots (officer)
5 Electronic Warfare Officers (officer)
Aircraft Maintenance Officer (officer)
3 Weapons Mechanics (enlisted)
4 Aircraft Crew Chiefs (enlisted)
4 Aircraft Assistant Crew Chiefs (enlisted)
Airframe Repairman (enlisted)
Parachute Rigger (enlisted)
Aircraft Electrical Navigational Equipment Repairman (enlisted)
F1ight Control Systems Specialist (enlisted)
Aircraft Maintenance Superintendent (enlisted)
FIGURE XI
used. The electronic warfare officers were asked to detail what they saw on their
equipment. Both were asked to address a variety of problems and suggest solutions. What
was the communication like between the crew? How should the equipment be repositioned
or what else needs to be added? This, however, was just one part of a larger process.
Each aircraft carried an airborne tape recorder in the rear cockpit and one carried a
seventy millimeter KA-60 camera in the nose.(49) The taped conversations of the crew
could clarify further the pilot and electronic warfare officer reports. The camera could help
identify overflown SA-2 sites, and, if these sites were attacked, give some indication of
damage. Photographs from subsequent reconnaissance flights would provide better bomb
damage assessment in these instances. Infonnation from other sources, such as intelligence
and electronic reconnaissance aircraft was gathered. When all this was combined, a more
complete picture of the mission emerged. Having painstakingly reconstructed the mission,
there now came the task of evaluating the mission. What went wrong? What went
right?(50) By late November, their training had been completed and the four Wild Weasel
crews flew their F-1OOF's to Korat AB in Thailand.
The process through which this took place however, was not as simple as it
otherwise might appear. Each F-100 carried only two aviators. That left over forty-five
others without transportation, notto mention the support equipment. Many organizations
had their hand in the movement of the Weasel team from Florida to Thailand. The Tactical
Air Command Headquarters in Virginia monitored the overall conduct of the program and
was responsible for acquiring contractors to assist the Wild Weasel maintenance personnel.
The Tactical Air Warfare Center at Eglin Air Force Base arranged for the deployment of
the Wild Weasels and also remained ultimately responsible for supporting and evaluating
the program during its tour in Southeast Asia. a.ther Air Force commands had to be
notified of the deployment so that they could provide support. The Pacific Air Forces, for
example, were given operational control of the Wild Weasel force once the latter flew west
of 140 degrees longitude. They also had to provide facilities for the Weasels at their final
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forward base in Thailand as well as logistical support. The Iv1ilitary Air Transport Service
airlifted most of the Weasel force from Florida to Thailand. Strategic Air Command
provided the tanker aircraft that enabled the both 1'-1OO's and the transport aircraft to make
the Transpacific flight, as well as providing a staging base (Anderson AFB Guam) for this
redeployment. Further coordination for various reasons was required with the stateside Air
Defense command, The western area US Coast Guard, Air Force Logistics Command,
The Air Force Communications Service and the US Navy.(5l) This deployment was not a
simple process for the people of the Wild Weasel team, either.
The personnel involved had relatively short notice as regards their fume
destination. This was, after all, a highly classified project and most knew only that
experienced personnel were needed. Each individual was "processed," as it were, through
what was known as a mobility line. Every thirty minutes, ftfteen people were processed
through this line in a large aircraft hangar.(52) By the time an individual completed his time
in the line, practically every personal and professional need was addressed. Suitcases and
bags were checked and re-checked to make sure everyone had what was needed for several
months of duty in Thailand. Uniforms or pieces of equipment that were either misplaced or
not deemed serviceable were immediately replaced. Each person received a special copy of
their personnel records to take with them, and was also required to fill out a form indicating
who was to be contacted in case of emergency. For those with families, decisions had to
be made with respect to care of children, payment of bills and other personal concerns.
Chaplains and legal representatives were available in the line for counseling and legal
matters such as the formation of wills. Also on hand for the test team's departure to
Southeast Asia were the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force's Vice Chief of Staff,
and the Commander of Tactical Air Command. The absence of the Air Force Chief of
Staff was noted by one Weasel, who deduced that he was in church praying for the success
of the mission.(53)
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The rather complex process of sending personnel through a mobility line and
moving the test team from I<lorida setved as a reminder that the small test team was part of
a greater entity. The rather fluid, almost haphazard nature of the Wild Weasel I program
contrasted sharply with the larger, rather inflexible Air Force system. Precise records of
technical changes were not always kept properly, and even AIl's initial contract with the
Air Force for procurement of parts was a photograph of a signed blackboard, since there
was no time for an official contract to be drawn up.(54) While much of the ad hoc nature
of Wild Weasel I can be attributed to the wartime needs of a military system in a desperate
situation, the growing ability of the operators to almost independently guide this program is
not so easily explained. The Wild Weasel had been adapted by its operators to fit the
tactical combat system, but the process of adaptation was far from complete. The true
testing ground for this new technology would be over North Vietnam.
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Chapter Eight:
Adaptation: The Wild Weasel I Program
Southeast Asia Phase
The Weasel crews were not thrown into direct combat immediately upon arrival in
Southeast Asia, despite the desperate situation facing the Air Force. The initial sorties for
each crew were orientation flights tor testing their equipment and getting adjusted to the
signal environment. More importantly, it was a check to see just how the friendly and
enemy radar emissions were displayed on the receivers. The SADS at Eglin did not
necessarily produce a signal which exactly matched those which the North Vietnamese
radars employed, and the electronic warfare officers had to rely upon their own experience
to sort out the various enemy and friendly signals. Eight of these types of sorties were
flown from the 28 to 30 November.(I)
During most of these initial missions, a pair of Wild Weasels teamed up with EB-
66C's flying outside SA-2 range to observe and record North Vietnamese and Chinese
radar signals. Usually these flights would be along the western border of North Vietnam or
over the Gulf of Tonkiri. Where possible, the electronic warfare officers on each aircraft
would track identical signals at the same time, and after landing the accuracy of the Wild
Weasel receivers could be compared with that of the EB-66C's. Ibe sets of data from
each aircraft tended to compare favorably for most radar signals; both the Weasel crews
and EB-66 crews usually identified the same signals at nearly the same radar
frequencies. (2)
The most prevalent Wild Weasel missions were not of this nature. In December
the Wild Weasels assumed their primary roles of leading the Iron Hand missions, which
were flown directly into the teeth of North Vietnam's air defense. Initially, these were
conceived as search-and-destroy missions where the F-1OOF would be assigned a specific
geographical area in which to look for SA-2's. For these missions a Weasel was mated with
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a flight of three or four F-105s, fonning a "hunter-killer" flight. The F-lOOF acted as te
hunter and the escorting Thuds were the killers.(3) \
- - ')
I
The problem with the mix of 1'-1OD's and F-105s was that the Weasels new abou~
100 knots slower than the typical speed for the F-105. This often forced either the F-105
pilots to fly at a slower speed than which they were accustomed or the F-100 to use its
fuel-gulping afterburner just to keep up with the Thuds. Rather than spend the entire
mission trying to keep track of the slower F-100F, the F-105s would often lead the hunter-
killer flight until SA-2 signals were picked up by the Weasel's receivers. At that time, the
Weasel crew would take the lead and hunt down the SA-2. There were three different
types of combat formations used by the hunter-killer night, as seen in Figures Xli, XIII,
and XIV. The weaving pattern of the 1'-105 aircraft was devised by the Weasel EWO's. as a
countermeasure to direct threat radars, like the Fan Song or anti-aircraft fire control radars.
The formation would appear on the Fan Song operator's scope as varying between a single
and target and multiple targets, possibly hindering his ability to continuously track a single
aircraft. (4)
For the Wild Weasel to home in on an SA-2 site, the back-seater would first have
to discern the Fan Song radar emissions from all the other active radars in a large radius.
This tended to be more of a problem at the higher altitudes than at the lower altitudes. The
path of radar waves from a ground site to an aircraft at 10,000 feet was rarely blocked by
intervening terrain such as mountains. For example, there were many cases of Weasel
crews firiding their scopes "cluttered" with radar signals from the Hanoi area while the
aircraft were still well within Laotian airspace.(5) Conversely, flight at lower altitudes
resulted in many dio;;tant radar signals being blocked by intervening hills and mountains
which made the task of sorting out radar signals much casier for the back-seater. Once the
electronic warfare officer found a Fan Song and determined where it was in relation to his
aircraft, he would direct the pilot toward the site. Just prior to beginning the homing run,
the Weasel pilot would transmit "contact" over the radio to the escorting F-105's.(6) The
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sites were well caniOuflaged, so it was necessary to fly right over the site's location in order
to find it and mark it for the follow-up F-I05 attack.
.. There were-tW()~ways~m"\Vhicfi-homiilg runs were accbmpl1sned,difetrhbrrtirtga11.d
terrain masking. The direct approach called for cooperative weather conditions, with an
eye to the height of the lowest cloud layer. North Vietnamese gunners often set their shell
fuses to explode right at the base of the cloud layer, providing a nasty surprise for aircraft
descending through the clouds. This tactic also greatly constricted the flexibility of aircraft
flying below the clouds by trapping them between anti-aircraft barrages. Direct homing
flights preferred to operate between 4500 and 8000 feet, altitude ranges that gave some
measure of safety from small arms frre and the prolific North Vietnamese 37mm AAA
guns.(7) The advantage of the direct approach was also its disadvantage. These flight
profiles provoked the air defenses into reacting against the Iron Hand flight, and there was
nowhere to hide from resultant missile launches, except through evasive maneuvers.
The evasion of missile launches on Iron Hand missions brought the Weasels and
Thuds down to the lowest altitudes and the necessary hard maneuvers to get them there
caused losses in airspeed. Like any other aircraft in such a position, the Weasels were
vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. Even without SA-2Iaunches, Weasels working radar signals
were still subject to attack. On 20 December 1965, the first Wild Weasel aircraft was shot
down by AAA frre shortly after the crew picked up a Fan Song on the receivers. Many
more Weasels were to go down in this deadly game of cat and mouse.
The terrain masking approach offered some measure of protection, but also at a
price. The primary problem for terrain making flights was not the North Vietnamese
defenses, but avoiding slamming into a mountainside. Although most airmen knew that
radars had difficulties tracking low-flying aircraft, it was not necessarily common
knowledge at the time that putting a mountain between one's aircraft and a ground radar
prevented active radar detection.(8) These were extremely tricky flights with the crews
subject to frequent, often constant, high-G maneuvers. The F-I00 would climb over a
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mountain only long enough to have the Fan Song, register on its receivers so that an
azimuth could be read and then dip back down into the valleys and behind the hills to avoid
_.- _._._.~ ...~-- --_.
radar detection. This method reqUired an absence of low altitude cloud') and excellent
visibility (9) but offered the advantage of surprise. Although the Weasel could detect the
Fan Song it was not necessarily true that the latter's operators knew about it, especially if
the Weasel was homing on the side lobes or back lobes. Further, such a method could also
take. the anti-aircraft gunners off-guard as well. It was such an approach that enabled the
first Wild Weasel kill in December, an event discussed later. Whether using the direct or
indirect approach, there remained the problem of finding the site.
Overflight procedures were relatively easy over the Eglin ranges but much more
difficult in combat conditions. Unlike the Eglin SADS sites, North Vietnamese SA-2's were
ringed with multitudes of gun positions. Despite trying to stay above 4500 feet, Weasels
were still subject to massive anti-aircraft flre, not to mention the chance of an angry reply
from the SA-2 flre control battery. In dry conditions a missile launch kicked up
tremendous clouds of dust which lingered in the air after the missile was airborne. Even if
the hunter-killer flight did not see the missile until after its launch, they often could pick out
the dust which gave away the location of the hidden site.(IO) Once the SA-2 missiles were
avoided by the flight., the search for the site would continue in earnest. Even overflying the
site's position was no guarantee that one could positively identify it.
Sometimes, the Weasel crew would intentionally fly left or right of the suspected
location, called an offset approach, to prevent the aircraft itself from blocking the view of
the site. Having determined the approximate location of the radar, the Wild Weasel would
have to come back to where station passage occurred and the crew would then search for
the site. If they found it, the Weasels could immediately attack the radar van and missile
launchers with cannon and rockets, the latter also serving to mark the area with for the F-
105s.(11) The Weasel crews found that measuring homing accuracy was not easy in a
combat zone. Adding to their trouble was the fact that the SA-2's were expertly hidden.
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There were two cases in December, 1965 where the Weasels received electronic
indicatiOIlS-that an S.&2radarhad_b~en overflown. As seen below, these particular sites
were too wen-camouflaged, however, and could not be pinpointed.
On 19 December, an F-lOOF flew in support of a Joint Chiefs-directed strike north
ofHano~ with the task of silencing any Fan Song radars that threatened the strike
force.(l2) Still sixty miles from the Vietnam border, the aircraft's receivers picked up
nwnerous fire control radars while flying just under 10000 feet. Upon reaching the border,
these radars so inundated the electronic warfare officer's Vector and IR-133 displays that
he found it difficult to sort them out. When a Fan Song finally appeared, the Weasel led
the flight toward i~ descending in the process to 3000 feet. The low altitude of the F-l00F
allowed the terrain to block any distant ftre control radars, so the scope became less
cluttered. The Weasel flew right over the transmitting Fan Song and the crew determined
there was definitely a cleared area in the vicinity, but neither the Weasels nor the
accompanying F-105 pilots saw any signs of hostile activity.(13) No weapons were fired or
dropped.
This particular combat experience emphasized the importance ofproper planning
for Wild Weasel missions. The direction from which a Weasel would approach a suspected
target area had to be carefully studied. Not only were the anti-aircraft artillery defenses an
important consideration in planning the route, but so was the signal environment. A well-
planned mission could avoid having the electronic warfare officer try to sort out a mass of
radar signals in order to pinpoint a Fan Song.(14) For example, assuming that there was a
suspected Fan Song Location south ofHano~ an east-west search route might mask the
southern signal within the mass of radars near Hanoi. A southern route, however,
effectively isolates this area from Hanoi. Site locations were not always known beforehand,
but where possible, crews took advantage of advanced planning
It should be noted that the flight path of this 19 December Iron Hand mission
should have left little doubt to the North Vietnamese defenders that the Air Force was
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using an aircraft with homing capabilities. The flight had been well within the envelope of
the SA-2 system for about five minutes. The SA-2 battalion did not tum on their Fan Song
until the flight was well on its way away fromthe-site.A:S-seenm-Figure XV. the Iron
Hand flight had to turn right almost 150 degrees in order to home in on the site. This
abrupt change of course coinciding with the Fan Song transmission had to have been
obvious to the defenses. This point was probably further driven home to the North
Vietnamese by the experiences of a second Wild Weasel on the same day.
Not only did this other Wild Weasel crew also home on a Fan Song but this
particular homing nut led them to a small village as well as a cleared area. This mission
showed how the process of adaptation is continuous. Here it was confirmed that the way
in which the homing runs at Eglin were flown was inadequate for combat missions. Unlike
typical stateside missions, the electronic warfare officer found it difficult to use the IR-133
in the "direction finding" mode by comparing signal amplitudes left and right of the
aircraft. The Fan Song signal on this mission was so strong that "both strobes went off
(the) scope." (15) It was impossible for the back-seater to compare their respective
amplitudes for refined steering as was commonly done on the Eglin runs. The Vector, on
the other hand, provided all the necessary information for the final phase of homing.(16)
Even though the IR-133 had been successfully tested and introduced by ATI and
North American into the Wild Weasel program, and the electronic warfare officers had
established individual procedures that seemed to work with the IR-133 in a flying
environment, combat necessitated further changes. When the aircraft travels at least six
miles every minute and only a few seconds' of time is often critical, seemingly minor
changes in equipment operating procedures may make huge differences. Here, it was
confirmed that despite the accuracy and sensitivity of the IR-133, it wa.c;; best employed
prior to the final homing run, for its senc;;itivity allowed radar signals, especially side and
back lobes, to be detected at great distances.(l7) The Vector, though slightly less accurate
than the IR-133. was less sensitive and best used during the final phases where hard
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maneuvering and fast action required a simpler display and azimuth. Some back-seaters
were therefore obliged to modifY their habit patterns formed at Eglin.
The process of adaptation, thougfi continuous, wali not going fast enough for the
Air Force's decision-makers (18) Almost three weeks had passed since the Weasels' arrival
and there had been no tangible results. No sites had been destroyed, and of those subject to
homing none were precisely located. The heretofore loose control by PACAF on Wild
Weasel I tightened somewhat when the order came down for most of the hunter-killer
flights to fly in the same fonnation with the strike forces. They were to lead the strike into
the target area and take care of any SA-2's that challenged the bomb-laden F-I05's. This
proved to be an unwise decision, because tying the Weasels to the strike force greatly
constricted their actions and weakened their potential effectiveness against the SA-2
battalions. It also led to the fIrst Wild Weasel casualties.
On 20 December, an F-IOOF flown by pilot John Pitchford and electronic warfare
officer Robert Trier, both Captains, led a flight of four F-105's supporting a strike against
the Vu Chua railroad bridge, forty miles northeast of Hanoi.(19) The Wild Weasels led the
entire strike formation as they headed north from the Gulf of Tonkin. Unfortunately, low
clouds in the area forced the formation into flying less than 4000 feet above the ground just
to see the ground. While about fIVe miles from the heavily defended North Vietnamese
airfield at KepI the Weasel crew transmitted "contact" to the F-I05 flight but was hit by
anti-aircraft gunfire shortly afterwards.(20) Although the pilot fired marking rockets in the
general direction of the SA-2 site, he was more concerned with keeping his aircraft in the
air. His efforts could not prevent the aircraft from becoming uncontrollable, and both crew
members were forced to eject. The pilot became a prisoner of war until 1973. lbe
electronic warfare officer was killed by North Vietnamese ground forces.
During this mission, the low cloud base had provided the North Vietnamese
gunners with an defmite altitude at which to set their fuses. This sandwiched the American
aircraft between two zones of fire with little room for error. The upper zone consisted of
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timed shell bursts while the lower zone was dominated by small anns fire. The aircraft had
to fly below the clouds in order to see their target, but spent most of their time trying to
~_.__.---umige-1heintense groWld frr~TIrei}lidge-was not destroyed-ancl-three-ofth'-e---
approximately thirty aircraft in the strike were shot down.(21) The Wild Weasel team
quickly established guidelines for further Iron Hand missions. In suspected SA-2Iocations,
target locations, and in the approach and exit routes to these areas, the lowest cloud ceiling
had to be at least 8000 feet above ground level accompanied with a five mile visibility. (22)
The weather was not the only problem. Radio frequencies provided the source for
yet another change. Flying directly among the strike force forced the hunter-killer fight to
use the same radio frequency as the other strike aircraft. Complicating matters was the fact
that the Wild Weasel flight had its own need for inter-flight communications that were
independent of the needs of the strike force.(23) This resulted in a problem on a radio net
already cluttered with voices even before the shooting started. During the high-pitched
moments of actual combat, the confusion on the radios often rose exponentially. All US
Air Force aircraft radios could receive transmissions on the emergency frequency known as
"Guard", while simultaneously operating on their nonnal strike frequencies. SA-2 warnings
were transmitted on this guard frequency as standard procedure, so the message would
reach all aircraft simultaneously. Rather than be tied to the same radio channel as the other
aircraft, hunter-killer flights were directed to use a separate radio frequency within their
flight during most of the mission. The Weasels changed over to strike frequencies when
necessary and always broadcast their SA-2 warnings on the common Guard frequency.
Even the Weasel formation itself presented unforeseen problems. The use of five
aircraft in one Iron Hand flight greatly reduced the time the hunter-killer teams could
remain in the target areas to search for SA-2's. On the 20 December mission, the hunter-
killer flight had to leave the target area and not seek out the active SA-2 site because the
aircraft were running low on fuel. Refueling with ftve aircraft on one KC-135 tanker took
anywhere from fifteen to thirty minutes, with an average just over twenty minutes'
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duration.(24) This assumed that the hunter-killer flight flawlessly rendezvoused \'vith the
tankers in the first place, a task that was not always as easy as it would otherwise seem. By
the time the last aircraft were fueled the first aircraft had expended precious gas that could
,
othetwise allow more time in the target area. Thereafter, two tankers were used for long
flights where these fuel considerations were important. The hunter-killer flight's basic
composition was also subject to close scrutiny.
The Wild Weasel team reported that the fIve-aircraft hunter killer fonnations
provided an "alerting and aiming point for ground gunners" (25) The gunners could use the
1'-100F as an aiming point for the entire fonnation because the Thuds weaved back and
forth across the straight path of the F-100F. flight using this fonnation also tended to lose
integrity during combat. On the 20 December mission, for example, two of the five aircraft
in Pitchford's flight got separated from the main fonnation.(26) Although the five-ship
fonnation continued to be used in addition to the four-ship, the Weasel team looked at the
pros and cons of each more closely. Tactics continued to change as the system adjusted to
these new aircraft.
Most important of these changes was the eventual decision to separate the hunter-
killer flight from the main strike force, yet allow for the latter's support. The initial Wild
Weasel recommendation was that the strike force arrive in'the target area prior to the Wild
Weasel force so that the strike mission commander could evaluate the weather in the target
area for Weasel operations.(27) The Wild Weasels would then plan to arrive somewhere
between the time the first and last bombs were dropped. The rationale behind this was to
allow the Weasels to loiter in the target area after the strike force left because the SA-2
battalions tended to shoot as the force egressed. Although this particular suggestion was not
followed, many hunter-killer teams soon were freed from the strike fonnation, but not
dwing Wild Weasel I. In these subsequent cases the Weasels became the first into the
target area on large strike missions, "stirring up" the enemy defenses in the hopes of fmding
an SA-2 battalion.(28) The first time a hunter-killer flight first succeeded in doing what the
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Weasels set out to do, however, did not occur as part of a larger mission. It was a pre-
planned strike against a suspected location of an SA-2 site.
On 22 December, 1965, an F-lOOF crewed by Captains AI Lamb and Jack
Donovan, found and successfully attacked an SA-2 battalion near Yen Bai, North
Vietnam. Spruce flight, consisting of four F-105s with Lamb and Donovan's F-I00,
crossed the North Vietnamese border at 16,000 feet altitude only to be greeted with a
searching Fan Song. After quickly lowering their altitude to put hills and ridges between
their flight and the SA-2, the Weasel-- Spruce Zero-One -- would occasionally "pop-up"
so that Donovan's equipment could get a "fix" on the SA-2. In this manner Lamb would
climb over a ridge, level the wings long enough for Donovan to get a reading, and then
execute a half-barrel roll into the next valley. Each succeeding valley ran perpendicular to
the site, so the flight followed the leader up and down each valley.(29) The flight proftle is
shown in Figure XVI.
Each pop-up exposed the Vector's sensitive antennas to bursts of Fan Song radar
energy from a slightly different relative bearing than the bearing noted after the previous
pop-up. The hard maneuvers caused a force varying from four to six times that of gravity
to be almost continually exerted upon aircraft and crew. (30) Under these kinds of
conditions it would have been extremely difficult, ifnot impossible, for Donovan to make
fme tuning adjustments to his IR-133. The Vector scope was the most practical to use
during these maneuvers. Donovan kept track of these changes by looking at the Vector's
scope display and kept Lamb constantly updated on the situation.(31)
This particular mission showed the role crew judgment played in detennining
range. The Vector did not receive a noticeable "burst" from the Fan Song until its antennas
had an unobstructed path to the radar. Each successive pass through a mountain valley
saw the signal grow larger on the vector as the range diminished. but an educated guess as
to the approximate location to the site could be made based on how high the Weasel had
to fly above the intervening terrain in order for the Vector to register the Fan Song.(32)
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Soon, the Weasel had no more hills for hiding, and it emerged over a ~ide, flat
plain, quite vulnerable to any radar. "Bang!" Recalled Donovan. "The Vector scope had a
two and one-half ring strobe."(33) There were three concentric circles, or "rings" on the
Vector Scope. Two-and-one-half rings meant that the strobe was so long it nearly reached
the edge of the scope. By this time, the Fan Song switched to a high pulse repetition
frequency that enabled faster updates of target information. The higher octave tone in the
electronic warfare officer's ears associated with this switch indicated that the SA-2 crew
was refIning the target data in preparation for launch. Although the Weasel had managed
for a time to sneak in "behind" the main lobe, the element of surprise was no longer in the
Americans' favor. Continuing their maneuvers, the Weasel attracted the attention of the
other nearby SA-2 site as well as some anti-aircraftfire control radars. Donovan's Vector
"started looking like a Christmas tree" as it tried to sort out all the radar signals. Still, there
was no SA-2 site to be seen, only "some fields, a tiny village, and some rice paddies." (34)
The Vector strobe jumped to three rings as Lamb popped up to 3500 feet to get a
better look at the village. Ibe site was then spotted. It had been expertly hidden in the
middle of the village with the missiles under thatched huts on the village periphery. The
radar sat alongside a long "hootch," and the white missile tips were barley visible as they
protruded from underneath thatched roofs.(35) Lamb dove on the position, firing all his
2.75 inch diameter high-explosive marking rockets and following that up with 20mm
cannon flre. The four F-105s followed Lamb and Donovan and demolished the site,
although only the lead F-105 pilot actually saw where Lamb fired his rockets. Each
succeeding F-105 pilot, busy trying to keep tabs on the aircraft in front of him while
avoiding the ground, did not pick up the site until the very last minute, either.(36) The
mission, however, was a success. The Wild Weasel I commander sent a message to the Air
Force Chief of Statf: "Wild Weasel sighted SAM, destroyed same."(37) A White House-
directed bombing halt implemented a few days later suspended all further combat flights
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over North Vietnam until well after the New Year. The combat test of Wild Weasel I came
to an end about one month later.
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Chapter Nine
Transfonnation: Tactical Electronic Combat Is Reborn
A new element, the Wild WeaseL had been added to the US Air Force tactical
combat system, and as was seen in the prior chapter, the process of integration for this
aircnift was rather complex. As both element and system were adapted to each other, the
system itself began to change. The Wild WeaseL however, had yet to be fully integrated
into the larger system for two main reasons. One, the process of adaptation was far from
finished by the Spring of 1966 because the F-100F's were to be replaced with faster and
more compatible F-IOSF's. Two, the elements which could best provide mutual support
for the Weasels, technologies such as anti-radiation missiles and jamming pods had yet to
arrive in Southeast Asia.
Consequently, the Weasels remained extremely vulnerable to the air defenses, and
attrition rates for Weasel crews were high. Shortly after the bombing pause ended, two
more Weasel F-100F's went down, bringing the tota1losses to three out of the four original
1'-100F's by February, 1966. Follow-on Weasel training programs, originally designed to
build up the reserve of Weasel crews, merely served at this time to replace the combat
losses. Three new 1'-100's quickly appeared and brought the total available back up to
four. (1) These aircraf~ the harbingers of tactical electronic combat in the age of missiles,
would soon be joined by other technologies in a continuous process of integration.
Some of the new additions to the American combat system in 1966 were the
cornerstones of tactical electronic combat. New versions of Weasel aircraft, EF-105F's of
the Wild Weasel ill program soon made their appearance, with the 1'-100's being phased
out by July.(2) The Navy's AGM-45 Shrike missile was modified to be carried by both the
F-IOO and 1'-105 aircraft. Improved versions of the QRC-160 pod were introduced by the
fall. Special teams were deployed throughout the command structure to analyze Air Force
113
electronic warfare etforts. In short, the system whose foundations were laid out by
Dempster's task force in 1965 emerged in nascent form by the end of 1966.
Dempster's task force had a pretty good grasp of what was neededto·defeat an·air
defense system featuring weapons like an SA-2. The Wild Weasel program was the first
step in a deliberate attempt at system-building, not solely a knee-jerk response to a new
threatening technology. New dement') of tactical electronic warfare were constructed in
the hopes of adapting them to the existing system of aerial combat. The mixture of these
new elements with the existing system was intended to produce a new tactical system to
bring the American aircraft back into its familiaf realm of medium-altitude operations. The
Wild Weasel I program was a test program, and when it concluded in January of 1966,
there were eight distinct objectives against which it was measured. These objectives were as
follows:
1) To determine the warning capability of RHAW equipment installed in the Wild
Weasel F-1OOF aircraft.
2) To investigate the effect ofjamming by friendly aircraft on Vector and IR-133
equipment
-3) To determine the homing accuracy of the RHAW equipment and the capability
of the crew to place the aircraft within visual range of the target.
4) To develop tactics for employing the Wild Weasel aircraft against SAM defense
system').
5) To determine maintenance requirements and reliability ofRHAW equipment
6) To determine the organizational and manning requirements for Wild Weasel
operations.
7) To detennine training requirements for flight crews and RHAW maintenance
personnel
8) To test any additional equipment which may be made available for this system
during the period of operational test and evaluation.(3)
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Only one of the eight objectives specifically referred to development of combat tactics to
defeat the SA-2. To the ainnen flying over North Vietnam, the whole point of the Wild
Weasel I program was to see if the F-100F could suppress the SA-2, but in creating a
program of electronic warfare there were other factors to be considered.
Objectives one, three, five, and seven, each pertaining to the radar homing and
warning (RHAW) devices, show that the scope of the test went beyond a single type of
aircraft. Although fighter RHAW gear was peculiar only to the Weasel and certain Navy
aircraft in 1965, Dempster's task force intended to equip all F-105 fighter aircraft with this
RHAW technology. The Air Force had ordered over five-hundred of Applied Technology
Incorporated's (ATI) radar homing sets by awarding AII a contract for them on 19
November 1965.(4) Lessons ·and recommendations from the Weasel program could save
time and money in an Air Force-wide RHAW gear installation and maintenance program.
Wild Weasel crews also recommended changes and modifications for follow-on
programs. There were also recommendations for the maintenance program as well. These
planned changes were all included in the [mal report of this tes~ printed in March of 1966
and distributed to all the major Air Force commands, research centers and tactical fighter
wings. (5) The recommended classroom and flight simulator training for new volunteer
crews totaled a minimum of forty-three hours of instruction. Half of these hours consisted
of "flight" time in an F-100F simulator, approximately twelve hours were focused on the
operation and employment of the radar homing equipment, and eight hours were set aside
for classroom instruction on the North Vietnamese air defenses. (6) Figure XVII shows an
overview of the recommended training classes, while figure xvrn shows an example of a
specific class. Recommendations also covered the training flights in Wild Weasel aircraft.
Nine training flights were recommended, the first of which was designed solely to
familiarize the electronic warfare officer with the F-100F and the second to practice basic
techniques of flight creW coordination. Each of the succeeding missions was planned to be
of increasing difficulty and incorporated combat tactics learned from experiences in
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Southeast Asia. For example, mission number seven was planned to make the crew
understand "problems related to attacking a camouflaged target, " with the hopes of forcing
ainnen to anticipate the North Vietnamese camouflage te"chniques.(7) An example of a
recommended flight training sortie is seen in Figure XIX. Wild Weasel I training flights
back in October, 1965 did not include practice on finding hidden sites. Not only were
many of these training modifications put into effect, but most of the original Weasels
returned to the states to form a cadre of Wild Wea~el instructors. lbe 4531th Fighter
Weapons Schoo~ nicknamed "Wild Weasel College," was established at Nellis Air Force
Base, Nevada in February, 1966.(8)
Wild Weasel III had its origins on 8 JanuaryI966 when General Dempster officially
decided to change the Weasel airframe to a two-seat F-105F and add new electronic
equipment. Switching to a Thud eliminated the problem with F-lOOIF-105 speed
differences, but all versions of the F-l05 had already gone out of production. High losses
would be difficu~t to replace.(9) Equipment changes in Wild Weasel ill were slight, but an
"AZ-EL" system, referring to "azimuth-elevation" gave the crews improved capability in
locating SA-2 sites. If the electronic warfare officer maintained adequate AZ-EL
equipment settings during the fmal phase of a homing run, a green dot would be projected
onto the pilot's windscreen. The position of this dot on the glass was intended to
correspond with the location of the missile site relative to the aircraft, thus helping out in
fmding hidden sites.CIO)
By Spring, 1966, the F-I00F Weasels, and subsequently the F-I05 Weasels, were
mated with what became their weapon of choice, the AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation
missile. This particular ARM was designed to home in on radar transmissions not only
from Fan songs, but also "Fire Can" fire control radars for anti-aircraft artillery. The
Shrike enabled the Wild Weasels to take on SA-2 sites without being forced to enter the
•lethal small arms fIre at the lower altitudes, and could prevent the dangerous tactic of flying
over SA-2 sites in order to pinpoint the location. It carried a flfty-one pound warhead that
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sprayed small steel balls after detonation. (11) This was enough to destroy or at least
seriously damage a radar, but would not destroy the entire site. Therefore, a number of
Shrikes also carried white phosphorus that served as excellent marking tools tor hidden
sites. Over four-hundred Shrikes were fired in 1966, three times that many in 1967, and
when Rolling Thunder was halted in March of 1968 the frring rate would have put the
yearly total over two-thousand.(12) For all the promise offered by this weapon, it too
needed to be adapted.
In order for the ARM to hit a radar, the latter had to be radiating up until the time
of impact. Sensitive receivers in the Shrike's nose were tuned to specific radar frequencies
on the ground prior to the mission. The missile was designed to home in on the strongest
source of electromagnetic radiation in this specific frequency band, the radar antenna itself.
Should the radar be turned off for any reason, the Shrike would have no source for
homing and would "go stupid," missing the intended target. In evaluating the initial uses of
the Shrike, ainnen sometimes mistakenly thought when a radar went "off the air" it was
destroyed.(13) This was not necessarily so, for the North Vietnamese quickly realized what
kind of weapon was being used and either limited their transmission time or shut the radars
ofl entirely.
The early Shrike attacks were conducted in the "lower" Route Packages because
the air defenses there were less dense than those around Hanoi and correspondingly less
capable of providing mutual support. Wild Weasel crews could thcn practice against
isolated sites. Also, with less radars around, the possibility was lessened that the Sluike
receivers would get confused from multiple radar emissions coming from various
directions.(14)
ThcftrSt Shrike attack occurred on 18 April 1966.(15) An Iron Hand flight of
three single-seat F-105D's and a two-seat F-105F Weasel encountered a single fire control
radar about six miles northwest of Dong Ho~ North Vietnam. The missile was fIred at the
site, even though the latter could not be seen due to intervening clouds. The missile
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disappeared into these clouds, but the radar went off the air shortly thereafter. The
remainder of the defenses soon reacted and severely limited the transmission time of their
radars, which, according to an Air Force report on the Shrike missile, became "intermittent
and sporadic in nature." Thus the Wild Weasel could neutralize a site not only by
destroying it but also by intimidating the operators, although this was not the first time the
Weasels forced Fan Song radars ofIthe air.(16)
Launching Shrikes also brought dangers. Ibe Shrike, though an important weapon,
often required flying into the heart of the SA-2's lethal envelope. The range at which the
Slu1ke could be effectively employed was no more than twelve miles from the fan Song
radar, which was only about one-half the SA-2's maximum effective range at the typical
Wild Weasel flight altitude. Also, the maximum speed of the Shrike was Mach 2.0, a little
more than half the SA-2s maximum speed of mach 3.5.(17) Because of these
characteristics, the aircrew intentionally had to make a target out of themselves, trying to
keep the Fan Song radar on the air long enough for the anti-radiation missile to hit its
target. If the SA-2 site frred upon the WeaseL the aircrew could only hope that they had
frred soon enough for the slower Shrike to hit the Fan Song before the accelerating
Guideline hit their own aircraft. At best, the Weasel would be forced into a violent evasive
maneuver to avoid the oncoming missile.
The effective ranges of the Shrike and Guideline had forced the Wea~els to develop
new tactics based on the limitations of their ARM. Prior to launch, a Weasels began to
"loft" the missile, which meant the aircraft had to pull up into a climb just prior to
frring.(18) This started the missile out on a higher trajectory which increased its effective
range almost to that of the Guideline's. This tactic also had its drawbacks. As it was, Iron
Hand flights, due to their peculiar flight paths, were the focus of special attention from the
North Vietnamese defenses and this method of "lofting" the missile invited additional
trouble. The climb would slow the aircraft down, making it relatively more vulnerable to
any nearby threat\). Each side in this deadly game of cat and mouse could monitor the
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other's actions. SA-2 radar operators attempting to shoot down Weasels could aLl)o track
an incoming Shrike on the Fan Song's radar scopes. Of course, the very act of tracking the
Shrike led the ARM to its prey, so the radar would have to be shut ofl to prevent homing.
The frre-control battery could no longer direct the Guideline if the radar stopped
transmitting. For the American airmen this meant that if the SA-2 radar was shut down,
'.
that particular SA-2 system ceased to be a threat to the strike force. Any Guidelines
already airborne were reduced to flying like oversized bullets with large warheads.
The Shrike appeared to have a deftnite impact on North Vietnamese air defense
operations as seen in Figure XX. Data for Shrike use between October 1967 and March
1968 are instructive, even though they pertain to a period beyond the focus of this study. In
comparing Shrikes fIred and not fIred against SA-2s within fifteen miles of potential
targets, there is a clear correlation between Shrikes frred and the potential effect on SA-2
operations. When SA-2's engaged a target by radiating their Fan Songs and no Shrikes
were ftred, 250 missile launches (of at least one missile each) were observed out of 560
radar engagements. During this same time period, 309 radar engagements were met with
Shrikes. Of these, only 16 launches were observed.(19)
As 1966 progressed, newly integrated munitions freed the Iron Hand flights from
having to overfly the site directly in level flight to drop area weapons. Improved cluster-
bombs like the CBlJ-24 and CBU-29 did not require a level low-altitude release like their
predecessor, the CBU-2A. This allowed for relatively safer dive-bombing runs to be used
against the sites.(20) Once the bomblets had dispersed and exploded over the area to
suppress the site defenders, the rest of the Iron Hand flight could then destroy the site and
its equipment with heavier ordnance. The Wild Weasel\) and their Iron Hand missions in
1966 were markedly different than what originally was done in 1965.
To summarize the Wild Weasel program in 1966, the most significant change
occurred when the EF-105F was introduced to the force and then mated with the Shrike.
The speed difference between the F-100's and F-105's were no longer a factor in the Iron
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INFLUENCE OF SHRIKE ON SA~ REACTION(Oct 19C7'=~'1ar 196TIT-------
Reactions (missile launch) were compared vlhen Shrikes were launched/not
launched and a potential target was within 15NM of an occupied site. The
follovJing chart sho\'/s results:
NOT SHRIKED SHRI1~EIJ
OPPORTUNITI ES REACTED OPPORTUNITIE~ REACTED
----
Oct 174 59 58 3
Nov (17 18 19 20) * 43 36 38 5
Nov (1-16 21- 30 ) 60 21 30 0
Dec 80 42 34 0
Jan 49 30 69 1
I='eb 90 37 35 2
lIar 64 25 45 5
TOT,Il.LS 560 250 309 16
* These four days are Dresenterl separate from the renainder of rlover.1ber,
because of the unusually high nUMber of SAM reactlons noted. On these
days, strikr.s involving unusually large number of aircraft, were conducted
against ~/ell defended targets in the hiiJh SAn threat area i:hich resulted
in the launching of approximately 130 SAi'ls.
FIGURE XX
Hand flights and strike fonnations. With the F-1OOF being phased out and the EF-I05F
assuming its place, American hunter-killer flights became rather formidable weapons. Now,
all strike aircraft flew at similar airspeeds. Although shrike employment was disc1.L"sed
earlier, it is important to point out that when a Weasel fired a Shrike the radar site was
inunediately put on the defensive, allowing the Iron Hand flight quickly to close the range
to the site. Also, even though a Shrike did not knock out the radar, if a white phosphorus
version was used, it" warhead would detonate and leave a clearly identified column of
white smoke in the site's vicinity. (21) New elements continued to be added to the tactical
air combat system.
Another USAF element began its process of adaptation to the aerial combat system
on 26 September, 1966. Twenty-five redesigned QRC-160-1 pods began their "combat
evaluation" over hostile skies, and were soon supplemented by almost identical ALQ-71
pods (22) The 355th Tactical Fighter Wing was chosen to conduct a combat evaluation of
the QRC pod over the skies of North Vietnam.(23) The jammers in the pods were tuned to
the known frequencies of radars which directly threatened the aircraft, like the Fan Song or
the Fire Can. Initially, these evaluation missions were flown in low-threat areas, but pod-
equipped aircraft were soon facing the heaviest North Vietnamese air defenses.
Pods were relatively simple for the F-105 pilot') to use. There would be one control
box for each pod attached to the aircraf~ up to a maximum of two. Immediately after take-
off, the pilot turned the selector switch on the control box to the "standby" position. This
allowed the pod to "wann-up" prior to actual use. The pilot would then see a white
"number one" light illuminate if the pod wanned up. If this occurred he subsequently
turned the selector knob to the "transmit" position for use in combat.(24) There were a
total of four color-coded lights on the control panel pertaining to the pod's operation, and a
relatively simple "troubleshooting" checklist was provided in case the proper lights were not
illuminated.(25) That the above technology was easily operated by the pilots was an
important part of the process of adaptation. The introduction of more complex equipment
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that required a pilot to keep his attention inside ht;.e cockpit rather than outside would have
invited trouble, because the pilot would either spend too much time trying to operate the
device at the expense of performing his mission or give up on the device altogether in order
to fly the mission properly. Therefore, the process of adaptation has its subtleties.
Less subtle was the challenging task of adjusting combat tactics to allow for the use
of these pods. While carrying pods, it was important for the fighters to fly what was called
a "pod formation." One pod acting alone was often insufficient to counter the Fan Song
radars. It was the combined radiation patterns of all the flight's pods which produced the
desired results. This pod fonnation was much more compact than what was preferred to
be flown by pilots. It placed the flight's aircraft much closer together than was considered
practical for flying into an area threatened by enemy fighter aircraft, reducing the overall
field ofview for the flight. Pilots entering enemy airspace preferred to be flying farther
apart than what the pod formation would allow, so the actual pod formations flown in
combat were a compromise. Consequently, they were different than the "optimum
formation." recommended by stateside testing, as seen in Figures XXI, XXII, and
XXIII. (26)
The pods also forced changes in tactics when SA-2launches occurred. Usually, a
pod-equipped flight would continue along the same flight path at medium altitude without
maneuvering when an SA-2 was launched at them. The flight leader would initiate evasive
maneuvers if he determined that the SA-2 wa') undeterred by the jamming. Even then, the
maneuvers would often be in the vertical plane (usually a dive) at a relatively shallow angle
so as to not interfere with the pod's radiation patterns. Horizontal plane maneuvers that
entailed large bank angles were avoided when possible since a banked aircraft would direct
radiation away from the site and leave the Fan song unjammed.(27) Each flight strived to
maintain its tight formation despite these conditions in order to prevent the loss of flight
integrity.
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According to reports written just after the September-October pod flights, despite
presenting themselves "as a straight and level non-evasive target at 85mm and SA-2 point-
blank altitude, " no fire was directed at the pod-equipped aircraft, (28) If any fire at all was
directed at these targets, it was nowhere near the mark. The "fIghters were able to go
relatively unmolested into the target area at altitudes between 10,000 and 17,000 feet."
Some aircraft even flew "racetrack" patterns in target areas, orbiting at altitudes once
dominated by the SA-2. Only a year prior, such tactics would have proved disastrous in
SA-2 defended regions. The North Vietnamese were not just taking the day off. Some
aircraft did not have pods, and were rudely awakened by anti-aircraft fire. In one flight of
four F-105s, two did not carry pods. "They received 37mm, 57mm, and 85mm fire, and
one SAM (SA-2) passed nearby," according to the post-mission report. This evidence
reflected the perils of incomplete pod formations. (29)
The Pacilic Air Forces conducted a study of these pods' effectiveness from
September through December of 1966. (30) The report's authors were hesitant to point to
any single conclusive fInding as evidence of the pods' unequivocal success, but noted that a
combination of factors were quite telling. The loss rate for pod-equipped F-I05's flying
missions in "Route Pack Six" in November and December was less than one-third of the
loss rates sustained in the same area for F-105's prior to the pods' arrival.(31) Evasive
maneuvers by F-105 formations became less frequent after the pods were introduced.
Between July and September, over 50 percent ofF-105 flights performed evasive action
during SA-21aunches. From October to December that number was reduced to less than
10 percent.(32) Finally, the SA-2 missiles were reported to be having problems in tracking
their prey and were missing their targets by greater distances after the pods were used than
before they were introduced. Between July.and September, of the almost sixty "miss-
distances" (i.e. SA-2's launched at their flight resulting in a miss) reported by F-105
flights, about thirty misses were by less than 1000 feet and the rest were greater than 1000
feet (The SA-2 needed to get within 200 feet to cause damage). After the pods were used,
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twenty-two of the twenty nine reportedpnUss-distances were greater than 1000 feet. (33)
Also, the number of sorties jettisoning ordnance due to SA-2launches declined steadily
from August until the end of the year. (34)
The medium altitudes, once denied to the American ainnen, were again open for
grabs in 1966. The door had opened a crack, and the US Air Force was trying to pry it
wide open. With the pods now appearing to confuse the ground threats, bombing missions
were immediately restored to the medium altitudes. The EB-66's were freed from their
SA-Z-jamming role and allowed to concentrate on a greater segment of the North
Vietnamese air defenses. Iron Hand flights gained a measure of self-protection and were
better able to carry out their mission. Ifftred upon by SA-2 sites I the Iron Hand flights,
rather than immediately descending into the waiting anti-aircraft fire, could instead assume
a pod formation. Wild Weasel crews had to be careful when choosing to use this
formation because the podc;' jamming would wreak havoc with their own sensitive radar
warning gear.(35) The successful integration of these new electronic combat technologies
was an ominous sign for the defenses.
The North Vietnamese did not back down so easily. The value of successfully
integrated weapons in air defense was obvious to the air defense system because the new
Vietnamese MIG-21 interceptors picked up where the SA-2s were slipping. The new
MIG-21 'S, out in force since April of 1966, contested the American attempts to control the
skies. For example I the numbers of American sorties jettisoning their bombs to fend off
MIG attacks were significantly higher in the fall of 1966 than comparable figures for SA-
2's and ground fire.(36) All things considered, the US Air Force made successful changes
in the ways it went about it business of flying tactical combat missions.
Some changes were less obvio\lc;. Along with these ~ew technologies came two
organized efforts to understand the new technologies' impacts on the USAF system. These
were called Anti-SAM Combat Assistance Teams and Comfy Coat.(37) Anti-SAM
Combat Assistance Teams (ASCAT) arrived in theater with the first Wild Weasels in 1965,
123
- ---- -_._--~----
and were also farmed out to most Air Force ~ings. Each ASCAT team, consisting of a
pilot and electronic warfare officer, quickly became an integral part of a wing commander's
staff. The focus of the Anti-SAM effort was narrowed to the electronic combat equipment
and its associated tactics. These teams also monitored the equipment's perfonnance and
recommended improvements. Comfy Coat and ASCAT were two examples of a rapidly
expanding command network handling all electronic warfare operations in Southeast Asia.
Headquarters US Air Force initiated the "Comfy Coat" program in October 1966
"to develop the capability for comprehensive evaluation of US Air Force electronic warfare
effectiveness in Southeast Asia combat operations (pertaining to) electronic warfare
support, self-protection, Wild Wease~ anti-radiation missile operations, and RHAW"
equipment,(38) This evaluation program was conducted under the guidance of the US Air
Force Security Service, then based in San Antonio, Texas. The Comfy Coat team did not
physically arrive in Southeast Asia until July 1967. Representatives from Comfy Coat
made their way to most major American air bases and worked directly with the wings.
Although most of the Comfy Coat activity falls outside the scope of this study, it is
useful in tenns of system-building. The ComfY Coat reports usually came in two varieties:
immediate reaction reports (IRR) and monthly summaries (MSR) The frrst IRR came out
on 9 March 1967 and the frrst MSR at the end of that same month. The IRR's analyzed
specific events in detail, with "every element pertaining to the mission exhaustively
scrutinized and reconstructed for evaluation." (39) Data from the missions, characteristics
of the electronic warfare equipment, American air tactics, and North Vietnamese tactics
were just some of the areas investigated. Monthly reports were constructed in a similar
way. In its final report for Rolling Thunder, Comfy Coat showed that the probabilities for
the Air Force's weapons to actually destroy an SA-2 site was quite low --less than 20
percent -- even with later improvements of anti-radiation missiles. What the final report did
show was the rather timid North Vietnamese actions when faced with aggressive American
electronic combat methods (40)
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show was the rather timid North Vietnamese actions when faced ~ith aggressive American
electronic combat methods (40)
One set of data helps to illustrate the effects of the integrated electronic combat
elements. The ratio of SA-2 missiles fired to aircraft lost was 12 to 1 in 1965. This ratio
jumped to 30 to 1 during 1966. April through October 1967 saw an 83 to 1 ratio.(41)
Although the number of missiles fired per aircraft lost is not by itself crucial in determining
the SA-2's effectiveness, the trend is important. Certainly, other factors must be considered
when examining the performance of the American tactical air combat system, but it is clear
that tactical electronic warfare had emerged in nascent form by the end of 1966. A little
over a year after Leopard 02 was downed by an SA-2, the US Air Force system had
evolved into a new form. It was to keep this basic structure throughout the rest of the
Rolling Thunder operations. As each new electronic combat technology was integrated into
the this system, as each element was adapted, the air attack system recovered an extra
degree of freedom of operations over the North Vietnamese skies.
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Conclusion
The air combat operations during Rolling Thunder in 1965 and 1966 resembled
Van Creveld's generalization of two large systems slugging it out in the skies in a slow war
of attrition. That it took well over a year for the US Air Force to regain their freedom of
operations and that the ground-based air defenses would rarely deny the use of these
altitudes after 1966 suggest that both the North Vietnamese air defense system and the US
Air Force tactical air combat system might have been relatively inflexible. With these
systems, the high ground in combat was taken by the side possessing a technological edge,
and that advantage remained as long as the technological gap remained.
This "edge" was provided by self-contained platforms like the SA-2 and Wild
Weasel. Each platform was capable of acquiring and attracting targets on its own. The
effectiveness of these weapons stemmed both from their newness what seemed to be their
ability to stand apart from the larger, inflexible combat systems of which they were a part.
While the former factor is rather obvious, the latter requires a closer look at the relation
between an individual weapon and its system, specifically the process of integration.
The SA-2, while a threat in its own right, depended upon integration into the air
defense system not only for it~ own success as a weapon but also for its very survival. The
system's detection elements, for example, continuously fed information to an SA-2
battalion. First, this allowed the latter to remain off the air and not reveal the site's location
until the last possible moment. Second., the radar operators would already know where to
look for their target, thus allowing for a faster launch. Meanwhile, the anti-aircraft artillery
covered the low altitudes which American fighters used to avoid the SA-2, and shot down
many aircraft as a result. North Vietnamese fighters could track the progress of American
strike formations and could also attack in an attempt to scatter the American formations. It
was the combined actions of all these elements which contributed to the SA-2's
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effectiveness, and it has already been shown what the North Vietnamese air defense system
did to the US Air Force in 1965 and 1966.
The integration of new American technologies neutralized the threat posed by the
North Vietnamese air defenses and restored freedom in US Air Force medium and high
altitude operations. A single technology like the Weasel or even several technologies
weren't by themselves responsible for overcoming the defenses. Were Guidelines not fIred
because a Weasel was feared to be nearby? Or, was it because the SA-2 operators gave up
trying to overcome the jamming from pods? Was a Shrike effective after it was launched
on its way to a specific radar? Or, while it was still carried aboard an Iron Hand flight
prowling within range of several radars? The answer to each of these questions is ''yes.''
Many Weasel crews forced an SA-2 battalion to shut off its Fan Song radar merely by
heading directly for the site or feigning a Shrike launch. Those radars that remained on the
air were potential beacons for Shrike missiles. North Vietnamese radar operators who
could not handle the jamming from a pod formation either did not fIre their missiles or
fired blindly. In short, the blows of the SA-2 battalions were parried by jamming pods
while the thrusts of the hunter-killer teams forced the battalions on the defensive. Although
the air defenses continued to grow and remained a lethal threat during the rest of Rolling
Thunder, the SA-2 would no longer dominate the air as it had in 1965 and 1966.
The North Vietnamese air defenses were highly integrated and highly coordinated,
but the nature of the system played an important role in its combat employment. In this
system most every tactical decision came out of Hanoi. Soviet air defense doctrine did not
leave much autonomy in the hands of the lower levels of command. As long as the lines of
commtmication from the control center to the various elements remained unobstructed and
the Americans remained fairly predictable, this system worked quite effectively. Given that
flexibility is governed by the nature of the system and that this system was highly ordered,
we can conclude that the North Vietnamese air defense system was to a large degree
inflexible as long as strong Soviet influences remained. Furthermore, this condition does
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not seem to be influenced more by the process of integration than it was by social and
cultural factors. The same holds true for the US Air Force system.
The inflexibility in the US Air Force tactical combat system seems also to have
been caused by a similar situation of centralized control. That US planes could not bomb
most targets without President Johnson's specific pennission is an indicator of the lack of
autonomy present in the American air combat system. The US Air Force leadership at the
highest levels also shared this centralized control with the Johnson Administration. The
Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, thousands of miles from its nearest subordinates, tried to
maintain tight control of daily air operations over North Vietnam. This was not always the
case, however. For example, each Air Force strike mission, although planned at the highest
levels, was thoroughly reviewed by those who were to do the flying. Once launched,
tactical decisions were usually left in the hands of the American force commander in the
lead flight of Thuds. He was well aware of what to do in case the primary target could not
be struck or if some other unforeseen problem arose, and could still execute decisions in
the absence of radio contact with the Second Air Division or even PACAF Headquarters.
By the same token, he might also be leading his flight down the same route that was
used the day before or even minutes before. Some of his aircraft may not have been
carrying full loads of bombs due to ordnance loading problems or because of higher
headquarters' demands for increased sortie rates, bombs or no bombs. His target might
have been one of dubious tactical value even though his superiors might have been well
aware that a convoy carrying Guideline missile reloads was intentionally left untouched that
day. Whatever the source of control, whatever the political restrictions in force at the time,
and regardless of whether or not airpower could do what either the Johnson Administration
or the Air Foree leadership though it could do, the constraints placed on air operations
greatly exacerbated the immediate tactical problem posed by the SA-2 and the North
Vietnamese air defenses in 1965. Fully a year elapsed after the first SA-2launch before
the US Air Force combat system came to terms with its foe.
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In retrospec~ the limitations imposed on the Air Force system accidentally may
have turned out to be of long-tenn benefit to tactical electronic warfare. Had the missile
sites and the resetVe supply of North Vietnamese SA-2's been targeted and struck, perhaps
the impact of the surface to air missile would have been less felt in the tactical air
community. This mayor may not have lessened the urgency -- or perhaps might have
even delayed the creation of -- Dempster's task force. The Air Force's tactical electronic
warfare program may well have remained donnant or only partially developed.
With regard to the nature of technological change, the focus of this study is too
narrow for any sweeping generalizations to be made. However, historians of technology
would be well-served to consider the role that the operators play when technological
change occurs within a system. In this specific case of using Wild Weasels to combat air
defenses, the operators helped to bring about changes in training, tactics, the design of new
technologies and even Air Force doctrine because in this case the system allowed for a high
degree of operator input. This seemed unusual in an organization which otherwise
appeared to prefer distant, centralized control of the planning and execution of air
operations. Most historians of technology would probably assume that a huge, hierarchical
system like that of the US Air Force would not allow for operators to have such decision-
making power, but unless a view from "the bottom up" had been taken, a case like this will
most likely go unnoticed. Each system, however, has its own unique dynamics and the
people using the technology in question will play different roles within different systems.
To be sure, the advent of a new technology by one side does not necessarily
produce a natural technological response by the other side. Other studies of response
patterns in military systems -- and even in non-military systems -- will shed more light on
O'Connell's promising concept of counter-responses. The transformed North Vietnamese
air defenSe system, and not just a surface-to-air missile, elicited a US Air Force response in
electronic warfare technologies and concepts, which, when combined to the existing air
combat system produced a powerful new system of tactical air combat. The process by
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which this new Air Force combat system emerged was part evolution and part, system
building. If the rifle forced an abandonment of musket-based Napoleonic tactics the SA-2
forced the Air Force to discard the doctrine dictating tactical air operations up until July of
1965.
This study shows additional- factors, such as a system's nature and the process of
adaptation, that historians might consider when they examine military systems and
technological change within them. What does it mean exactly to have an "integrated"
system? There are many possible interpretations. For example during the Wild Weasel I
test program, the decision to tie the hunter-killer flights to the strike force could be seen as
a process of integration where a heretofore autonomous element -- the hunter-killer flight --
lost its effectiveness because it was denied freedom of operation. However, it could also be
seen as poor employment of a new weapon. Hunter-killer flights were no less integrated in
1966 when they preceded the strike force into the target area and stayed there after the
strikers left, but here the Weasels' employment better matched their capabilities. Does
integration in modern warfare simply mean that the elements can communicate and
coordinate with each other or, more ominously, that some central force has taken control
by forcing intermediate-level humans out of the decision-making loop? This latter
definition, in fact, seems to be what Van Creveld was trying to emphasize. Yet the
operators, the humans, seem to be alive and well in the age of computers, electronics, and
integrated warfare. It can only be concluded that the relation between systems integration
and modern warfare needs further study.
The strobe on a Weasel's Vector or the blip on the Fan Song's radar represented to
the operator more than an electronic display. Ultimately, it represented another human
trying to kill him. The struggle that is modem air warfare is more than a clash of
technologies. It is a struggle between people. Combat tactics used by one side not only
took into account the capabilities of the individual operators and their weapons, but also the
perceived abilities of the opponents. The SA-2s denied the medium altitudes because
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ainnen weie afraid of it. Siinilartv', the SA-2s lost their dominant position because their
operators were intimidated by Wild Weasels. As in any conflict, it was as much a challenge
to control the actions of one's own forces in combat as it was to predict the respon~e of the
opponent. Ultimately, either one side would win, the other would lose, or both would
retreat to lick their wounds. To these ends, warfare has not changed.
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1. This study strives to remain within the realm of USAF tactical air operations
directed against North Vietnam in 1965-1966. Very little mention will be made in this ~
essay of either US Navy or Marine Corps air operations. This in no way intends to detract
from the others' roles; I had to narrow the scope of this paper in order to make it
manageable for a master's thesis.
2. See Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North
Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989) and Earl Tilford, Jr. Crqsswinds: The Air Force's
Setup in Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University, 1993).
3. As will be seen later, the Navy configured its own aircraft for a similar purpose but
did not continue operations with a dedicated "Wild Weasel" type aircraft after the Vietnam
conflict. On the otheJtand, the Air Force continues to maintain a Wild Weasel force until
the time of this writing.Wild Weasels are but one part of a multifaceted approach to
electronic combat. ClUTent US Air Force doctrine, as explicitly stated in Air Force Manual
1-1: "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force," (Vol IT page 191) calls
electronic combat "a sine qua non of modem warfare, particularly for airmen." One would
be hard-pressed to fmd such a claim in Air Force doctrine in 1965.
4. Alex Roland's "Technology and War: The Historiographical Revolution of the
1980's," (Technology and Culture Jan 93.) reviewed many major works of the last decade.
See also John Ellis, Social History of the Machine Gun London, 1976 ; IB Holley, Ideas
and Weapons, Yale University Press, 1953; Alex Roland, "Secrecy, Technology and War:
Greek Fire and the Defense of Byzantium" Technology & Culture (Oct 1992); Kemp,
Pfaltzgraft and Ra'anan The Other Arms Race: New Technologies and Non-Nuclear
Conflict, Toronto: Lexington Books, 1975; K.Perkins. Weapons and Warfare:
Conventional Weapons and Their Roles in Battle, New York: Brasseys, 1987~Trevor
Dupuy The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, New York: The Bobbs-Merill Co.,1980.
The Journal of Military History has featured several articles involving military technology
since 1989. Some include: George Raudzens "War-winning weapons: The
Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military History" 54(Oct 1990); Daniel
. Kuehl "Refighting the Last War: Electronic Warfare and USAF B-29 Operations in the
Korean War," 56(Jan 1992); Roland, "Technology, Ground Warfare and Strategy: The
Paradox of American Experience." 5S(Oct 1991);Kenneth Werrell "'The Weapon the
Military Did Not Want: The Modem Strategic Cruise Missile," S3 (Oct 1989).
5. Martin Van Creveld Technology and War, New York: The Free Press, 1989, p279.
Specifically, I refer to his chapter called "Integrated War."
6. Van Creveld Technology and War p280
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7. By using the term "weapon", I refer here not only to an actual weapon but also to
relatedmilitary technology whicn can Unprove the-effectiveness ofilieseWeapons. Thus,
for the purposes of this essay, the terms "weapon" and "technology" will be used
interchangeably. For example, with reference to a modem electronic battlefield, weapons
refer to new cannon as well as new fire control system enabling the cannon to be fired with
unsurpassed accuracy. Other examples would be an improved version of a jet fighter or
an electronic jamming pod which disrupts air defense radars and can be attached to any
fighter aircraft.
8. The users of the technology in combat and the decision-makers who first
introduced the technology into the system are generally two separate entities. I define
"operators" as the individuals -- the troops, airmen, sailors, marines -- who use the
technology in daily combat operations. "Decision-makers" refer to those who have the
authority or ability -- commanders, procurement officers, government contractors -- to
introduce or deny the introduction of a new technology to a particular military system. The
degree of ease in communication between these two groups generally determines how
quickly and effectively a new weapon becomes integrated into the overall system.
9. One wonders, for example, what might have happened if the Germans were better
prepared to react quickly to the gas-induced gaping hole in the French lines at Ypres in
1915. In 1940, British and French tanks were far superior to the German panzers in
numbers, armor thickness and firepower. Yet in the Blitzkrieg across France the Allied
annor was usually out-fought by their German counterparts.
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copies of this report at the USAFHRA or in the records of the PACAF Historian (Hickam
AFB, Hawaii). The written accounts conflict with a 1985 video interview (see below) with
one of the pilots in Leopard flight. They refer to "02" being hit while the pilot says it was
"04." I chose to use the pilot's account.
A hard-to-find but informative video on the Wild Weasel program includes an
account of this july mission; see Patti King, prod. First In. Last Out (The BDM
Corporation, 1985) hereafter referred to as "First In, Last Out."
11. John Morocco, 'Thunder From Above, Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1984
p 106. For fIghter operations over Vietnam see also R. Frank Futrell, ed. Aces and Aerial
Victories, (Washington DC: Headquarters, USAF, 1976).
12. William A.Hewitt, "Planting the Seeds of SEAD," Maxwell AFB, Alabama: School
of Advanced Airpower Studies Thesis, 1993 p 1. For a description of Airborne control
and I'vflG warning see Berger, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast
Asia. Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977
13. Morocco, Thunder From Above, p.106
14. "Wild Weasel I: Response to a Challenge," p.l1
15. Ibid, p.9
16. For one account of Lyndon Johnson's rationale behind the prosecution of the
Rolling Thunder campaign, see Doris Keams, Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream,
New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
The micro-management of the Vietnam air war by the Johnson Administration is
an important factor for any historian to consider when analyzing OS aerial operations in
Southeast Asia through 1968. It is not, however, the only reason Rolling 'Thunder turned
out to be just a rumble as has been shown in the studies by Earl Tilford, Jr. and Mark
Clodfelter, Air Force historians critical of the way the US Air Forc.e fought the Vietnam
war. See Tilford, Crosswinds: 1be Air Force's Setup in Vietnam and Clodfelter, The
Limits of Aimower.
17. Air Force General-M~ior Mikhailllyich Fesenko, "The Vietnam Syndrome:Uneven
Play," Aviation and Cosmonautics no 7 (July, 1992). (Translated by Peter Vorobeift~
Lehigh University).
18. For a look at the former SOviet Union's air defenses see David Isbey, Weapons and
Tactics of the Soviet Army London: Jane's Publishing company, 1988. Many Russian
veterans of Vietnam were SA-2 advisors/operators, and only recently have they been
136
allowed to organize open veteran's groups. The Vietnam Veterans of America and
Veterans for Peace have esti5lislieacontact·willimanYRl1Ssianveteran.(especiaTIyUiose
from the conflict in Afghanistan, who suffer trom post-traumatic stress syndrome. These
Russian operators represent an untapped, Valuable source for studies covering air
operations in Southeast Asia.
19. For a historical treatment of US electronic reconnaissance operations, see John T.
Farquhar "A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning,
1945-1953 " Ohio State University: PhD dissertation, 1991 and Volumes I and II of Alfred
Price, History of US Electronic Warfare. One RB-66B strayed 100 miles off course and
into East German airspace in 1964. It was shot down by Soviet fighters. The crew
survived and returned to the West a few weeks later.
At this time, the aircraft were referred to as "RE-66's." The nomenclature "EB-66"
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EB-66 EWO Col Bill Jahn, USAF (Ret) April, 1994.)
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